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The government of Ghana borrows from both domestic and foreign sources to finance the budget 
deficit. By the year 2013, the domestic debt was 55% of the public debt. Government domestic 
borrowing is competitive and can potentially crowd out the private corporate sector. Therefore, 
the specific research problem addressed in this study was whether the Ghanaian government’s 
domestic debt (DEBT) caused financial crowding out (FCO) in Ghana. FCO theory is not 
conclusive and not proven specifically for Ghana, so the purpose of this research was to 
investigate its presence in Ghana. The neoclassical theory of FCO underpinned the research. The 
2 research questions investigated FCO along the quantity and cost channels. The research 
examined the relationship between DEBT as the independent variable, the quantity of private 
sector credit (PSCREDIT), and the net interest margin (NIM) of banks as dependent variables. 
Covariates were macroeconomic and banking industry variables. The research population was 
the banking sector of the financial services industry. The research was correlational, and it used 
time series data from the Bank of Ghana and the World Bank. Data analysis used the 
autoregressive distributed lag method. The analysis returned a negative relationship between 
DEBT and PSCREDIT, and a positve relationship between NIM and DEBT. These results 
indicated the presence of FCO along both the quantity and cost channels. The research provides 
policymakers a means of quantifying the extent and effects of fiscal policies. The study may 
contribute to positive social change by promoting the revision of fiscal policies to favor the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Accessing credit to finance businesses in Ghana is an ongoing challenge 
(Haselip, Desgain, & Mackenzie, 2014; Musa & Acheampong, 2015; Sarbah & Wen, 
2013). A World Bank (2014) study in Ghana found that, in 2013, banks financed only 
12.6% and 26.8% private sector corporations’ (PSCs) investment and working 
capitals respectively. The government of Ghana (GoG) also borrows extensively from 
the domestic market and, by the year 2013, 55% of the public debt was from domestic 
sources (Ministry of Finance, 2015). In this quantitative research, therefore, I 
hypothesized and investigated the presence of financial crowding out (FCO) in Ghana 
as defined by Graham, Leary, and Roberts (2014).  
The dissertation is in five chapters. In this first chapter, I provided a 
background to the study and stated the problem, the purpose, the hypotheses, and 
research questions. I also discuss the significance of the study and its implications for 
social change. In Chapter 2, I present a review of the literature on FCO and a 
preliminary examination of the methods for assessing FCO an economy. In Chapter 3, 
I present the design of the research and discuss my data collection and analysis 
methods. In Chapter 4, I discuss my data collection, analysis, and hypothesis testing. I 
conclude with Chapter 5, in which I discuss my findings and their contribution to 
positive social change; I also conclude and make recommendations for future 
research. 
Background of the Study 
Several factors determine how firms gain access to credit for their operations 
in a country. Researchers including Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot, (2012), Joeveer 
(2013), and Love and Peria (2015) identified these factors and noted that they operate 
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at the levels of the economy, firm, household, and lending institutions or banks. At the 
national level, the determinants are market and macroeconomic factors. The 
macroeconomic factors result from government policies that affect inflation, the gross 
domestic product (GDP) and other economic indicators. Firm-level access to credit 
results from the size of the firm and corporate policies on the capital structure of the 
corporation. I discuss these factors in detail in the following sections. 
Market Factors  
The effect of market factors on access to credit refers to competition among 
the financial service providers in the country. Competition in the banking sector has a 
direct relationship with access to credit (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Singer, 2013; 
Gimet & Lagoarde-Segot, 2012; Love & Peria, 2015). When a few large banks 
dominate the industry, no degree of competition in the sector is likely to exist. Love 
and Peria (2015) confirmed that the resulting low competition reduces firms’ access to 
finance. 
Macroeconomic Factors 
The two major policies that emanate from the macroeconomic conditions in a 
country are the monetary and the fiscal policies. Monetary policy relates to the supply 
and management of money in the economy, whereas fiscal policy refers to the 
management of the government’s budget. Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot (2012) 
intimated that governments’ macroeconomic policies affect access to finance because 
of the effect of such policies on inflation, the size of the economy, savings rate, 
government borrowing, treasury bill rates, and exchange rates. 
Fiscal policy emerges as a deficit management strategy. Kugbee and Insah 
(2015) noted that the policy options available to governments are bailouts from 
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international financial organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank, defaulting on debts, borrowing from internal and external 
sources, or issuing debt against securities to the central bank. Other policy options for 
managing budget deficits include cutting public spending, boosting the revenue base 
through increased taxation, or implementing measures that will promote economic 
growth.  
Researchers differ in their opinions regarding the role of fiscal policy on FCO. 
Mallick (2013) explained the position of theorists concerning deficit financing. 
According to Mallick, the Ricardian theorists suggest deficit financing will not affect 
the supply of credit whereas the Keynesian theorists argue that the policy will crowd-
in credit. The neoclassical theorists, on the other hand, contend that such policies 
would stifle economic development by crowding out private sector credit. Ghana’s 
experience seems to reflect the neoclassical viewpoint because Adom and Williams 
(2012) found that increased taxation drove some Ghanaian firms into the informal 
sector to avoid paying taxes, effectively rendering such a policy counterproductive. 
Firm-Specific Factors in Access to Credit 
Firm-level characteristics that affect access to credit include the size, asset 
tangibility, and leverage for listed companies (Joeveer, 2013); financial distress 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984); or the presence of low deficits (Bhaduri, 2015). The 
financing policy of the company is another characteristic that may determine their use 
of credit. According to the pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984), a firm 
might adopt a financing model based on a hierarchized source of funding comprising 
retained earnings, debt, and equity. Firms may also prefer equity because of 
asymmetric information or existing debt (Fulghieri, Garcia, & Hackbarth, 2013).  
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Household-Specific Factors in Access to Credit 
Households and individuals supply funds to banks in the form of deposits that 
become loans to borrowers. Thus, a direct relationship exists between deposits and the 
volume of loans that banks can make. Per the liquidity preference theory (Keynes, 
1936) and the quantitative theory of credit, (Werner, 2012) deposits will increase with 
increasing savings interest rate. These theories notwithstanding, Hanson, Shleifer, 
Stein, and Vishny (2015) concluded that households might be motivated to deposit 
their funds with banks for safety, ease of access, and the assurance of prudent 
investment. Households may also divert their funds from the banks due to 
consumption needs, instability in the banking system, or the existence of alternative 
forms of investment including government bonds and treasury bills. 
Bank-Specific Factors in Access to Credit 
Lending policy. Standards and policies set by the lending institutions do not 
qualify every firm for credit. The requirements for collateral or other forms of security 
can be a barrier to accessing credit from banks as noted by Akudugu (2012), Musa 
and Acheampong (2015), and Sarbah and Wen (2013). Asogwa and Okeke (2013) 
study of the Nigerian financial market revealed that a policy of lending to the 
government was one of the contributory factors to the lack of credit to the private 
sector. Such a policy may be a risk management strategy, but it could be a setback for 
firms intending to borrow. Other policies, such as investment in high-interest treasury 
bills (Fayed, 2013) and other low-risk securities by banks, can be responsible for 
financially crowding out the private sector.  
Reserves. Werner (2012) noted in the quantitative theory of credit that the 
central bank and commercial banks create money by making loans. Central banks 
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require banks to reserve a percentage (R) of deposits. They can then extend credit to 
households and firms up to 100-R the reserve amount. However, banks can make 
loans by increasing their reserves without receiving money from depositors. 
Commercial bank reserves held by the central bank can determine the volume of 
credit available in an economy. 
Gap in Theory 
Given the above arguments, several factors influence firms’ access to credit 
including FCO. The FCO theory is, however, still evolving as evidenced by Aisen and 
Hauner (2013), who stated that substantial amounts of literature support every opinion 
on the subject. For example, Sharpe (2013) posited that crowding out occurred only in 
nonsovereign countries, whereas Gjini, Durres, and Kukeli (2012) doubted the theory 
and argued that it may exist in the West but not in Eastern Europe. In emerging 
economies, Fayed (2013) found crowding in in the long term in Egypt but noted that 
high treasury bill rates could trigger crowding out. Asogwa and Okeke (2013), on the 
other hand, found FCO in Nigeria but also noted that it has a Granger causality 
relationship with budget deficits. 
Sheriff and Amoako (2014) indicated a short-term relationship between 
interest rate spread (IRS) and government debt in Ghana. However, Ho and Saunders 
(1981) had argued that the IRS does not represent the full cost of financial 
intermediation. Other variables, such as fees and commissions, operational costs, and 
industry characteristics, add up to the cost of credit. The authors, therefore, proposed 
the use of the net interest margin (NIM) as an accurate reflection of the cost of 
financial intermediation. Also, my definition of FCO refers to both the cost and the 
quantity of credit, a definition that Sheriff and Amoako (2014) did not consider in 
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their study. Therefore, in my research, I extended their work by replacing the IRS 
with the NIM. I also included additional variables in the model to yield a better 
picture of the extent of FCO in the Ghanaian economy. Following Djankov, McLiesh, 
and Shleifer (2007), I used the GDP as a deflator to make the results comparable with 
results from other countries and, hopefully, to contribute toward convergence of the 
theory. 
Problem Statement 
The GoG borrows from domestic and foreign sources to finance the budget 
deficit. In 2013, 55% of the public debt in Ghana was from domestic sources 
(Ministry of Finance, 2015). The government’s domestic borrowing is competitive 
and has potential crowding out effect on PSCs. FCO theory is not conclusive (Aisen 
& Hauner, 2013) and is not proven specifically for Ghana. Therefore, the specific 
research problem that I addressed in this study was whether government’s domestic 
debt caused FCO in Ghana. I correlated private sector credit with the government’s 
domestic debt to investigate FCO along the quantity channel (Djankov et al., 2007; 
Fayed, 2013). I also correlated the NIM of banks with government’s domestic debt to 
investigate FCO along the cost channel. I sourced data from the Bank of Ghana (BoG) 
and the World Bank. My findings showed that FCO existed in Ghana. Results 
contribute to positive social change by supporting a re-evaluation and a revision of 
Ghana’s fiscal policies to favor the private corporate sector. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this quantitative research was to investigate the presence of 
FCO in Ghana. My investigation was along the quantity and cost channels. I 
correlated government debt, my independent variable, with the quantity of private 
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sector credit, my independent variable, along the quantity channel in the first instance. 
In the second model, I correlated government debt as an independent variable, with 
the cost of credit represented by the NIM as the independent variable along the cost 
channel. My data were time series from the Bank of Ghana and the World Bank 
databases. The results indicated the presence of FCO in Ghana along both channels 
and provided practitioners a means to quantify the extent and effect of government 
fiscal policies on the private corporate sector. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
I investigated the phenomenon of FCO in Ghana that is, whether the 
government’s domestic debt competed with credit to the private corporate sector. I 
asked two questions along the quantity and cost channels respectively to form the 
basis of my research. The first question and the associated hypothesis were: 
RQ1: What was the relationship between government’s domestic debt and the 
volume of private sector credit? 
The hypotheses I tested for the first research question were:  
H01: There was no significant relationship between government’s domestic 
debt and the volume of private sector credit.  
Ha1: There was a significant relationship between government’s domestic debt 
and the volume of private sector credit.  
In testing the first hypothesis, I used multiple regression data analysis 
processes to correlate volume of private sector credit with the government’s domestic 
debt and other macroeconomic covariates. The dependent variable was the volume of 
private sector credit. The independent variable was the government’s domestic debt 
comprising loans to central government and its agencies, treasury bill, and bond 
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purchases by banks. Covariates were macroeconomic variables comprising the GDP, 
the treasury bill rate, and the level of financial intermediation.  
The second research question and associated hypotheses were: 
RQ2: What was the relationship between government’s domestic debt and the 
cost of credit to the private sector in Ghana?  
The hypotheses I tested for the second research question were: 
H02: There was no significant relationship between government’s domestic 
debt and the cost of credit to the private sector  
Ha2: There was a significant relationship between government’s domestic debt 
and the cost of credit to Ghanaian private sector corporations. 
For the second hypothesis, I used multiple regression analytic processes to 
correlate the dependent variable, the NIM, with the independent variable, the 
government’s domestic debt. Covariates were a vector of macroeconomic variables 
for the country, a vector of bank operational variables, and a vector of industry 
variables. 
Theoretical Foundation 
Three schools of economic thought or theories define and describe the FCO 
phenomenon. These are the Ricardian equivalence theory, the Keynesian theory, and 
the neoclassical theory. Each theory reflects a unique position regarding FCO. 
Barro (1989) expounding the Ricardian equivalence theory, argued a null 
effect of deficits on interest rates. Barro explained that rational households increase 
their savings in anticipation of higher taxes in the presence of deficits. Savings 
improve the cash holding of banks, thus reducing the need to increase interest rates to 
attract deposits. Many researchers have attempted to refute the theory. Schlicht 
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(2013), for example, stated that its premise, the rational behavior expectation of 
households, invalidated it because it omitted interest payments on the public debt. The 
author averred that extracting interest payment on government debt from households 
will reduce the volume of their savings and affect the cost of credit. Caparole (2015) 
also argued against the Ricardian equivalence theory. Caparole’s research of the effect 
of taxation on interest rates found a significant negative relationship between the two, 
which led the researcher to conclude that the Ricardian theory is inconsistent with the 
theory of FCO. 
Mahmoudzadeh, Sadeghi, and Sadeghi (2013) elucidated the Keynesian 
approach to FCO that government spending complements credit supply. Deficits, 
according to the authors, signal positive economic conditions to the private corporate 
sector, which responds with higher investments in the economy. Therefore, applying 
the Keynesian theory should result in a crowd-in in credit demand and investments in 
the economy. However, when Balcerzak and Rogalska (2014) analyzed data from 
different countries using the Keynesian investment-savings, liquidity-money (IS-LM) 
framework, they concluded that the theory did not yield consistent results. 
Econometric factors relevant to specific countries led to different outcomes. They also 
found contradicting results from the same country when they applied other methods or 
used different data periods, leading them to conclude that the Keynesian theory is not 
a reliable tool for research into FCO. 
The neoclassical theory evolved from the classical theory espoused by Adam 
Smith according to Lawson (2013). In classical theory, the distribution of the 
production of an economy is proportional to the cost incurred by different strata of 
society to produce it. Hence, the price of a product will reflect the cost of production. 
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Researchers, however, quickly noted that people are willing to pay more than the 
production cost to acquire a product leading to the formulation of the neoclassical 
theory. Neoclassicists use their theory to explain the notion of value, that is, the 
relationship between an object and its acquirer, that led to the formulation of relations 
between demand, supply, and price. Weintraub (2002) stated that neoclassical theory 
dominated economic discussions. Researchers use the theory to spawn new theories 
rooted in its basic assumptions. Thus, there is a neoclassical theory of FCO, which 
was my choice of theory for this study.  
The neoclassical theory of FCO, as discussed by Claeys, Moreno, and 
Surinach (2012), posits that increases in budget deficits have a direct correlation with 
interest rates. The rationale behind this theory is that government borrows to finance 
its budget deficit. The demand for credit by the government will consequently exert 
upward pressure on interest rates. Higher interest rates increase the probability of 
bankruptcy for borrowing firms, and thus they will refrain from issuing debt; that is, 
they will be crowded out. The neoclassical theory, therefore, is an appropriate 
analytical theory for explaining the phenomenon of FCO in an economy. I am, 
therefore, adopting the neoclassical theory for my research. 
Nature of the Study 
The two major strands of research are the qualitative and quantitative methods. 
Qualitative researchers explore the thoughts, actions, and speeches of persons to 
arrive at context specific conclusions (Kaczynski, Salmona, & Smith, 2014). Findings 
are not generalizable to whole populations. Quantitative research, on the other hand, 
allows the use of large datasets, hypothesis testing, and deductive reasoning to arrive 
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at replicable conclusions. The choice of method is, therefore, a function of the nature 
of the data and the objective of the research.  
The objective of my research was to investigate the presence of FCO in 
Ghana. The research replicates similar studies and is an attempt to generalize their 
findings to Ghana. I adopted a quantitative approach because my objectives, data, 
analytical method, and application were amenable to that approach. I used the method 
of Johnson (2001) to classify my research as correlational and explanatory. 
Study Variables 
Cost of credit model. Following the steps of Ho and Saunders (1981) and 
Mensah and Abor (2014), I adopted the NIM to represent the cost of credit. The 
independent variable for estimating the cost of credit was the government’s domestic 
debt. Covariates were macroeconomic, banking, and industry variables.  
Quantity of credit model. I followed in the steps of previous researchers 
including Djankov et al., (2007) and Fayed (2013) and used the quantity of credit to 
the private corporate sector as my dependent variable. My independent variable was 
the government’s domestic debt. Macroeconomic variables constituted my covariates. 
Data sources. I limited the research population to the Ghanaian financial 
sector operators who report to the Bank of Ghana as was reported in the 2016 Annual 
Report of the BoG (Bank of Ghana, 2017). I sourced my data from the BoG and the 
World Bank’s Database.  
Data Analysis Process 
Following the steps of Agca and Celasun (2012) and Fayed (2013), I adopted 
multivariate regression analysis processes to study the correlation respectively 
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between (a) the quantity of private sector credit, and (b) the cost, and government’s 
domestic debt and other covariates. 
I used a regression model of the form Yt = β0 + β1X + εt, where Yt is the 
dependent variable, β0 and β1 are regression constants, Xt is the independent variable, 
and εt is the error term. My independent variable is the government’s domestic debt 
represented by Xt in the model. In the presence of crowding out, the constant β1 < 0 
for the quantity model and β1 > 0 for the cost model. If the error term, εt, is random, 
the constant β1 will be an unbiased, consistent, and efficient estimator of FCO in both 
the short and long term. If the dependent variable correlated with both the current and 
lagged values of Xt, a distributed-lag model will result, and the relation between the 
variables will be of the form: Yt = β0 + β1Xt +β2Xt-1 + β2Xt-2 + …+βnXt-n + εt. Under 
these circumstances, there is both a short-run and long-run relationship between the 
variables. The short-run relation shall be β1 whereas the long-term relationship will be 
of the form Σnt=1βt = β1 + β2 + β3 + ..+ βn. The two estimators were the key results I 
relied on to answer the research questions.  
My data analysis tools were visual, the IBM’s Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS) software (IBM, 2015), also known simply as SPSS. I also 
used Microsoft Excel, and the Eviews software, to perform analyses not available 
through the SPSS. I used visual inspection of my data to find duplicates, missing data, 
and mistakes. I replaced randomly missing data by interpolation. I used correlation 
methods to check the collinearity relation among my research variables and removed 
one of any pair of variables that had a correlation coefficient greater than 0.9. I used 
the augmented Dickey-Fuller method (ADF) to check the unit root properties of my 
variables and the bounds test method to check for the existence of a level relationship 
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between the independent and dependent variables. I performed my regression analysis 
using the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) method. The ARDL cointegration 
method yielded my long- and short-term regression models. Finally, I checked the 
construct validity of my model using the Ramsey stability analysis method. I tested 
my hypotheses by examining the magnitude and sign of the regression coefficient of 
the government’s domestic debt and the other macroeconomic covariates. 
Definitions 
Access to finance: Access to credit (with or without a formal loan), deposit 
(with/without commercial, rural bank, other banks), insurance. Sourced from Brazil: 
Access to Financial Services, World Bank Report No. 27773-BR (2004). 
Annual budget deficit (D): The annual budget deficit of the government 
measured as a percentage of GDP. The data were made available by the Bank of 
Ghana. 
Annual inflation (I): Inflation as measured by the consumer price index (CPI). 
The model used average annual rate of inflation expressed as a percentage. Data were 
made available by the Bank of Ghana. 
Bank concentration (C): The variable measures the assets of the three largest 
banks as a share of the assets of all commercial banks in the country expressed in a 
percentage.  
Bank efficiency (E): E is the ratio of overhead costs to total assets, defined as 
the accounting value of a bank’s overhead costs as a share of its total assets.  
Bank risks (Rb): Rb is the proportion of all outstanding loans-to-total assets 
measured at the end of the year.  
Bank size (S): S is the total assets of commercial banks relative to the GDP.  
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Exchange rate (R): R is the official exchange rate calculated as an annual 
average based on monthly averages of local currency units relative to the U.S. dollar.  
Government domestic debt (DEBT): DEBT is the entire stock of direct 
government fixed-term contractual obligations to others outstanding on a particular 
date. It includes loans, treasury bill purchases, and bonds issued to banks. Banks 
measure debt on the last day of the reporting period.  
Gross domestic product (GDP): GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of the 
gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes 
minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products.  
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI): The HHI measures competition in an 
industry. Lijesen, Niljkamp, and Rietveld (2002) defined HHI as the sum of squared 
market shares of all firms in the market.  
Institutional quality (INSQUAL): The institutional or regulatory quality 
captures the perception of the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
The estimate gives the country’s score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a 
standard normal distribution (i.e., ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5). Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010) derived the definition and estimate. 
The level of financial intermediation (FINT): The ratio of total deposits, 
comprising time and savings, to the monetary base (M2) in the economy. Rother 
(2001) provided the definition.  
Money supply or monetary base (M2): Money and quasi-money comprise the 
sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other than those of the central 
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government, and the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors 
other than the central government.  
Net interest margin (NIM): The NIM is the accounting value of net income as 
a ratio of total bank assets (Ho & Saunders, 1981). I estimated the variable from data 
made available by the Bank of Ghana.  
Private sector credit (PSCREDIT): PSCREDIT refers to financial resources 
provided to the private sector by deposit-taking companies (i.e., banks, except the 
central bank). Financial resources include loans, purchases of non-equity securities, 
trade credits, and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment.  
Public-private partnership (PPP): Contractual agreement between a public 
entity and a private sector organization with the objective of providing infrastructure 
and services usually provided by the public sector. 
Pure spread (α0): The pure spread is the bank’s margin due to transactions 
uncertainty (Ho & Saunders, 1981). The variable was the regression intercept in the 
model.  
Treasury bill (TBRATE): A Treasury bill is a short-term investment product 
issued for a specific time duration of either 91, 180, or 365 days and offered by the 
Bank of Ghana on behalf of the government. The TBRATE used in the research was 
the 91-day rate averaged monthly and provided by the BoG.  
Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs): Firms that employ fewer than 
140 persons (Aryeetey, 1994).  
Special purpose vehicles (SPVs): Companies set up to execute a single project 




I made three assumptions in undertaking my research. Musgrave (1981) 
distinguished between three types of assumptions: negligible, with minimal impact on 
the theory; domain, which describe applicable conditions; and heuristic, which 
simplify the logical development of the theory. Mulgrave stated that an assumption 
may start out as negligible but can progress to domain and heuristic after subjection to 
extensive evaluation and analysis of its effect on the theory. In performing my 
research, I made certain assumptions situated within the domain assumptions 
framework.  
My first assumption was about the choice of theory. The three schools of 
economic thought argue different positions on the theory of FCO. The neoclassical 
school support crowding out, the Keynesian school argued crowding in, and the 
Ricardian school argues a no consequence relation (Mallick, 2013). One of these 
theories must operate in the country, and I assumed that the neoclassical theory 
applied to Ghana given the country’s status as a lower-middle-income economy with 
frequent episodes of IMF interventions. 
My second assumption was about my research data. I used data from the Bank 
of Ghana and the World Bank. I assumed that the data they provided was accurate, 
unbiased, and adequate to make predictions and generalizations based on the theory.  
I used time series data, which is a special case of panel data. Flannery and 
Hankins (2013) challenged the case of bias in panel data but also acknowledged the 
existence of scientific methods for treating such bias. I assumed that I could use one 
of the available methods to treat any symptoms of bias in my data. 
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Scope and Delimitations 
Financial services offered by the banking industry include credit supply, 
deposit taking, payments, and insurance services. I focused only on the demand and 
supply of credit to private corporations. I adopted this research focus because of the 
complaint by corporate Ghana that access to finance was one of their greatest 
challenges (World Bank, 2014).  
I limited the study to the 33 deposit money banks (DMBs) in Ghana (Bank of 
Ghana, 2017). They controlled 85.6% of the assets of the banking industry in the 
country, and their contribution to the presence or otherwise of the phenomenon of 
FCO could be substantial. The other financial institutions, that is, the rural and 
community banks (RCBs) and the nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) also 
advance loans to customers but, despite their large numbers, they control only 14.6% 
of the total assets of the industry. The quantity of credit they advance is relatively 
small to be of any significance. 
The GoG’s borrowing was not limited to the domestic market only. The 
government borrowed between 1% and 5% of GDP from foreign sources to finance 
the deficit (Ministry of Finance, 2015). However, this source of funding did not 
compete with local firms for access to credit from the domestic market. Thus, I 
excluded foreign borrowing by the GoG from the analysis. 
Limitations 
In this research, I sought to correlate the quantity and the cost of credit to the 
private corporate sector with government debt. The sector comprised industries of 
various types and sizes, and with different credit ratings. I did not attempt to 
differentiate between the institutions. It was possible that some sectors received better 
18 
 
services than others. However, I overcame this limitation by aggregation, that is, the 
estimates were at country and not at the level of the firm. The implication was that the 
results I obtained addressed the issues of cost and quantity of private sector credit at 
the aggregate level without distinguishing between sectors of the economy. 
I used data from the Bank of Ghana and World Bank. The reliability and 
accuracy of the data were beyond my control as a researcher. However, these are 
credible institutions with several years’ experience in data collection, cleaning, 
analysis, and dissemination. The reliability of the data from these sources was a 
reasonable expectation.  
The frequency of my data was a mixture of annual and monthly intervals. 
Macroeconomic variables were reported annually, whereas banking data was 
monthly. To assure adequate power for the research’s findings, I adopted the monthly 
intervals and, to overcome the lack of monthly macroeconomic data, I used the annual 
data for each month for the reporting year. 
Significance of the Study 
Different levels of economic development, openness, and systems of 
governance characterize the countries of the world (Kaufmann et al., 2010). These 
systems affect the management of budget deficits and government debt. The import of 
the different administrative setups is that research may reveal country-specific effects 
of FCO.  
Regionally, Ghana is in sub-Saharan Africa, one of the least developed regions 
of the world. The country is lower middle income and has been a beneficiary of 
substantial International Development Association (IDA) and IMF loans, and bilateral 
assistance from several countries. In addition to the external loans, the GoG also 
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borrows extensively from the domestic market to supplement its revenue shortfalls. 
Therefore, a potential for the FCO of Ghana’s private corporate sector existed which 
motivated my research. 
Significance of Theory 
The specific problem that I investigated in this study was whether the 
government’s domestic borrowing caused FCO in Ghana. I undertook this research in 
the knowledge that researchers remain divided on the subject of FCO. All the 
empirical research had yielded different results and interpretations of the phenomenon 
according to Hubbard (2012). The Ricardian theorists, for example, concluded that 
FCO did not exist, the Keynesians argued that government debt had crowding in 
effect, and the neoclassical theorists posited that government debt crowded out the 
private corporate sector. 
I adopted the neoclassical position following Asogwa and Okeke (2013), who 
found FCO of investments in Nigeria. However, the neoclassical paradigm is not 
without differing points of view. For example, Sharpe (2013) argued that crowding 
out occurs only in non-sovereign countries because those governments cannot print 
their currency and could only finance their deficits through increased taxation or 
borrowing. Gjini et al. (2012) stated that crowding out occurs only in developed 
economies. They concluded that public expenditure in developing countries crowds in 
private investment. However, their argument referred to public investments without 
indicating the source of financing and therefore left a gap in the theory. My study has 
contributed to the rhetoric on FCO by indicating the presence of FCO in Ghana. 
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Significance to Practice 
The GoG adopted a PPP policy (Ministry of Finance, 2011) for infrastructure 
development in the country. PPPs are project financed and, therefore, highly levered 
with debt-to-total capital ratios up to 75%. According to Esty, Chavich, and Sesia 
(2014), approximately one-third of such projects has debt-to-total capital ratios of 
80%. Bank loans and bonds constitute 81% and 19% of these debts respectively. 
Ghana’s PPP program can be successful if private sector firms have access to bank 
credit and other forms of debt. Unfortunately, the need to finance budget deficits 
drove the government to the financial market to raise funds. These actions made the 
government a competitor of the private sector in the market. Ahiawodzi and Sackey 
(2013) stated that Ghanaian banks preferred to invest in the low-risk government debt, 
thus depriving the private sector of funds for investment. 
Studies in Ghana confirm the low level of use of bank credit by Ghanaian 
businesses. Abor (2005); Antwi, Mills, and Zhao (2012); Awunyo-Vitor and Badu 
(2012); and Tornyeva (2013) found that internal or firm-specific factors influenced 
capital decisions. Andani and Al-hassan, (2014) also found that Ghanaian firms use 
short-term credit, trade credit, and other nonbank sources to finance their businesses. 
These findings could indicate the absence, or the rationing, of credit by the banks 
while they invested in government debt. 
The government, acting through its Ministry of Finance, is responsible for the 
macroeconomic policies and management of the country. Policymakers can use my 
results to quantify the extent and effect of government fiscal policies on the private 
corporate sector and to support policy revision. 
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Significance to Social Change 
Gaye (2013) stated that a financially crowded-out private sector could result in 
a slowdown or stagnation in economic activities, growth, and welfare. It can also 
induce a financial crisis in affected countries as observed by Broner, Erce, Martin, and 
Ventura (2014). Other potential problems include low industrial growth and job losses 
(Asogwa & Okeke, 2013) and low investment in research and development in the 
economy (Cecchetti & Kharroubi, 2015). On the other hand, financial crowding in, 
where government stimulates the economy by not borrowing or by cash injection, can 
lead to growth and prosperity for all (Kaboski & Townsend, 2012). 
FCO reduces the supply of credit to the private sector in quantity or increases 
the cost. When businesses cannot finance their operations, they downsize and lay off 
staff. Laid-off workers may move into the informal economy (Adom & Williams, 
2012) and pay no taxes, remain unemployed and experience a deterioration in their 
quality of life, or become a burden on society. On the other hand, when businesses 
have access to affordable credit in their desired quantities, they are likely to expand 
operations, create jobs, and contribute to social programs for the benefit of their host 
communities.  
My research findings help produce a positive social change in Ghana in 
several ways. My results can contribute to policy revision in deficit financing. I 
expect that government would borrow less so that cheaper and adequate funds will be 
available to the private sector for investment and other productive uses. Individual 
Ghanaians will have jobs, and all will pay taxes that government can use to provide 
social services to improve the quality of life of citizens. I also expect that my research 
will inspire other research on the financing of Ghanaian businesses to understand their 
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operational challenges. Such research may lead to the formulation of policies that 
would support their operations and survival. 
Summary and Transition 
The purpose of this quantitative research was to investigate the presence of 
FCO in Ghana by examining the relationship between government domestic debt and 
credit advanced to the private corporate sector by Ghanaian banks. In this first chapter 
of the dissertation, I have provided a background to the study, identified the problem, 
and stated the purpose of the research. I also posed my research questions, stated my 
hypotheses and assumptions, delineated the scope of the study, set the limits, and 
delimited the research. I also defined key terms and indicated the potential 
contribution of the research to positive change in the lives of Ghanaians. 
Chapter 2 is a review of relevant literature in support of the research. I begin 
the chapter with a discussion of my strategy for reviewing literature. I indicate the 
scope and the source of literature reviewed. I also discuss the theoretical foundation 
on which I based my research and followed it up with a detailed review of the 
literature on FCO. The review of FCO includes a discussion of the definition, 
theories, determinants, and methods of assessing the presence and operation of the 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The GoG borrows from domestic and foreign sources to finance the budget 
deficit. In 2013, 55% of the public debt was from domestic sources (Ministry of 
Finance, 2015). Government’s domestic borrowing is competitive and has a potential 
crowding out effect on PSCs. FCO theory is not conclusive (Aisen & Hauner, 2013) 
and not proven specifically for Ghana. Therefore, the specific research problem was 
whether the government’s domestic debt caused FCO in Ghana.  
The purpose of this quantitative research was to investigate the presence of 
FCO in Ghana. I did this by examining the relationship between the government’s 
domestic debt and the credit advanced to the private corporate sector by Ghanaian 
banks. In this chapter, I discuss the theoretical bases of my research, followed by a 
detailed review of the literature on FCO and its determinants: the cost of credit and 
the quantity of credit. I end Chapter 2 with a preview of the methods of measuring the 
presence of FCO in an economy. 
Literature Search Strategy 
I designed my literature review to provide a comprehensive examination of the 
subject matter. I undertook my research using the Walden University library’s 
resources, the Google Scholar search engine and, to a limited extent, the Google main 
search engine. Within the Walden University Library resources, I relied on the 
Business Source Complete and the Academic Source databases for my literature. I 
also set up a Google alert for published articles on FCO and government debt as they 
related to my research topic. The alert service provided a continuous source of latest 
articles on my research topic. Occasionally I would also use the Thoreau database to 
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provide additional research material not specifically related to finance. I also used 
relevant textbooks and encyclopedias when necessary. 
Scope of the Literature Review  
Peer-reviewed literature. Walden University requires the use of peer-
reviewed literature only. Using the Walden library search engine, I could select peer-
reviewed literature by specifying the selection criteria. The peer review feature is, 
however, not available through the Google Scholar search engine. I, therefore, used 
the “verify peer review” feature available through the Walden library to check the 
status of every journal article that I sourced from Google. 
Years reviewed. As much as practicable, I kept the age of my reviewed 
articles within a 5-year band. Accordingly, the publication dates of 55% of my 
reviewed articles were between 2013 and 2017. Some of the pieces that fell outside 
the time range were either seminal, provided definitions and background information, 
or were those that I needed to include to provide better and complete explanation of 
the issues under discussion. Some of these were articles by Ho and Saunders (1981) 
and Myers (1984). Twelve percent of all references related to my methodology and 
8% were from institutional websites. Institutional articles were not necessarily peer 
reviewed but provided background information critical for explaining issues, 
especially as pertained to the Ghanaian situation. These sources were the Bank of 
England (2015), the Bank of Ghana (2017), the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning of Ghana (Ministry of Finance, 2015), and the World Bank (2013, 2014).  
Strategy for Reviewing the Literature  
Framework for the review. The first task that I undertook was to design a 
framework within which the literature review would take place. The framework, 
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shown in Figure 1, served as my guide for a systematic search, review, acceptance, or 
rejection of selected articles. 
Keyword search. The bulk of the search revolved around keywords. The 
main keyword was financial crowding out (FCO). I conducted searches related to 
FCO definition, theories, indicators, and measurements. FCO manifests in increased 
cost of credit and reduced quantity of credit to the private sector. Interest rates, the 
interest rate spread, and the net interest margin measure the cost of credit. Interest 
rates are affected by macroeconomic factors such as gross domestic product (GDP), 
inflation, and exchange rates, all of which became search terms. 
Both the cost of credit and the quantity of credit are affected by bank 
operational costs and savings habits of households and firms. Theories that explain 
the savings habit such as the loanable fund’s theory and the quantity theory of funds 
also emerged as search terms. The quantity of credit available for lending is also a 
function of the central bank’s reserve requirements, the monetary policy, budget 
deficits, and the fiscal policy of the government. I adopted these as my search terms 








Three schools of economic thought or theories define and describe the FCO 
phenomenon. These are the neoclassical theory, the Ricardian equivalence theory, and 
the Keynesian theory. Each theory reflects a unique position regarding the 
phenomenon.  
Ricardian Equivalence Theory 
The Ricardian equivalence theory, as posited by Barro, (1989); Larbi, (2013); 
and Mahmoudzadeh et al. (2013), is that when a government tried to increase 
borrowing, demand for credit remained unchanged. Barro (1989) explained the theory 
that households’ response to the government’s demand for credit to finance the budget 
deficit is to increase their level of savings in anticipation of future tax increases. 
Hence, the presence of government debt increases savings that will increase the 
quantity of credit available to borrowers. Banks do not have to increase the savings 
interest rates to attract these extra savings. Thus, the cost of credit available to firms 
will remain unaffected, and private investment will also remain unchanged. In sum, 
the Ricardian theory does not support the crowding out effect. 
Some researchers have refuted the claims of the Ricardian theory. Schlicht 
(2013), in refuting the theory stated that its premise, the rational behavior expectation 
of households, invalidated it because it omitted interest payments on the public debt. 
Schlicht argued that extracting interest payments on government debt from 
households will reduce their savings. Thus, there will be a reduction in the volume of 
funds available to the banks to extend credit to borrowers. The author concluded that 
the rational behavior of households would not support the Ricardian theory. 
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Caparole (2015) also argued against the Ricardian equivalence theory. Using 
the efficient markets model of interest rates, Caparole researched the influence of 
taxation on interest rates in the U.S. bond market and found a significant negative 
relationship between the two. The author concluded that the effect of externally 
imposed taxes on interest rates did not support the Ricardian theory of FCO. 
Keynesian Theory 
The Keynesian approach to FCO argues a complementary relation between 
credit supply and government spending (Mahmoudzadeh et al., 2013). The theory 
states that public expenditure signals positive economic conditions to the private 
sector, which responds with higher investments. Government spending will, therefore, 
have a crowd-in effect on the private sector's investment. However, when Balcerzak 
and Rogalska (2014), and Mahmoudzadeh et al. (2013), analyzed data from different 
countries using the Keynesian IS-LM framework, they found that the theory yielded 
different results depending on the type of government spending. Expenditure on 
capital formation yielded a crowd-in effect for all countries they investigated, whereas 
consumption spending led to crowding out in developed economies but a crowd in 
developing countries. In both cases, however, the results were marginal implying a 
weak explanatory power of the theory. Also, Balcerzak and Rogalska found 
contradicting results from the same country when they applied other methods or used 
different data periods. These finding led me to conclude that the Keynesian theory is 
not reliable for explaining FCO in an economy.  
Neoclassical Theory 
The neoclassical theory evolved from and is considered a continuation of the 
classical theory espoused by Smith (Lawson, 2013). In classical theory, the 
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distribution of the production of an economy is proportional to the cost incurred by 
different strata of society in production. Hence, the price of a product will reflect the 
cost of production. 
Researchers, however, quickly noted that people are willing to pay more than 
the production cost to acquire a product, leading to the formulation of three basic 
assumptions that underpin the neoclassical theory. Weintraub (2002) stated these 
theories to be that individuals, households, and firms have rational preferences among 
outcomes; individuals maximize utility and firms maximize profits; and all persons 
act independently using all the information available to them. The neoclassical theory 
thus explains the notion of value (i.e., the relationship between an object and its 
acquirer) and leads to the formulation of relationships among demand, supply, and 
price. The price of a good comprises both the cost of production and the value placed 
on it by the demanders and suppliers. Price, therefore, determines the relationship 
between the quantities demanded and supplied. Producers are willing to sell at the 
highest price they can get whereas buyers will want to purchase at the lowest price 
possible. Price then becomes the clearing mechanism for market operations in 
neoclassical theory.  
Weintraub (2002) stated that neoclassical theory dominated economic 
discussions. Researchers use the theory to spawn new ones rooted in its basic 
assumptions. Thus, there is a neoclassical theory of FCO, which was the theory that I 
preferred for my research.  
The neoclassical theory postulates a rational relation between demand and 
supply of resources. The theory, as it related to access to credit, (Aisen & Hauner, 
2013; Claeys et al., 2012), posited that increases in budget deficits have a direct 
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correlation with interest rates. The rationale behind this theory is that growing 
demand for credit by the government to finance the budget deficit exerts an upward 
pressure on interest rates. Higher interest rates increase the probability of bankruptcy 
for borrowers, and thus rational managers will refrain from issuing debt, that is, they 
will be crowded out. 
The ability to apply rigid mathematical formulae for testing hypotheses is the 
major advantage of the neoclassical approach. The fields of economics and finance 
have a strong tradition of repeated applications of mathematical modeling to explain 
phenomena. Both Weintraub (2002) and Lawson (2013) averred that neoclassical 
theory lends itself to a deductive approach, that is, the process of relying on 
mathematical correlations to provide explanations for events. Coad (2007) stated that 
neoclassical theorists have developed an impressive set of mathematical models that 
enable objective tests of economic theories. 
Bernheim’s (1989) seminal paper on budget deficits guided my adoption of 
the neoclassical approach. Bernheim disaggregated deficits into permanent and 
temporary components. Permanent deficits are long-term while the temporary, year-
on-year deficits are deviations from the norm. The neoclassical analysis sheds light on 
the effect of the permanent deficit while Keynesian analysis concerns itself with the 
effect of temporary deviations. Temporary deviations, however, are not useful for 
studying and testing theory. The analysis of deficits and the subsequent enactment of 
policies must, therefore, adopt the neoclassical approach. Bernheim advised that the 
neoclassicist should focus on the total outstanding public debt instead of year-to-year 
changes to provide a more informed measurement of the impact of government’s 
fiscal policy on capital formation and consumption. Neoclassical theorists have, as 
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noted by Coad (2007), developed the right mathematical framework and models to 
enable this analysis. Such an analysis may yield results which can inform public 
policy in support of a positive social change. 
Literature Review 
FCO refers to an increase in cost and a reduction in the quantity of credit to 
the non-financial private sector resulting from government competition for loanable 
funds from the financial market (Graham, Leary, & Roberts, 2014). Sharpe (2013) 
stated that the phenomenon resulted from borrowing from domestic lenders to finance 
rising public debt and budget deficits leading to increases in interest rates. Agnello 
and Sousa (2013) indicated that rising government debt imposed a fiscal shock on 
asset prices that manifest in reduced access to affordable credit for businesses. A 
decline in credit conditions can be a major obstacle to business and can affect their 
survival (Haselip et al., 2014). 
FCO is, therefore, a phenomenon created by the actions of government and its 
institutions on the money market. Governments, operating through their central banks, 
play the role of regulating the amount of liquidity available to the private sector of the 
economy. In times of excessive liquidity, the central bank intervenes by selling 
financial instruments in a mop-up exercise. During periods of low liquidity, central 
banks release extra funds into the market by selling bonds and other financial 
instruments, or by creating new money in a process described by the Bank of England 
(2015) as quantitative easing. These actions form part of monetary policies designed 
to keep inflation on target. However, under circumstances of budget deficits, 
governments’ purchase of credit from the market can become excessive and may 
exclude other players from accessing funds. Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012) described 
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the borrowing activity of government as FCO while Agnello and Sousa (2013) called 
it a negative fiscal shock. 
FCO also occurs under other actions of central banks and public institutions. 
Foreign reserve accumulation, a process in which central banks purchase foreign debt 
to stabilize the local currency, can have a crowding out effect on domestic businesses. 
Reinhart and Tashiro (2013) reported that in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, 
Asian central banks embarked on the purchase of foreign reserves as a measure to 
cushion their currencies against depreciation. The action had the effect of limiting the 
amount of credit available to their private sector borrowers thus crowding them out of 
the credit market. 
The preferential treatment of government-owned businesses in gaining access 
to credit is another cause of FCO for private business. Private sector firms are unable 
to compete with government-owned or government-sponsored institutions that receive 
preferential treatment in access to government contracts, supplies, and tax treatment. 
Under these circumstances, even in the presence of loanable funds, the private sector 
will not invest because of the potential for low returns on their investments. Menon 
and Ng (2013) described the phenomenon when they studied the effect of the 
operations of government-linked corporations (GLCs) on the investment activities of 
other corporate entities in the Malaysian economy. They found that where GLCs 
control about 60% of the market, non-GLCs receive such low returns on capital 
employed that investments were not worthwhile, effectively crowding them out of the 
investment market. 
Crowding out can operate in reverse. A reversed crowding out phenomenon 
exists when the government is crowded out especially in the provision of services. 
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Isaac and Norton (2013) described a scenario of reserve crowding out in which 
service delivery by, for example, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) crowded 
out government from providing these services. Health, education, and other social 
services benefit from provision by NGOs which can crowd out government supply. 
However, I will not consider the crowding out described by the authors because it 
does not conform to the definition of crowding out I have adopted in this research. 
FCO is not directly observable in an economy or a firm. However, there are 
directly observable events or measurable variables that can serve as pointers to the 
existence of the phenomenon. These indicators operate at the country and corporate 
levels. 
Country-Level Indicators of Financial Crowding Out 
The variables and events that indicate the presence of FCO in an economy are 
increasing accumulation of foreign reserves (Reinhart & Tashiro, 2013), public 
investments, domestic and external public debt, and the degree of integration with 
other economies (Broner et al., 2014). Other indicators are the Treasury bill rate 
(Fayed, 2013), policy rate, reserve requirements, and domestic savings. 
Accumulation of foreign reserves. Capital flies from an economy through 
the acquisition and accumulation of foreign reserves, a measure adopted by central 
banks to shore up the currency against foreign currencies. The purchase of foreign 
exchange by the central bank is an indication that the private sector in the country is 
likely to be crowded out of credit for investment purposes due to the reduction in the 
available loanable funds. Reinhart and Tashiro (2013) therefore, defined FCO to 
include the purchase and accumulation of foreign reserves by a central bank.  
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Treasury bill rates. Treasury bills are debt instruments sold and bought by 
the central bank. The Treasury bill rate represents the price the central bank is willing 
to pay for its debt. Movements in the rate can, therefore, serve as an indication of the 
demand for debt. The higher the rate, the more debt the public and banks will be 
willing to purchase from the government or the central bank, and the less the amount 
available to the private sector (Fayed, 2013). Therefore, movements in the Treasury 
bill rate can proxy for the presence of FCO in an economy.  
Monetary policy rate. The monetary policy rate, the rate at which the central 
bank sells short-term debt to banks can serve as an indicator of the cost of debt in the 
country. Central banks announce the monetary policy rate periodically, usually on a 
quarterly basis. They use the rates to expand or contract the economy by reallocating 
credit between the private and the public sectors as explained by Broner et al. (2014). 
In an expansionary policy, the central bank will lower the rate to make government 
securities unattractive. A contractionary policy increases the policy rate thus 
increasing the cost of credit and restricting the supply of loans to the market. Addo 
and Seyram (2013) found a positive correlation between the policy rate and bank 
borrowing rates in Ghana which suggests that the policy rate may serve as an 
indicator of the potential for FCO of the private sector. The reaction of banks to these 
policies, however, do not always correlate with the actions of the central bank. Banks 
may resist the urge to increase interest rates in response to increases in the policy rate 
to attract and serve high-quality clients. Banks may also refuse to reduce lending rates 
if they perceive a recession. Notwithstanding these exceptions, Amidu (2014) noted 
that the policy rate always influences lending and bank managers will normally set the 
interest rates on bank debt instruments higher than the policy rate.  
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Reserve requirements. Central bank reserve requirements have a negative 
correlation with the quantities of loans banks can make available to their customers. 
The central bank requires banks to deposit a fraction of clients’ savings as reserves. 
The higher the reserve requirements, the less the deposits available to extend as credit, 
and the higher the cost due to a higher non-interest earning liabilities carried by the 
banks (Addo & Seyram, 2013). Banks will, according to Ahinful (2012), then resort 
to credit rationing as a demand management strategy. Thus, movements in the 
statutory reserve requirements can serve as an indicator of FCO of bank customers. 
Public investments. Public spending is an indicator of FCO or crowding in. 
As noted by Bello, Nagwari, and Saulawa, (2012), and Traum and Yang (2015), some 
government expenditures crowded in while others crowded out credit. In Nigeria for 
example, Bello et al. (2012) found that public spending on manufacturing and 
construction crowded out the private sector while expenditure on education, health, 
agriculture, communication, and transport infrastructure crowded in private 
investments. 
Domestic savings. An increase in government spending leading to a rise in the 
budget deficit reduces the level of national savings by both the public and private 
sectors. The effect of such action is a reduction of loanable funds on the market 
(Sharpe, 2013). Under conditions of credit supply constraints, government debt, used 
to finance increased spending, competes with private debt, exerting upward pressure 
on market interest rates. When the government decides to fund the increased spending 
through taxation, according to Sharpe (2013) and Traum and Yang (2015), the result 
is a reduction in both public and private savings. There is also a corresponding 
decrease in the size of loanable funds available to industry. A persistent reduction in 
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domestic savings, therefore, is an indication of crowding out of the private sector 
from the financial market in the country.  
Economic integration. FCO correlates with the economic development of a 
country as well as its degree of integration with other economies. In developed 
economies, deficits may not have any effect on the financial markets resulting in a 
minimum incidence of crowding out. Where economies are integrated, the spillover 
effect of the international bond market mitigates FCOs. Government debt instruments 
are tradeable (Broner et al., 2014) thus minimizing the impact on the local economy.  
Public debt. In emerging and low-income countries, there is a more severe 
effect of deficits. In what they described as a laissez-faire approach to banking, Fayed 
(2013) and Shetta and Kamaly (2014) described the phenomenon of emerging country 
banks purchasing government bonds at the expense of credit to the private sector. The 
sale of bonds by governments to pay for the public debt creates conditions for the 
operation of FCO in developing countries. 
Sovereign borrowing has a direct correlation FCO. Agca and Celasun (2012) 
examined the relationship between sovereign debt and the cost of borrowing in 
countries where there has been a default on sovereign debts. They found a positive 
correlation between the cost of corporate borrowing and the level of sovereign 
borrowing: the more a country borrowed from foreign lenders, the higher the cost of 
credit to its business sector from foreign banks. Significantly, they also found that the 
cost of lending to the corporate sector by foreign lenders increased substantially in 
countries where the sovereign debt was perceived to be at risk of default, and where 
there was weak legal protection for creditors. These findings indicated that the 
phenomenon of FCO was not limited to domestic markets. 
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Firm-Level Indicators of Financial Crowding Out 
FCO from the perspectives of the firm manifests in the holding of cash and 
other short-term securities (Graham et al., 2014). When businesses increase their 
holdings of cash and other short-term securities, it serves as an indication that 
government may be crowding out the private sector. Firms anticipating crowding out 
may also hold foreign treasuries instead of corporate bonds and will resort to reduced 
capital expenditures. 
A company's debt can also result in the crowding out of investments according 
to Diamond and He (2014). A substantial debt overhang can cause a firm to refuse to 
invest in positive net present value projects because of the perception that the 
proceeds will service the debt. Thus, the debt creates a crowding out effect on new 
investments in the firm. 
Qualitative Indicators 
Credit rationing is a leading qualitative indicator of FCO. Banks choose credit 
rationing as a demand management strategy (Ahinful, 2012) whereby they deny some 
clients credit irrespective of the interest rate there are willing to accept. Credit 
rationing is not an observable behavior as noted by Bellier, Sayeh, and Serve (2012). 
Field surveys remain the only way of acquiring data. In Kumasi in Ghana, for 
example, Ahinful (2012) found that 41.7% of respondents in a survey needed five 
times more credit than their banks granted them. Ghanaian banks allocate credit to 
clients based, according to Ahiawodzi and Sackey (2013), on borrower information 




Determinants of Financial Crowding Out 
The indicators of FCO emphasized two variables--interest rates (Sharpe, 2013) 
and the quantity of credit (Djankov et al., 2007; Fayed, 2013) as the key determinants 
of the phenomenon. In this section, I discuss the two variables, their different 
definitions and their effect on FCO. 
Interest rates. Interest rates are the cost and benefits of using or giving up the 
use of money respectively for a period. The interest rate on loans, expressed as a 
percentage of the balance outstanding, may be fixed or variable depending on the 
terms of the loan agreement. There are different definitions of interest rates based on 
its application (Aboagye, Akoena, Antwi-Asare, & Gockel, 2008). For the lender, it is 
the fee charged for supplying the funds and represents the opportunity cost of 
forgoing the use of the money for alternative purposes. From the perspectives of the 
borrower, an interest rate is a cost incurred for using other people's money. When the 
same institution is responsible for attracting both lenders and borrowers, the 
difference between the lending and borrowing rates is called the interest rate spread. 
Classification of interest rates. The classification of interest rates varies with 
purpose. Classification can be by the length of maturity, by their relation to the 
economy, by their rigidity, by type of instrument, by mode of compounding, and by 
its application on the market. Maturities can be short-term--up to 1 year; medium-
term--more than 1 year but less than 5 years; and long-term--more than 5 years. 
Interest rates can be nominal or real. The nominal interest rate denotes the speed at 
which invested money will grow over a period (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014), while the 




 n =  nominal interest rate 
 r = real interest rate 
 i = inflation rate, 
Then, r = (n – 1)/ (1 + i) and for small values of i, r = n – i. 
The real interest rate indicates the purchasing power of the invested sum and 
earned interest. Real interest rates can be positive or negative depending on the rate of 
inflation. Where the real interest rate is also the discount rate, there is an adjustment 
of the cash flows to account for inflation, that is, the cash flow is in real terms. 
However, given the constant movement in inflation rates, Berk and DeMarzo (2014) 
cautioned against the use of the real interest rate and instead recommended the 
nominal interest rate as the discount rate. 
The rigidity of interest rates and type of financial instrument serves as modes 
of classification. Thus, there is a fixed interest rate, a variable or floating interest rate, 
or a combination of the two in a loan agreement. Berk and DeMarzo (2014) defined a 
floating interest rate as one which varies with the demand and supply of loans in the 
market. A fixed interest rate is set ab initio determined by several internal and 
external factors affecting the issuing institution. There are also deposit instruments 
such as savings, time, and some demand or current accounts with different interest 
rates. Investment instruments like bonds and securities have different classifications 
depending on the tenor. 
The mode of compounding of interest rates is another criterion for 
classification. Interest calculation is simple or compound. In simple interest 
calculations, the principal earns interest at specified intervals. In compounding mode, 
the sum of the interest and the principal in a preceding period serves as the principal 
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for the next interest calculation period. Thus, there is a continuous change of principal 
throughout the tenor of the investment or loan. 
Compounding can be at discrete intervals or continuously throughout the tenor 
of the investment or loan. Discrete compounding calculates interest accrued on the 
previous period’s principal at fixed or specified intervals. The intervals can be annual, 
semiannual, quarterly, monthly, or daily. Continuous compounding estimates interest 
on a continuous basis by assuming that there is no interval between compounding 
periods. The relation, 𝑖 = 𝑒𝑟𝑡, where r is the interest rate and, t is the time elapsed 
yields the accrued interest, i, at any time. 
 Two other classifications of interest rate are the spot and future rates. The 
spot rate is the rate applicable on-the-spot, that is, today's interest rate applied to an 
investment maturing on a specific date. A forward interest rate is a rate that applies to 
an investment in a future period. Forward rates are forecast and may not be attainable 
in practice. 
Other important interest rates for making capital investment decisions include: 
• Base rate—this is a rate set by banks and serves as the starting-point for loan 
negotiations. The rate has four modules namely the cost of funds, return on 
equity, provision for bad debt and risk premium. The BoG provided a formula 
for calculating this rate to introduce more transparency into the banking sector 
in Ghana. The BoG requires banks not to lend below the advertised base rates 
that it adjusts the rate periodically to reflect changes in the larger market. 
• Policy rate—the rate which central banks charge on loans made to commercial 
banking institutions. In Ghana, the policy rate design is targeting single-digit 
inflation (Bank of Ghana, 2014). 
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• Commercial paper rate—these are short-term discount bonds issued by 
established corporate borrowers to mature in 6 months or less. 
• Treasury bill rates--central banks issue these bills at fixed interest rates. These 
are short-term measures to increase or reduce the amount of credit in the 
economy. The BoG issues 91-day and the 182-day Treasury bills. Treasury 
bills are risk-free, sold at a price less than the value at maturity, and 
operationalize both the fiscal and monetary policies of the government. 
• Government bond rates—government issues debt at a fixed rate to raise funds. 
In Ghana, the government has 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 10-year bonds on the market. It 
also has longer duration bonds issued in the international markets. The bonds 
have different interest rates related to their maturity. 
• Corporate bond rate—corporations issue debt instrument as a means of raising 
long-term financing. Bonds have different interest rates based on the time to 
maturity and the risk profile of the issuing institution. The corporate bond 
market in Ghana is nascent but promising (Ghana Stock Exchange, 2016). 
Determinants of bank interest rates. Bank interest rates represent the risk 
banks associated with lending to a customer. Interest rates also reflect the cost of 
obtaining and managing the funds that the bank makes available to the borrower. 
Banks retain the power to determine how much interest a borrower must pay on the 
borrowed sum. In some instances, the interest rate will be subject to negotiation 
between the lender and the borrower, but the lender still retains the right to determine 
the final rate. Several factors influence and determine the interest firms should pay for 
borrowing. Macroeconomic conditions, financial industry parameters, bank-specific, 
and firm-specific factors come into play in determining the interest rate.  
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Economic conditions. Entrop, Memmel, Ruprecht, and Wilkens (2014) 
averred that both macro and micro economic conditions affect interest rates. The 
macroeconomic conditions reflect the uncertainty surrounding interest rate changes 
whereas microeconomic conditions involve exposure to risks. Banks, therefore, price 
their loans to include the risks associated with both conditions. 
The macroeconomic conditions which affect the interest rate spreads are, 
according to Churchill, Kwaning, and Ababio (2014) GDP, exchange rate, prime rate, 
and the Treasury bill rate. Among these variables, they found GDP to be negatively 
correlated with the spread whereas all the other variables had a positive relation. 
Another variable that affects interest rate spread is the level of inflation in the 
economy. Mensah and Abor (2014) stated that the degree of inflation correlates 
positively with higher NIMs in Ghana. Meanwhile, Were and Wambua (2014) 
reported that in Kenya, macroeconomic factors such as economic growth were not 
significant determinants, and neither was the monetary policy rate of the Bank of 
Kenya even though it had a positive correlation with interest rate spreads. 
Bank level. At the bank level, the determinants of interest rates include 
liquidity, overhead costs, loan loss provisioning, and profit margins. Additionally, 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2014) intimated that the relations between the bank and the 
customer could influence the interest rate charged. A close lending relationship 
between a bank and a customer will result in a lower cost of borrowing for the client. 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2014) also noted that a bank's business model plays 
a significant role in interest rate setting. Banks which specialize in lending tend to 
have lower interest rates. Also, banks with substantial capital and liquidity buffers, 
43 
 
and those which require securitization of loans are more likely to charge lower 
interest rates.  
The risk associated with lending is another influencing factor and one of the 
determinants of the interest rate charged by banks. Entrop, et al. (2014) observed a 
positive correlation between interest rate and risk. Banks may increase the interest 
rate premium when interest payments face an uncertain future but will adopt a more 
favorable regime at lower perceived risks.  
Other determinants of interest rates are, according to Were and Wambua 
(2014) the size of the bank, credit risk, return on average assets, and operating costs. 
Mensah and Abor, (2014) also added that executive compensation, asset size, the 
level of concentration in the banking industry, capitalization, and the reserve 
requirements correlates positively with higher NIMs. The authors also suggested that 
corporate governance could be critical in determining IRS, noting that rent-seeking 
managers would seize every opportunity to tweak the IRS to their advantage.  
Interest rate measurement. A review of the classification of interest rates 
reveals the potential for a multitude of deposit and lending interest rates. Such a 
multiplicity of deposit and loan types, applicable rates, and conditions made the 
World Bank (2014) declare the limited utility of interest rate as a tool for comparison 
or analysis across the board. The limitation spawned a surfeit of definitions of the 
interest rates as researcher’s devised different means of measuring the variable. The 
most popular proxies are the interest rate spread and the net interest margin which was 
preferred by Ho and Saunders (1981). I discuss these two proxies in the sections 
following and indicate my preferred choice.  
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Interest rate spread. The IRS is the difference between the interest charged on 
loans and the interest paid on deposits. However, because of the several different 
definitions of interest rates, the IRS also has several definitions and measurements. 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2014) for example, measured the IRS as the difference 
between the interest rate charged on credit lines (i.e., overdrafts) and the 3-month 
interbank rate. Mannasoo (2013) estimated the spread using two definitions: first, the 
loan-deposit spread, calculated as the difference between the loan and deposit interest 
rate; and second, the loan-Euribor spread, computed as the difference between the 
loan rate and the Euribor 6-month rate. These two examples give an indication of the 
potential of deriving many and different spreads based on the frame of reference of 
the research. 
The role of IRS. The IRS is a measure the efficiency of a bank or the entire 
banking industry in a country. Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, and Morduchp (2014) estimated 
the IRS as the difference between a bank’s lending and deposit interest rates and 
posited that it served as a proxy for assessing the efficiency of the banking industry. 
The correlation between the IRS and efficiency is negative, that is, the higher the 
spread, the less efficient the bank, and vice versa. 
IRS also serve as a proxy for gauging the FCO of households and industries in 
a country. Mannasoo (2013) posited that lower IRS increase access to credit which 
can serve as a boost for economic growth. Therefore, IRS has a direct link to the GDP 
of a country, all things being equal. 
Determinants of IRS. Studies of the determinants of IRS yielded three 
variable groups--bank specific, macroeconomic, and industry-specific. Researchers 
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use the three variable groups in their assessment of IRS. For example, Ho and 
Saunders (1981) derived the net spread as in Equation 1: 




 = pure spread or bank risk-neutral spread 
R = the bank’s management’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
Q = the size of bank transactions 
σI
2 = the instantaneous variance of the interest rate on deposits and loans 
Ho and Saunders (1981) inferred that modeling could yield the pure spread. 
They also showed that pure spread is a function of four factors: the degree of 
managerial risk aversion, the size of transactions undertaken by the bank, bank market 
structure, and the variance of interest rates.  
Following their work, researchers established other determinants for modeling 
the impact and effect of the IRS. Were and Wambua, (2014) identified bank-specific 
factors that play significant roles in the determination of IRS. These include bank 
size, credit risk as measured by the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, return 
on average assets, and operating costs. These factors have a positive correlation with 
IRS. Higher bank liquidity ratio, on the other hand, hurts the spreads. On average, big 
banks have higher spreads than small banks.  
Sheriff and Amoako (2014) showed that some of the determinants of the IRS 
in Ghana were inflation, total deposits, Treasury bill rates, and domestic public 
borrowing. Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2014) also found that the borrower's 
relationship with the bank, securitization, and the degree of lending as a proportion of 
banking operations affected the interest rate pass through. Churchill et al. (2014) also 
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found the determinants of the IRS in Ghana to include GDP, inflation, exchange rate, 
prime rate, Treasury bill rate, liquidity position of banks, overhead costs, loan loss 
provisioning, and profit margins. Banks' operational variables including their hedge 
against deposit and loan maturity asymmetry and macroeconomic changes in interest 
rates were key determinants according to Entrop et al. (2014). They also found that 
banks price the interest risk premium based on interest income and expenses after 
controlling for earnings that arise from bank-specific maturity structure. Haruna 
(2012) added that banks hide the actual cost of lending in the fees and commissions 
they charge borrowers. Banks do not report these charges as part of their interest 
income thus giving the impression of low-interest rates while the effective interest 
rate is high. Therefore, the real IRS shall be calculated to include fees on loans levied 
on borrowers. His definition of IRS is by Equation 2: 
IRS = (interest plus commission received/total earning assets) – (interest plus 
commission paid/interest-bearing liabilities)      (2) 
The definition by Haruna (2012) is very similar to the definition of NIM 
which suggests that the NIM may be a better variable to use in assessing the presence 
of FCO in an economy.  
Concluding remarks on the IRS. The preceding suggests that interest rates 
and their spreads are stochastic. Modeling can deduce the pure spread (Ho & 
Saunders, 1981), but determining the actual spread can be challenging. Ghanaian 
banks publish their base rates (Business Ghana, 2015) but do not disclose their 
interest rates. Thus, any research in Ghana that relies on the IRS is likely to encounter 
difficulties in assembling credible data compared with the NIM. 
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Net Interest Margin 
The NIM is the net interest income expressed as a percentage of the total 
average earning assets. The NIM thus measures the difference between interest earned 
on assets and interest paid on liabilities according to Amuakwa-Mensah and Marbuah 
(2015). It has the advantage that it accounts for a bank's investment of non-interest-
bearing liabilities in income earning assets. For example, current account deposits 
earn no interest income to the holders, but the bank can invest such sums in income 
earning assets for its benefit. The NIM has a direct relation with and derives from the 
IRS. NIM has better utility for research because it is directly observable compared 
with the IRS. NIM also aggregates all interest rates charged and paid on banks’ 
earning assets and liabilities without regard to the different rates applied to individual 
customers. 
Role of the NIM. While both the IRS and the NIM measure the profitability 
of banking operations, the IRS is an average rate that applies only to interest-earning 
assets and liabilities. The NIM, on the other hand, measures the actual amounts paid 
and received by the banks on their assets and liabilities including non-interest earning 
liabilities. The NIM thus provides a real measure of the earnings from the 
intermediation services provided by the bank as noted by Ho and Saunders (1981). By 
relating NIM to the asset base of the bank, NIMs can be aggregated for all banks thus 
making it appropriate for industry-wide research.  
Determinants of NIM. The determinants of the NIM are similar to the 
determinants of the IRS because they are both measures of interest rates on loans and 
deposits. Therefore, the NIM is affected by the same macroeconomic factors, bank-
specific factors and industry factors identified by Agca and Celasum (2012); Mensah 
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and Abor (2014; and Sharpe (2012). Equation 3 defines the relationship between the 
NIM and these factors: 
NIM = f{industry variables; macroeconomic variables; bank-specific 
variables}           (3)  
According to Mensah and Abor (2014), the bank-specific variables include 
bank-specific risk (loans-to-total-assets), bank size (log of total assets), and bank 
efficiency (cost-asset ratio). The industry-specific variables are the level of 
competition among banks captured by the HHI, the capital asset ratio, and the 
statutory reserves imposed by the regulator which represents non-income earning 
liabilities. The macroeconomic variables are inflation, the volatility of interest rates 
proxied by the standard deviation of the 91-day Treasury bill rate, and the exchange 
rate. Other variables are public debt represented by the ratio of government debt to 
GDP and the budget deficit, (Agca & Celasun, 2012).  
Application of the NIM in research. Researchers’ make extensive use of the 
NIM. Ho and Saunders (1981) were some of the early adopters of the NIM in their 
seminal paper on the determinants of bank interest margins. Researchers modified and 
adapted the original equation by Ho and Saunders (1981) to suit different research 
objectives related to IRS. Entrop et al. (2014) adopted NIM in their study of the 
pricing of interest risk exposure in bank margins in which they extended the model of 
Ho and Saunders (1981). Mensah and Abor (2014) study of the relationship between 
IRS and agency conflict in Ghanaian banks regressed NIM with executive 
compensation, macroeconomic factors, and bank-specific factors. These researchers 
provided the justification for adopting NIM as my proxy for the interest rates on loans 
and, by extension, the cost of borrowing to Ghanaian businesses. In my research, I 
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used data from the databases of the BoG and the World Bank. I adopted the definition 
of NIM as the accounting value of a bank’s net interest revenue as a percentage of 
GDP. 
Quantity of Credit 
The second variable for assessing FCO is the demand and supply of credit to 
the private sector. The use of the quantity of credit as a research variable was the 
preferred approach by Djankov et al. (2007) and Fayed (2013) in what they called the 
quantity channel. Credit is the money received and used in the present for 
reimbursement later, otherwise known as bank loans (Bernanke & Blinder, 1988). The 
demanders of credit pay interest on the amount received for the privilege of using 
other peoples' money. The suppliers of the money receive the interest as 
compensation for forgoing the use of their money in the present. The arrangement 
between the demanders and suppliers can be private, that is, between the two parties 
without an external intermediary, or through an intermediary for a fee. The role of 
intermediaries evolved due to information asymmetry between the parties. Banks 
have assumed the role of intermediaries in the demand and supply of credit (Ho & 
Saunders, 1981) and bear the risk of guaranteeing a refund of deposits to the 
suppliers. For their services, Haruna (2012) stated that banks levy the cost of 
intermediation on the interest rates, commissions, and fees they charge the borrowers. 
Neoclassical theory suggests that the demand and supply of credit should 
follow purely economic principles (Lawson, 2013). Demand will follow an upward 
sloping curve while supply exhibits a downward sloping curve. The interest rate 
charged by banks for granting credit then serves as the clearing mechanism. 
Following from Say's law, the demand for credit should provide its supply. However, 
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recent events such as the financial crisis involving subprime loans and other market 
imperfections make it difficult to operationalize the law. 
Classification of credit. Credit consists of two components--the direct 
demand for credit through loan applications, and the sale of all classes of interest-
bearing financial assets denoted as bonds, as a means to raise funds. Credit 
classification is in several different ways. Classification can be by type of security, 
payment plan, tenor, or by a combination of these classes. 
Credit may be securitized or not. Bankers secure credit by placing a lien on an 
asset belonging to the borrower. In the event of a default, the lender can sell the asset 
to defray the loan amount outstanding. Trust underlies the use of unsecured credit. 
There is no collateral, but the expectation is that the borrowers will honor their 
obligations. Government debts, for example, are unsecured but backed by full faith in 
the government that it will honor its obligations when it falls due. 
The repayment plan can be a means of classifying credit. Installment credit 
allows the borrower to make fixed periodic payments on the loan amount. A balloon 
makes one payment of the entire amount and the interest at the end of the term. 
 Another classification of credit refers to the frequency of borrowing. A 
revolving credit or an open-ended loan allows the borrower to borrow as often as 
needed up to a limit set by the creditor. There are requirements for the borrower to 
make periodic repayments according to terms agreed by the parties. A closed-end loan 
is a one-off arrangement without the option of renewal, that is, each loan application 
is a stand-alone agreement. 
Loans may be conventional or non-conventional. Unconventional loans may 
be insured by or be provided by the government through a nominated bank. 
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Governments may use unconventional loans to target specific sectors of the economy 
or as part of special economic programs. Conventional loans, by contrast, are not 
insured by the government and can be considered pure loans extended by the banks as 
part of their operations. 
The tenor of a loan is one determinant of its classification. Loan durations may 
be short-term or long-term. There are different classifications of tenor depending on 
the source of the funds. Short term loan maturities range between 1 and 3 years 
whereas long-term loans last more than 3 years. Some definitions also introduce a 
mid-term loan which lasts between 1-to-3 years. 
Bonds have similar classifications, but with higher tenors. A short-term bond 
may have a tenor of 5 years, a mid-term bond between 5-to-10 years and a long-term 
bond is usually more than a decade with many lasting up to 30 years (Dass & Massa, 
2014). The difference between a bond and a loan is that bondholders can trade them 
on the bond market. Bondholders, therefore, do not have to hold until maturity. 
Instead, they can trade to recover their investment when necessary. Loans, on the 
other hand, are private agreements between two parties and so cannot be traded. 
Creditors must pay the full amount to their debtors at agreed terms for principal and 
interest until they retire the loan.  
The final classification of credit I reviewed is by Werner (2012). Werner 
distinguished between credit that used for GDP transactions (CR) and credit that used 
for non-GDP transactions (CF). CR drives nominal growth in GDP while CF drives 
asset transaction values that is, they are for providing collateral. 
Sources of credit. Werner (2012) disaggregated credit into physical money 
and credit. Central banks create physical money by printing. Both the central bank 
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and commercial banks create credit money by making loans. Central banks require 
banks to reserve a percentage, R, of customers' deposits. Banks can then extend credit 
to households and firms up to 100-R percent of the deposited amount. However, a 
bank can make loans by increasing their reserves without receiving money from 
depositors. The power to extend credit based on the reserve requirements grants 
money creating abilities to banks. The import of this reserve requirements is that 
theoretically, researchers may estimate the quantity of credit that an economy can 
create from the total commercial bank reserves and the loans and bonds issued by the 
central bank.  
Determinants of credit demand. The demand for credit (D) is in three parts. 
These are for household consumption (C), investment (I), and government borrowing, 
(G). Mathematically, the demand function is D = C + I + G. The major determinants 
of the demand for households and investors are, according to Herrera, Hurlin, and 
Zaki (2013), the level of economic activity, and the availability of alternative funding 
sources. The intensity of economic activity correlates positively with the demand 
while the presence of alternative funding has a negative relation with demand. The 
fraction of the budget deficit financed by domestic borrowing establishes the level of 
government demand for loans. 
Determinants of credit supply. Banks supply credit to the market. The 
quantity of credit available for loans depends on the sources and uses of funds. 
Herrera et al. (2013) identified the sources as savings by households (S) dissaving or 
disinvestments (Di), and liquidity injection by central banks or government as part of 
a stimulus package (Li). The uses of funds by banks are for operational purposes (B), 
reserve requirements by central banks (R), and excess reserves by banks with the 
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central bank (Re). The sources have a positive effect on credit while the use of funds 
reduces the amount available. Mathematically, the supply function is L = S + Di + Li 
– B – R – Re, where the variables are as defined previously. 
Theories on the demand and supply of credit. Two theories that explain the 
relationship between demand and supply are the neoclassical and the Keynesian. 
According to Lawson (2013), the basis of the neoclassical economic theory is the 
premise that free markets can regulate themselves if left alone, free of any human 
intervention. Therefore, the demand for credit will equal the supply. The neoclassical 
approach indicates that the intersection of the upward sloping supply curve of savings 
and downward sloping curve of demand for credit determines the cost of credit. As far 
as the theory goes, there is no external influence in the determination of the cost and 
quantity of funds available and requested--the so-called invisible hand ensures that the 
market clears and corrects itself in the long term. 
A critique of the classical theory is that everything happens in the long term. 
As famously stated by Keynes (1936), ‘in the long run, we are all dead.' There is, 
therefore, the need to intervene in the short term to correct market imperfections and 
stimulate the economy. Monetary authorities, therefore, intervene regularly in the 
market to regulate the flow of funds. The intervention led to the evolution of the 
Keynesian loanable fund's theory which acknowledges the role of central banks in 
regulating the amount and cost of credit. The role of monetary authorities in the funds 
market includes the purchase and sale of government debt, revision of the reserve 
requirements, sale and acquisition of central bank bonds, and adjustments to the 
policy rates for interbank borrowing. 
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Both the neoclassical and Keynesian theories acknowledge the role of the 
interest rate as a clearing mechanism for the market. According to the neoclassical 
theory, the intersection of the upward sloping supply curve of savings and downward 
sloping demand curve determines the cost of credit represented by the interest rate. 
Higher interest rate increases the risk of bankruptcy. Therefore, firms facing an 
upward-sloping interest rate regime reduce their demand for loans. 
Banks also, knowing that higher interest rates can attract risky investors, may 
restrain themselves from increasing interest rates beyond a certain level. Instead, they 
may ration credit and use their excess loanable funds to purchase government bonds 
and loans if the applicable interest rate ensured a minimum profit level for their 
operations. 
The exception to the rule is the demand for credit by the government. 
Governments can borrow at any price but can also negotiate to borrow at concessional 
rates. These two conditions place governments in an advantageous position, and 
therefore they will not curtail their demand for credit at higher interest rates. The 
scenario of high-interest rate and strong demand for credit by the government can 
limit resources available and supplied by banks to the private sector. It can shift the 
supply of funds from the private sector to the public sector (Krishnamurthy & 
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2015) and financially crowd them out. Crowding out, therefore, 
results from increased government borrowing, higher interest rates, banks purchase of 
the public debt, credit rationing by banks, central bank reserves –both statutory and 
voluntary, and bank operating costs. 
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Models for Analyzing Financial Crowding Out 
Investigating the incidence of FCO is a backward-looking process according 
to Guyton (2014). A fundamental assumption of this process is that past data can 
predict the future when used in the appropriate mathematical model. Coad (2007) 
stated that the adoption of a neoclassical theoretical base for research made possible 
the use of quantitative approaches in undertaking such investigations. 
The purpose of quantitative research is to make generalizable conclusions 
about the subject of study. The results of such studies are useful for predicting the 
outcome of similar studies (Gippel, 2013). The quantitative process is deductive, 
enabled by the use of statistical models and large datasets. Deductive research 
according to Wayhuni (2012) follows a neoclassical and a rational expectations 
paradigm which derives from a positivist philosophy. Deductive research is scientific, 
driven by theory, seeks to confirm or falsify hypotheses, and contributes towards the 
generalization of results because they are replicable in similar contexts. 
Scientific inquiry uses models to describe and explain the phenomena under 
study. Von Bertalanffy (1972) stated that the use of models finds application in 
everyday life and language. Finance researchers seek to explain, describe, and predict 
the performance of financial indicators and variables. Such research is mainly 
quantitative. Research in finance is a scientific inquiry and has benefited from the use 
of models. Qualitative methods also find application in finance research but, as noted 
by Kaczynski, Salmona, and Smith (2014), such methods are meant to supplement, or, 
serve as a prelude to the quantitative methods.  
Nelder and Wedderburn (1972) popularized the use of models in their seminal 
work on the Generalized Linear Models (GLM). GLMs has three components: a 
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random element, which specifies the conditional distribution of the response variable; 
a linear predictor, that is, a linear function of regressors; and an invertible linearizing 
link function. The function transforms the expectation of the dependent variable to the 
linear predictor. GLMs adapts to varied applications. 
Two specialized applications of GLM are multiple regression and correlation 
analysis. Johnson (2001) stated that both correlation and multiple regression are 
applicable in explanatory, descriptive, and predictive research. They also find 
application in the control of extraneous variables. 
In finance research, one of the most common multiple regression methods is 
the ordinary least squares involving multiple independent variables and a dependent 
variable. The analysis yields explanations on which of several independent variables 
have a relationship, and the form of the relationship, with the dependent variable. 
Researchers use variants of the multiple regression analysis in reporting on FCO and 
other finance phenomena. Mahmoudzadeh et al. (2013) found four models, all 
adaptations of the multiple regression procedures, as the preferred methods for 
measuring FCO and other time series variables. These are the Vector Autoregression 
(VAR) model, the Error Correction Model (ECM), the Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM) and One-Way Error Terms model. Researchers use these models in 
combination with time series data.  
Other models in the literature include the Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) family of models for forecasting the 
volatility of time series data. The GARCH models predict variance by utilizing the 
previous period's data in predicting the next period's outcome. 
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The Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) and the Autoregressive 
Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models are a class of stochastic processes used 
to analyze and to forecast using time series data. ARIMA models are a form of 
regression analysis. The models predict the future movements of seemingly random 
data series by examining the differences between values in the data instead of using 
the actual values. Lags of the differenced series are "autoregressive," and lags within 
forecasted data are "moving average''. The model's specification is ARIMA (p, d, q), 
where the letters p, d, and q refer respectively to the autoregressive, integrated and 
moving average parts of the data set respectively. ARIMA modeling allows the 
analyst to account for trends, seasonality, cycles, errors, and non-stationary aspects of 
the data.  
There is also the Rule-Based Forecasting model (RBF) which evolved out of 
the need to incorporate expert knowledge and judgment into the analyses and 
forecasting of time series data (Adya & Lusk, 2013). The RBF is thus an expert 
system that translates forecasting expertise into a set of rules that uses the analyst's 
knowledge and the characteristic of the data being analyzed to develop a model from 
a combination of simple extrapolation methods.  
Model selection. Analysts adopt the model that most suit their data set and 
research objectives. Naa-Idar, Ayentimi, and Frimpong (2012) took a cointegration 
approach to study the determinants of private investments in Ghana for the period 
1960 to 2010. They were able to analyze the 50-year period data because of the use of 
a time series model. Fayed (2013) similarly used a cointegration method to study the 
relationship between public borrowing and private credit. Mahmoudzadeh et al. 
(2013) on the other hand used the one-way error terms component of panel data in a 
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regression model to study the effect of fiscal spending and budget deficits on FCO in 
both developed and developing countries. 
Model variables. Selecting variables to use in analyzing financial data is a 
combination of the model's requirements and availability. Data selection assumes that 
there is information on a large number of potential variables to sample for relevant 
variables for the preferred model. The second assumption is that data is accurate, 
unbiased, and adequate to make predictions and generalizations. Flannery and 
Hankins (2013) however, revealed the inaccuracy of these assumptions. They 
contended that analysts have to make approximations and adjustments to existing data 
to be able to analyze, make predictions, and propound theories. 
The preceding can show the preponderance of variables used by different 
researchers in their analysis. Mahmoudzadeh et al. (2013) for example used private 
investment, the inflation rate, gross domestic product, government investment 
expenditure, government consumption expenditure, and deficit in their assessment of 
FCO. Fayed (2013), on the other hand, used private credit, government borrowing, the 
log of industrial production, the level of financial intermediation, the institutional 
quality, and the lending interest rate in analyzing the effect of FCO in Egypt. 
Time selection. The purpose of my research is to investigate the presence of 
FCO in Ghana. It is an attempt to explain the effect of excessive government debt on 
interest rates and the quantity of private sector credit in Ghana. My research will span 
the period from 2006 to 2016. During this time, Ghana continued with economic and 
financial reforms under the aegis of the IMF and the World Bank. The country 
borrowed from both domestic and international banks to resuscitate the economy. The 
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period, therefore, defines the frame of reference for my data and is sufficient to 
provide the desired power and the effect size of my analysis. 
Research Models 
Quantity of Credit Model 
I adopted Fayed (2013) approach for estimating the quantity of credit available 
to the private sector because my study location is in a developing country with fairly 
similar characteristics. I investigated the quantity of credit available to the private 
sector by using Equation 4: 
PSCREDITt = α0 + β1DEBTt + β 2FINTt – 1 + β 3INSQUALt + β 4TBRATEt + β 
5GDPt + εt          (4) 
where:  
PSCREDIT  =  private credit as a percentage of GDP,  
DEBT   =  government debt as a percentage of GDP,  
GDP  =  the log of GDP,  
FINT  =  the level of financial intermediation,  
INSQUAL =  the institutional quality, and  
TBRATE =  the Treasury bill rate.  
The subscript t is the time index. 
The focus was on the parameter β1. Crowding out of private credit by 
government borrowing implied that β1 < 0. My set of control variables were the log of 
GDP, the level of financial intermediation measured by the ratio of total deposits 
comprising time and savings to the monetary base in the economy as defined by 
Rother (2001), and the degree of institutional quality. I used a one period lagged value 
of the financial sector deposits to allow for a positive response of deposits to a higher 
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interest rate in the current period. I used the institutional quality indicator (I), as an 
indicator of the quality governance in the economy. The World Bank reports the 
regulatory quality indicator as part of its worldwide governance indicators (WGI) 
report. The indicator reflects the perception of the government’s ability to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations in support of private sector 
development. 
Cost of Credit Model 
Interest rates represent the cost of credit to borrowers. Banks also borrow and 
pay interest to depositors. The IRS, the difference between the lending and deposit 
interest rates charged by banks (Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, & Morduchp, 2014; Entrop et 
al., 2014; Gambacorta & Mistrulli, 2014) is the net gain to banks for their 
intermediation services. The IRS is, therefore, a measure of the cost of credit. There 
is, however, such a multiplicity of deposit and lending types, and applicable rates and 
conditions that the World Bank (2014) stated that there are limitations to their 
comparability across the board.  
Ho and Saunders (1981) in their seminal paper on the determinants of bank 
interest margins, adopted NIM, the difference between the interest revenue and 
interest expense as reported by banks as their measure of interest rate spread. For a 
countrywide analysis, Mensah and Abor (2014) averaged all the interest margins by 
weighting with the total assets of each participating bank. The resulting average 
indicated the scale of interest margins in the country. Following their example, I 
adopted the NIM as my measure of the cost of credit.  
Studies of the determinants of IRS yielded four sets of determinants- pure 
spread, bank operations, macroeconomic, and industry induced spreads (Ho & 
61 
 
Saunders, 1981). I advance the same arguments for the NIM. Therefore, following in 
the steps of earlier researchers such as Agca and Celasum (2012), Ho and Saunders 
(1981), Mensah and Abor (2014), and Sharpe (2012), I adopted an econometric model 
for my research. The model included all the four determinants of the NIM in the form 
stated in Equation 5:  
NIM = f{industry variables; macroeconomic variables; bank-specific 
variables}          (5) 
My dependent variable was the cost of credit represented by the NIM. The 
independent variable was the government’s domestic debt expressed as a ratio of 
domestic public debt to GDP. Macroeconomic variables, bank-specific variables, and 
industry variables served as my covariates. I lagged the regression terms for 
government debt to account for their delayed effect on the economy. 
Following Agca and Celasun (2012) but replacing IRS with NIM, and 
eliminating all variables related to foreign debt, I examined the incidence of changes 
in the cost of credit to the private sector by Equation 6:  
NIMt = α0 + α1Debtt-1 + α2Xt + α3Yt + α4Lt + εt    (6) 
where  
NIMt   = net interest income as a ratio of total bank assets in year t, 
α0   = the pure spread, obtained by the regression intercept  
DEBTt-1  = lagged ratio of domestic public debt to GDP, 
Xt  = a vector of macroeconomic variables for the country in year t 
including inflation, budget deficit, exchange rate, 
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Yt  = a vector of bank operational variables (including information 
on bank size, efficiency, and risks for all banks in the country 
for year t,  
Lt = a vector of industry characteristics, including the level of 
competition and regulations  
εt   = error term. 
The effect of government debt is likely to lag the cost of credit. I, therefore, 
lagged the regression terms for the public debt by one period to account for their 
expected delayed effect. 
Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter, I presented the state of the literature on the theory of FCO. I 
began the chapter by discussing my approach to the literature review. I continued with 
an introduction and discussion of the theory and literature behind the phenomenon of 
FCO. I discussed the determinants, operations, indicators, and the means of assessing 
the existence of FCO in an economy.  
Bernheim (1989) asserted that researchers do not seem to agree on the FCO 
concept. One of the major points of departure related to economic geography. 
Developed economies experience minimal levels of FCO due to economic integration 
and their ability to trade government debt across borders. In developing economies, 
government debt may induce FCO, but additional factors such as macroeconomic 
conditions and banking industry factors may be influential as well. Fayed (2013) 
found long-term financial crowd-in in Egypt; whereas, Asogwa and Okeke (2013) 
found that public investment crowded out private investments in Nigeria. These 
findings are supportive but not necessarily applicable to Ghana. My research extended 
63 
 
knowledge in this area by showing that FCO existed in the Ghanaian economy where 
public debt is a significant proportion of bank assets. 
In the next chapter, I develop and justify my methodology for studying FCO in 
Ghana based on available data and my research questions. I also discuss my data 
sources and collection methods. I identify the limitations and threats to data collection 
and analysis and discuss the strategies to minimize their impact on my research. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
The purpose of this quantitative research was to investigate the presence of 
FCO in Ghana. I did this by examining the relationship between government domestic 
debt and credit advanced to the private corporate sector by Ghanaian banks. I used the 
results to determine whether the government crowded out the private sector regarding 
the quantity of credit, the cost of credit, or both, to confirm the presence of FCO in 
Ghana. 
In this chapter, I discuss my research design and the rationale behind it. I also 
discuss my research philosophy, the theoretical basis, and my choice of analytical 
method. I define and operationalize my research variables and present a detailed 
methodology for the study. In the method section, I identify my research population 
and the sampling methods that I used. I also discuss my data analysis plan and my 
strategies to mitigate any threats to the internal and external validities of the research. 
I conclude the chapter with a summary and provide a transition to the next chapter. 
Research Design and Rationale 
In this research, I tested two hypotheses related to FCO. The first hypothesis 
related to the quantity of private sector credit, whereas the second hypothesis related 
to the cost of credit. The dependent variable for the first hypothesis was the quantity 
of private sector credit. The independent variable was domestic government debt. The 
covariates were the GDP, the level of financial intermediation, the institutional 
quality, and the treasury bill rate. In testing the second hypothesis, the dependent 
variable was the cost of credit operationalized as the NIM. The independent variable 
was the government’s domestic debt. The covariates were annual inflation, the annual 
budget deficit, the exchange rate (i.e., Ghana cedi to US dollar), the size of the 
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banking industry, bank efficiency, bank risks, Herfindahl-Hirschman index, bank 
concentration, and the regulatory quality index. 
The research design was quantitative. I classified it as explanatory and 
correlational. Explanatory research describes the relationship between variables 
(Vogt, 2011), whereas correlational research explores causation and association 
between the research variables (Chen & Krauss, 2011).  
Research Philosophy and Theoretical Base 
I grounded my study in the positivist philosophy as per the classification of 
Wahyuni (2012). In positivism, reality is external, objective, and independent of the 
researcher. Positivists also focus on fact-based causality and generalizations, and 
value-free interpretation of results. The positivist philosophy thus suited my research 
in which I analyzed and based my conclusions on data procured and stored by the 
BoG and the World Bank, two objective and independent institutions. By its nature, 
the positivist approach is quantitative, which justified my design. Other research 
philosophies such as postpositivism, interpretivism, and pragmatism are value-laden, 
and interpretation of data depends on the researcher. The results of such research 
approaches are not generalizable to other jurisdictions and did not serve my purpose 
in this study. 
I based my research on the neoclassical theory of FCO. Lawson (2013) stated 
that the neoclassical approach allows the researcher to adopt rigid mathematical 
formulae and models to test his or her hypothesis. The use of mathematical formulae 
makes the research replicable in similar circumstances, thus giving it a distinct 
advantage over qualitative methods. According to Coad (2007), neoclassical theorists 
have developed an impressive set of mathematical models that enable an objective test 
66 
 
of theories. Researchers in economics and finance prefer these models because they 
yield results that can inform public policy in support of a positive social change. 
Choice of Analytic Method 
I adopted multiple regression data analytic process in my research consistent 
with previous similar research including studies by Fayed (2013), Mahmoudzadeh et 
al. (2013), and Sharpe (2013). Another quantitative method that I could have used was 
correlations. Correlations estimate the strength and the direction of the association 
between pairs of data. Correlation, however, does not infer causality; that is, I could 
not use it to explain whether the changes in the independent variable caused changes 
in the dependent variable (Chen & Krauss, 2011). Correlations also cannot be used to 
process data with multiple independent variables, rendering them unsuitable for my 
research in which I used one independent variable, one dependent variable, and 
several covariates. 
I used time series data consistent with Fayed (2013), who stated that 
measuring the crowding out effect of government borrowing requires the use of data 
through an extended period. Time series data can be regression analyzed, after data 
cleaning and transformation, to test hypotheses and draw conclusions. 
My data consisted of the total outstanding measurement of the variables 
instead of periodic changes. The approach was consistent with Bernheim’s (1989) 
advice that the neoclassicist should focus on the total outstanding measure of the 
variables under study instead of the changes that occurred between periods. The 
objective is to provide a more informed measurement and effect of the independent 





The research population comprises the 802 financial sector operators listed in 
the 2016 Annual Report of the BoG (Bank of Ghana, 2017). They comprised 33 
DMBs, 64 NBFIs, 141 RCBs, and 564 microfinance institutions (MFIs). The list 
formed the frame of reference for the financial institutions whose data I used. I 
sampled participants from this population of financial institutions who purchase 
government debt in its various forms. 
Sampling and Sampling Procedures 
My research involved a two-stage sampling approach. The first was to sample 
the number of financial institutions to participate in the study. The second was the 
number of periods of data used in the analysis. The second sampling arose because of 
my use of time series data. I had to specify the length of data I used, which introduced 
the second set of sampling required. 
Sampling the number of financial institutions. My data sources were the 
Bank of Ghana and the World Bank’s world governance database. I limited my 
sample to the commercial banks, also referred to as DMBs, because their asset value 
constituted 85.6% of all the Ghanaian financial institutions in 2016 (Bank of Ghana, 
2017). They, therefore, represent a significant size of the financial sector of the 
Ghanaian economy. 
Sampling the duration of research data. Determining the size of the sample 
involved first estimating the power and effect size and then using the result to 
determine the extent of data required for the study. 
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Power estimation. The power of a test measures the ability of the analysis to 
reject the null hypothesis when it is false (Coffey, 2010). I, therefore, chose a sample 
size that ensured adequate power for my research findings. The basis of power 
analysis is the F distribution. The power of research findings is a function of the 
significant level of the test, α; the number of explanatory variables, m; the effect size, 
ƒ; and the sample size, n.  
Ioannidis, Stanley, and Doucouliagos (2015) stated that researchers in 
economics and finance have no preferred power for their analysis. According to 
McCloskey (1985), these researchers routinely ignore the advice of statisticians to 
estimate the power of their analyses because they prefer substantive to statistical 
significance in their studies. Such scientists seem to adopt the maxim of Kelley and 
Maxwell (2003) that sample sizing must aim at obtaining accurate and not just 
statistically significant results. In the absence of accepted practice, researchers adopt 
the general methods of others in their disciplines. I adopted Coffey’s (2010) 
recommendation of power level of between 80% and 90% for estimating the size of 
the sample in my research. 
Effect size. Effect size is the nonscalar measure of the strength of the 
relationship between variables (Maher, Markey, & Ebert-May, 2013). Effect size and 
statistical significance testing are complementary, and both are necessary when 
evaluating research findings. Different effect size measures exist for various research 
objectives. In my research, I used multiple regression data analysis processes to 
investigate whether my independent variable and covariates jointly explain the 
variation in the dependent variable. Maher et al. (2013) recommended that the right 
effect size measure for such research be the coefficient of multiple determination, R2. 
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R2 explains how much of the variation in the dependent variable resulted from 
changes in the independent variables. I preferred as strong a relationship as possible to 
ensure significant research findings. 
The relationship between effect size and R2 was given by Zaiontz (2016) in 
Equation 7:  
R2 = f 2(1 + f 2)-1         (7) 
where: 
R2 = coefficient of multiple determination, and  
𝑓2 = the effect size measure 
I observed that finance and econometric research did not specify effect sizes. 
Durlak (2009) advised that under such circumstances, researchers could adopt Cohen 
(1988) recommended effect sizes. By this recommendation, I selected a medium 
effect size of 0.15 for estimating my sample size. The choice of 0.15 effect size 
resulted in an R2 of 0.13 which was the minimum value to assure adequate power for 
the findings of the research. 
Estimating the sample size. Using any three of the four variables: the 
significant level of the test, α; the number of explanatory variables, m; the effect size, 
ƒ2; and the sample size, n; the analyst can estimate the fourth by employing an 
appropriate test. I adopted the methodology used by the G*Power software to estimate 
the sample size I needed for each research question. I summarized the results of the 
G*Power analysis of the determination of my sample size in Table 1. 
70 
 
Table 1  
Sample Size Selection 
















5 0.15 0.05 
0.8 82 131 
0.9 123 131 
Research 
Question 2 
9 0.15 0.05 
0.8 101 131 
0.9 125 131 
 
By the results shown in Table 1, I needed a maximum of 82 periods of data to 
answer Question 1 and 101 periods data to answer Question 2 assuming a power of 
0.8, and 123 and 121 respectively for an assumed power of 0.9. The BoG provided 
monthly data for the period February 2006 to December 2016 which yielded a sample 
size of 131. I, therefore, adopted a power of 0.9 and a sample size of 131 for both 
questions. The larger sample size would result in a higher explanatory power for the 
findings of my research. 
Archival Data 
I followed Walden University’s procedure for data collection. I obtained 
approval to collect data from Walden University's Institutional Review Board (IRB). 
The IRB approval is a prerequisite for data collection designed to ensure that 
researchers adopt ethical standards and comply with US federal regulations. 
I employed secondary data for my research. I sourced my data from the Bank 
of Ghana and the World Bank databases. These are open source databases available to 
the public. Data on some variables were not publicly available on the BoGs website. 
The BoG considers data from individual banks sensitive and will only release them in 
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an anonymized format to prevent users tracing their source. I wrote to request such 
processed data from the BoG. 
Definition and operationalization of research variables. I measured two 
key variables that explained the incidence of FCO in my research. These are the 
quantity of private sector credit measured as a percentage of total loans, and the cost 
of credit represented by the NIM and measured as a percentage of GDP. The two 
variables were key indicators of the potential use of debt by firms and served as my 
dependent variables.  
Quantity of credit variables. I adopted Djankov et al. (2007) and Fayed (2013) 
approach for estimating the quantity of credit available to the private sector. I 
investigated the quantity of credit available using Equation 8:  
PSCREDITt = α0 + β1DEBTt + β 2FINTt–1 + β3INSQUALt + β 4TBRATEt + 
β5GDPt + εt          (8) 
I have summarized the model's variables, their operational definition, and 
sources in the following sections:  
1. Private Sector Credit (PSCREDIT): PSCREDIT is the dependent 
variable in the model. It refers to financial resources provided to the 
private sector by deposit-taking companies (i.e., banks, except the 
central bank). Financial resources include loans, purchases of 
nonequity securities, trade credits, and other accounts receivable that 
establish a claim for repayment, measured as private credit as a 
percentage of total credit. The Bank of Ghana provided financial 




2. Government Debt (DEBT): DEBT was the government’s domestic 
public debt outstanding measured as the ratio of government domestic 
debt to total credit in percentage. DEBT is the entire stock of direct 
government fixed-term contractual obligations to others outstanding on 
a particular date. It comprises loans and credit advanced by 
commercial banks to the central government, government ministries, 
departments, and agencies, and government corporations. It also 
includes treasury bill purchases of the central bank and bonds issued in 
the domestic market by the government and the central bank. It is the 
gross amount of government liabilities to the banks reduced by the 
amount of equity and financial derivatives held by the government. 
Debt is a stock rather than a flow, measured as of a given date, usually 
the last day of the reporting period. The data I used in the model was 
the total debt outstanding at the end of the reporting period divided by 
the total credit. I collated and summarized the data from the balance 
sheet of individual banks.  
3. Gross Domestic Product (GDP): GDP measured at purchaser's prices 
is the sum of the gross value added by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes minus any subsidies not included in 
the value of the products. Data are in current Ghana cedi. I transformed 
the GDP of the country by a log function in the model. I sourced GDP 
data from the BoG. 
4. The level of financial intermediation (FINT): FINT is the ratio of total 
deposits, comprising time and savings, to the monetary base (M2) in 
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the economy. Rother (2001) defined the variable. The Bank of Ghana 
provided financial statements of individual banks from which I 
extracted data for this variable. 
5. Institutional Quality (INSQUAL): INSQUAL captures the perception 
of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. The estimate gives a country's score on the aggregate 
indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution (i.e., ranging from 
approximately -2.5 to 2.5). The definition and estimate were by 
Kaufmann et al. (2010). I sourced INSQUAL data from the World 
Bank’s world development indicators database at 
https://worldbank.org/indicators. 
6. The treasury bill rate (TBRATE): A treasury bill is a short-term 
investment product ranging in duration from 91 days to 365 days and 
which the BoG sells on behalf of the Government. In the research, I 
used the average monthly rate for the 91-day treasury bills I sourced 
from the Bank of Ghana. 
7. Time Index (t): The time index was monthly to conform to the format 
of the data I used in the model. Time was not a research variable. 
Cost of credit variables. Following Agca and Celasun (2012), but replacing 
interest rate spread with net interest margin, and eliminating all variables related to 
foreign debt, I examined the incidence of changes in the cost of credit by Equation 9:  
NIMt = α0 + α1DEBTt–1- α2DEFt + α3EXCHRt + α4INFLt + α5RISKt + 
α6CONCENt + α7EFFt + α8SIZEt + α9HHI + α10RQUALt + εt   (9) 
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I summarized the model's variables, their operational definition, and source in 
the following sections: 
1. Net Interest Margin (NIM): NIM represents the cost of credit, the 
dependent variable in the model. NIM is the accounting value of net 
interest income (NII) as a ratio of total assets. I estimated this variable 
from the financial statements of Ghanaian banks made available by the 
BoG. The BoG data reports NII cumulatively from the beginning of 
each financial year. I subtracted the preceding months’ data from the 
current month to obtain the net for each month for the periods February 
to December. January figures were net.  
2. The pure spread (α0): The pure spread is the banks’ margin due to 
transactions uncertainty (Ho & Saunders, 1981). The variable is the 
regression intercept in the model.  
3. Government domestic debt (DEBT): DEBT refers to public debt 
defined as the outstanding government debt owed to domestic lenders. 
The variable used in the model was the ratio of domestic government 
debt to GDP following Agca and Celasun (2012). The Bank of Ghana 
provided financial statements of individual banks from which I 
extracted data for this variable. 
4. Inflation (INF). INF is a measure of periodic changes in the consumer 
price index (CPI). The model used the monthly average rate of 
inflation expressed in percent. The BoG provided the INF. 
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5. Annual budget deficit (DEF): DEF is the annual budget deficit of the 
government measured as a percentage of GDP. The BoG provided the 
data. 
6. Exchange Rate (EXCHR): EXCHR is the official exchange rate 
calculated as monthly average based on daily averages of local 
currency units relative to the U.S. dollar. EXCHR data was available 
from the Bank of Ghana. 
7. Bank Size (SIZE): SIZE is the total assets of commercial banks as a 
ratio of GDP. Assets included claims on the whole nonfinancial real 
sector, including government, public enterprises, and the private sector. 
I extracted the variable from the financial statements of individual 
banks made available by the BoG.  
8. Bank efficiency (EFF): EFF is the ratio of overhead costs to total 
assets, defined as the accounting value of a bank's overhead costs as a 
share of its total assets in percent. I estimated the data from the 
financial statements of individual banks made available by the BoG. 
9. Bank risks (RISK): RISK is the ratio of loans-to-total assets, defined as 
the proportion of all outstanding loans-to-total assets measured in 
percent at the end of the period. I estimated the variable from the 
financial statements of individual banks made available by the BoG. 
10. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI): The HHI measures the level of 
competition in the banking industry. Lijesen et al., (2002) defined the 
HHI as the sum of squared of market shares of all firms in the market. I 
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estimated the HHI using the total assets data from individual bank 
financial statements made available by the Bank of Ghana. 
11. Bank Concentration (CONCEN): CONCEN measures the assets of the 
three largest banks as a share of assets of all DMBs in the country 
expressed in percent. I estimated the variable using the total assets data 
from individual bank financial statements made available by the Bank 
of Ghana. 
12. Regulatory Quality Index (RQUAL): RQUAL captures the perceptions 
of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. The estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate 
indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution (i.e., ranging from 
approximately -2.5 to 2.5). The data was available at World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators website. 
13. Time Index (t): The time index was monthly to conform to the format 
of the data I used in the model. Time was not a research variable. 
Data Analysis Plan 
I used IBM’s Statistical Package for Social Scientists software (IBM, 2015) 
also known simply as SPSS, the statistical software package known as EViews, and 
the Microsoft Excel software package to analyze my data. The SPSS software can 
perform some of the statistical analysis I envisaged. The software also has the 
capabilities to import data from other sources including Microsoft Excel, which 
improved on its versatility as an analysis tool. However, SPSS had limitations when 
applied to dynamic econometric data, and so I employed EViews to perform some of 
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my analysis. I used the Microsoft Excel software to collate my data before I exported 
them to SPSS and EViews for analysis.  
In this section, I described the methods I used to clean and screen my data and 
to check for the independence of the variables. I also restated my research questions 
and each of the hypotheses I tested. In the final part of this section, I presented a 
detailed plan for analyzing each of the research questions. 
Data Cleaning and Screening 
My first action on acquiring the data was to screen and clean it. The screening 
took the form of visual inspection to find duplicates, missing data, outliers, and 
mistakes. There were no duplicate data entries, but some data were missing, and 
others were obvious mistakes. I drew the attention of the BoG to obvious mistakes 
and subsequently received corrected data. Three months data entries were completely 
missing. I determined that the loss was random. I resolved the missing data by 
replacement using interpolation between adjacent values and by assuming linearity of 
the variable within that space.  
Data transformation. Regression models assume linearity of the variables 
employed. However, all the variables may not obey the rule. Data may be present in 
different scales and dimensions and would require transformation to be useful in a 
model. Roberts (2008) explained that transforming data involves applying a non-
linear operator to the data and analyzing the resulting data instead of the raw data. The 
transforms could be a logarithm, reciprocal, or root. Negative data can be converted 
into a logarithm form by the addition of a constant to convert to a positive value 




Table 3, all of the models’ variables are in the range of zero to thousands. The 
exception is the GDP data which were in millions. Following from Roberts (2008), I 
transformed my GDP variable using the logarithmic transformation as indicated in 
Table 2. The other variables required no transformation. 
Table 2  
Transformed Variables of Research Question 1 
Variable Description Dimension Order of 
magnitude 
Transform 
PSCREDIT Private credit as a 
percentage of GDP 
% %, max 100 None 
DEBT Government 
domestic debt as a 
percentage of GDP 
% %, max 100 None 
GDP GDP $ 106 Logarithm 
FINT Level of financial 
intermediation 
% %, max 100 None 




-2.5 to 2.5 None 
TBRATE Treasury bill rate % Max 100 None 





Table 3  
Transformed Variables of Research Question 2  
Variable Description Dimension Order of 
magnitude 
Transform 
NIM Net interest 
margin 
% Max 100 None 
α0 Pure spread Depends on the 





INF Inflation % Max 100 None 
DEBT Ratio of 
government debt 
to GDP 
% Max 100 None 
DEF Ratio of annual 
budget deficit to 
GDP 
% Max 100 None 
EXCHR Exchange rate ¢/$ Units None 
SIZE Bank size % Max 100 None 
EFF Bank efficiency % Max 100 None 
RISK Bank risks % Max 100 None 
HHI Level of 
competition 
% squared Thousands None 
CONCEN Bank 
concentration 
% Max 100 None 
RQUAL Regulations Units of a 
standard normal 
distribution 
-2.5 to 2.5 None 
 
Data Analysis Process 
Descriptive statistics. The first set of analysis I performed was a descriptive 
analysis of my research data. I reported on the mean, median, standard deviation, the 
skew, and kurtosis of the data. I also inspected the data graphically to check the 
presence of outliers (Field, 2013). 
Check for normality of data. Ordinary least squares regression assumes 
normality of the data employed. Normally distributed data make possible the 
application of standard statistical methods to analyze the data. Three models for 
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testing the normality of data are the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test for non-
parametric data, the Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) for continuous variables, and the Jacque-
Bera (J-B) which tests whether a sample data had the skewness and kurtosis to qualify 
as a normally distributed data. I checked for the normality of my research data using 
the J-B method. The test rejects a J-B statistic greater than 5.5 for normality.  
Solutions to normality violations include converting the data, or the researcher 
may elect to use non-parametric analytic methods. However, I adhered to Field’s 
(2013, p 184) caution that in large samples, researchers need not worry about 
normality as results are likely to be significant. I chose to ignore the non-normal 
distribution exhibited by some of my research variables. 
Check for multicollinearity. I checked for multicollinearity between the 
variables by estimating the correlation coefficient between pairs of variables. Models 
with more than one predictor shall not have significant correlations between any pair 
of the predictors (Field, 2013, p. 132). Correlation coefficients greater than 0.90 
indicates the presence of collinearity. The solution to collinearity is to remove one of 
the predictor variables and so I eliminated one of the two collinear variables from the 
dataset in the model. 
Check for stationarity. Ordinary least squares regression method analyzes 
and produces efficient estimates when the data is stationary (Beck, 2004) A stationary 
time series has a constant mean, variance, and autocorrelation over time. Researchers 
assess stationarity of a time series by examining the coefficient of regression of a 
series on its first lag. The three tests for checking stationarity status of research data 
are the Dickey-Fuller (DF), the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), and the bounds test. 
The DF test checks whether a time series data has autoregressive properties. 
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Researchers perform by regressing the variable over its first lag and examining the 
estimate of the coefficient of regression. In general, we test if the following property 
of Equation 10 holds: 
xt – xt-1 = α0 + δxt-1 +μt      (10) 
The hypothesis test is to reject the null when 𝜕 ≠ 0, and assume unit roots. 
The ADF method introduced three variations to the model as follows in 
Equations 11, 12, and 13: 
• no constant, no trend:  Δxt = δxt-1 + Σni=1αiΔxt-i + εt   (11)  
• constant, no trend: Δxt = α + δxt-1 + Σni=1αiΔxt-i + vt   (12)  
• constant and trend: Δxt = α + δxt-1 + γt + Σni=1αiΔxt-i + vt   (13) 
where the parameters α denotes a non-zero constant, 𝛾𝑡 is a deterministic time 
trend, and 𝑣𝑡 represents the residuals generated by the test. The parameter i is the 
lagged term of each variable, xt-i represents the ith lagged term of the variable, t = 1, 2, 
3, …., n, and n is the dimension of the vector variable. Equation 11 denotes a 
stationary time series with no intercept and trend when the null is rejected; Equation 
12 denotes a stationary time series with an intercept but no time trend implying that xt 
is stationary with a nonzero mean when the null is rejected; Equation 13 includes an 
intercept and a time trend, implying that xt is a stationary series around a deterministic 
trend when the null is rejected. 
To run the ADF test, the researcher must decide the number of lags to apply to 
the model by the vector auto-regression method. The length of the lag shall be such 
that there is no serial correlation between the residuals. The options for selection are 
to minimize Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) or the Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC) or drop lags until the last lag is statistically significant. 
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The bounds test developed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001) determines if 
there is a level relationship between a dependent variable and a set of regressors when 
it is not known with certainty whether the underlying regressors are stationary in 
levels or first difference. An F statistic greater than the critical I(0) value implied a 
short run relationship while a statistic greater than the critical I(1) value indicated a 
long run relationship. An F statistics between I(0) and I(1) returns an indeterminate 
situation. The Bounds test was available in the EViews software. According to 
Pesaran et al. (2001), the unrestricted ECM must be dynamically stable based on its 
autoregressive structure and errors must be serially independent. When these 
conditions are satisfied, a bounds test can be conducted to determine whether there is 
a long run relationship between the variables. 
Performing the regression. The test of stationarity can yield four different 
results: the variables are stationary in levels; the variables are stationary in first 
difference but not cointegrated; the variables are stationary in first difference and 
cointegrated; the variables are a mix of I(0) and I(1). 
Where the variables were stationary in levels, that is, they were I(0), I 
performed the regression model to establish the relationship between the variables 
using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. Where the variables were stationary in 
first difference, that is, they were I(1), but not cointegrated, I modeled the regression 
using their differenced variables in an OLS method. Where the variables were 
stationary in first difference and cointegrated, I used the Johansen cointegration 
method to establish a cointegrating relationship between the variables. The 
cointegration method developed by Johansen and Juselius (1990) uses the multivariate 
maximum likelihood test to determine the number of cointegrating equations. 
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Researchers use the test to establish if there was a linear combination of the dependent 
and independent variables that results in a stationary model, Equation 14: 
Yt + γ1X1,t + γ2X2,t + … + γkXk,t ~ I(0)     (14) 
where Yt is the dependent variable, and Xkts are the independent variables. 
The Johansen test has two forms--the trace test and the maximum eigenvalue 
test. In the trace test, we test for the number of linear combinations (K) to be equal to 
a given value Ko and the alternative hypothesis for K to be greater than Ko, that is, Ho: 
K = Ko; and H1: K > Ko. The test sets Ko = 0, for no cointegration and attempt to reject 
the null hypothesis to confirm the existence of at least one cointegration relationship. 
The maximum eigenvalue test examines the relations Ho: K = Ko and H1: K = 
Ko + 1. By rejecting the null hypothesis, we could infer that there was only one 
cointegrating relationship between the variables. 
After establishing the stationarity and cointegration status of the series at some 
combination, researchers use a vector error correction model (VECM) to estimate the 
cointegrating equation. The VECM combines the Vector Autoregression (VAR) and 
the cointegration results. Niyimbanira (2013) described the ECM as an estimate of the 
linear transformation of an autoregressive lag model. The ECM model is the Equation 
15: 
NΔyt = MΔxt + α(yt-1 – β0 – β1xt-1) + εt    (15)  
where N, M are vectors of the dependent and independent variable 
respectively. The regression equation yields the parameter, α, of the error variable 
which describes how quickly the model returns to equilibrium. For the model to return 
to its long-run equilibrium position after drifting, α must be negative and less than 
one. I used the model to describe the short run impact of the independent variables on 
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the dependent variable. Where my variables exhibited a mix of I(0) and I(1), Perasan 
and Shin (1999) proposed the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to 
finding a cointegration relationship between the variables.  
The ARDL method formulates an unrestricted ECM with an appropriate lag 
structure for each variable. The BIC or the AIC determines the lag structure. In the 
EViews software, determining the lag structure can be automated such that the 
software determines the optimal lag length for each variable. The key assumption of 
the ARDL method is that the errors of the unrestricted ECM are not serially 
correlated.  
The ARDL methodology has some advantages over the traditional 
cointegrating model. These include application in a mix I(0) and I(1) data; a single-
equation set-up, making it simple to implement and interpret; and differing lag lengths 
for each of the model’s variables. The model is autoregressive because the lagged 
values of the dependent variable explain part of variable’s values. 
The basic ARDL regression model is of the form in Equation 16: 
yt = β0 + β1yt-1 + … + βpyt-p + α0xt + α1xt-1 + … + αqxt-q + εt   (16) 
where εt is an error term.  
The ADRL model generates the long run relationship between the research 
variables. The model also generates the short run cointegrating model which specifies 
how fast the model returns to its long-run equilibrium state after a drift. The short-run 
equation of the ADRL method uses the first differences of the regression variables.  
Tests of Residuals 
Following from the ADRL analysis, I performed tests on the residuals. These 
tests were to satisfy the requirement that results were best linear unbiased estimates 
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(BLUE) and could explain the relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables in the model. I checked for outliers, serial correlation, and heteroscedasticity 
of the residuals. 
Check for outliers. Observations or data which lie outside a specified region 
of a dataset qualify as outliers (Ben-Gal, 2005). Outliers may be univariate affecting 
one variable only or multivariate, affecting multiple variables simultaneously. 
Outliers can be peculiar observations, the result of mistakes in data entry, or sampling 
error. Baragona and Battaglia (2007) stated that compared with random samples, time 
series outliers may not always be the largest or smallest records. They may be outliers 
because they are inconsistent with adjacent data entries. Their presence can affect the 
statistics by introducing bias in estimated parameters, the wrong specification of 
research models, or incorrect research results (Ben-Gal, 2005; Field, 2013). Detecting 
outliers are to identify data that lie in the defined outlier region using distance-based 
methods. Distance-based methods measure an observation from a reference parameter 
usually the mean, median, or the trend line. The method identifies an observation as 
an outlier when it lies beyond a specified distance from the reference. 
A scatter plot, a box plot, or a histogram of the data can reveal the presence of 
outliers in univariate data and some multivariate data (Field, 2013). However, for 
some data, graphical methods may not necessarily unearth outliers, and researchers 
must rely on non-graphical methods to detect such outliers (Baragona & Battaglia, 
2007). Among the non-graphical methods are the z-score approach, the Mahalanobis 
distance (MD) approach, the Cooks’ distance (CD) approach, and the median absolute 
deviation (MAD) method of Leys, Ley, Klein, Bernard, and Licata (2013). The 
authors argued that all the methods except the MAD included the outlier(s) in the 
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estimation of the mean and the standard deviation. The resulting statistic is, therefore, 
biased and may not properly identify the outlier(s). The MAD method uses the 
median observation of the data as a reference and therefore presents an unbiased 
determination of outliers. The MAD method is most suitable for univariate data. 
The MD is a measure of the distance between populations (Vogt, 2011). It is 
one of the most used test methods for investigating the presence of multivariate 
outliers. Researchers also use the MD to test the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance. The measure considers the variance and covariance between variables. It 
measures the distance of the predictor data entries from their means. According to 
Field (2013, p. 307), these measurements follow a chi-square distribution with the 
degree of freedom equal to the number of predictors in the model. A cut-off point, 
established by specifying the desired alpha level, indicates which cases are outliers. In 
my research, I used an alpha level of 0.05 (i.e., p = 0.05) to determine my cut-off 
points.  
CD measures influential cases in the regression model (Stevens, 1984) by 
assessing the changes in the regression coefficient with a case omitted. It is an outlier 
measure which examines the joint effect of a case on both the predictor and dependent 
variables. The distance, CD, is given by Equation 17:  
CDi = (p + 1)-1ri
2hii         (17) 
where ri is the standardized residual, and hii is the hat element. A CD value 
greater that one is large and warrant further examination of the data (Field, 2013, p 
306). The solution to large CDs is to examine the case for validity, omitting the case, 
including additional data points to improve the estimation, and investigating the data 
set to see whether more data points would be required.  
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I adopted the non-graphical methods recommended by Baragona and Battaglia 
(2007) to check for outliers. I used the MD method to check the presence of outliers 
and the CD method to check for influential cases. Together, I was able to make 
informed decisions on the status of my residuals. 
Check for serial correlation. Serial correlation occurred when the residual 
terms of any two variables were correlated, also referred to as autocorrelation (Field, 
2013, p. 311). The presence of serial correlation violated the assumption of 
independence and identical distribution of variables and rendered the results of 
significance tests and confidence intervals invalid. The Durbin-Watson (DW), the 
Breuch-Godfrey LM, and the Durbin’s h tests test for serial correlation.  
The DW statistics tests for the presence of serial correlation among variables. 
It tests the null hypothesis that residuals of an OLS regression are not autocorrelated. 
The alternative hypothesis is that they follow an auto-regression (AR1) process. The 
DW statistics range in value from zero to four. As a rule of thumb, values close to 
zero means a positive autocorrelation while a value close to four implies a negative 
autocorrelation, with values near two implying no autocorrelation. Lagged values of 
the dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation violates the assumptions 
of the DW test making it unfit for use to test serial correlations. In such instances the 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test or Durbin’s h-test were appropriate. 
The Breusch-Godfrey’s LM test tests for higher order regressions while the 
Durbin’s h-test applied to AR(1) models only. I therefore chose and checked for serial 
correlation using the Breusch-Godfrey method. 
The Breusch-Godfrey LM test stated that if by Equation 18:  
yt = β0 + β1x1 +β2x2 + … + βkxk + μt     (18) 
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where μt is given by Equation 19:  
μt = ρ1μt-1 + ρ2μt-2 +…+ ρnμt-n + εt     (19) 
then combine Equations 18 and 19 into Equation 20:  
yt = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + … + βkxk + ρ1μt-1 + ρ2μt-2 + … + ρnμt-n + εt  (20) 
and test the null hypothesis H0: ρ1 = ρ2 = … = ρn = 0 (i.e., no serial correlation 
in the residuals against the alternative hypothesis Ha: at least one of the ρs is not zero, 
implying there is serial correlation). 
Check for homoscedasticity. Homoscedasticity is a necessary condition for 
performing an OLS. Homoscedasticity assumes that variability in the residual scores 
of one continuous variable is roughly the same at all values of another continuous 
variable (Field, 2013). Homoscedasticity simplifies the OLS estimation techniques, 
leads to an unbiased and efficient OLS estimates, allows hypothesis testing, and the 
construction of confidence intervals and variances of coefficients in regression 
models.  
Homoscedasticity is verifiable by visual inspection of the graphical plot of the 
residuals with the independent variable. Breusch and Pagan (1979), White (1980), and 
Perasan et al. (1980) provided methods to test whether the variance of errors from a 
regression correlated with the independent values. These tests are chi-square tests 
with k-degrees of freedom. A test return of p < 0.05 rejects the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity and assumes heteroscedasticity of variance. The Breusch-Pagan 
method tests for homoscedasticity where data is assumed to be parametric. The White 
method tests for both heteroscedasticity and model misspecification and applies to 
non-parametric data. The Perasan et al. (1980) bounds test tests for heteroscedasticity 
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when the variables are a mix of I(0) and I(1). I have described the bounds test in 
another section of this dissertation.  
Both the Breusch-Pagan and the White tests for heteroscedasticity are not 
available in SPSS. The White test can, however, be performed indirectly in SPSS. I 
used the EViews software for the Breusch-Pagan test. I based my choice of method on 
the results of the normality test of the data which exhibited both I(0) and I(1) 
characteristics. 
Heteroscedasticity does not result in biased parameter estimates, but its 
presence means that the OLS does not provide the estimate with the least variance. It 
may also produce biased standard errors but may not affect significance tests. The 
solution to heteroscedasticity is data transformation. The Box-Cox transformation 
(Box & Cox, 1964), lists three common types of transformations: power 
transformation, used when there is moderate skewness or deviation; logarithm 
transformation used when there is substantial skewness or deviation; and data 
inversion, used for extreme skewness or deviation cases. Their test estimates a lambda 
(λ) value between -5 and +5 which determines the power of the transformation 
applicable with the proviso that a λ = 0 implied a logarithmic transformation of the 
variable. EViews calculates the best λ value to apply. I did not have to transform any 
of my variables because my tests returned non-significant results of 
heteroscedasticity. 
Data Analysis Plan for Research Question 1 
I investigated my first research question by using the equation of Djankov et 
al. (2007) and Fayed (2013) as shown in Equation 21:  
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PSCREDITt = α0 + α1DEBTt + α2FINTt – 1 + α3INSQUALt + α4TBRATEt + 
α5GDPt + εt        (21) 
Research variables. The key variables were the quantity of private sector 
credit, PSCREDIT, and the government’s domestic debt, DEBT. The key regression 
parameter was the regression coefficient β1. Crowding out of the corporate sector due 
to DEBT implied that there should be a negative relationship between PSCREDIT and 
DEBT. I expected a negative coefficient of regression of DEBT. 
The model included four control variables. These were the log of GDP, FINT, 
INSQUAL, and the TBRATE. Djankov et al. (2007) were the first to adopt these 
control variables in their study of private credit in 129 countries. The log of real GDP 
captured the idea that the cost of setting up credit market institutions required an 
economy to be large. I expect a positive relation between GDP and PSCREDIT 
because it captures business cycles (Dietrich, Wanzenried, & Cole, 2015), which in 
turn affect the demand for credit.  
I expected FINT to be positively related to PSCREDIT because banks were 
expected to increase their lending activities in response to the availability of deposits. 
Fayed (2013) argued that increases in liquidity may result in a spurious relation 
between government borrowing and private credit. To overcome this situation, Fayed 
(2013) adopted the ratio of time deposits and savings to the monetary base as her 
measure of the level of financial intermediation. However, to allow for the effect of 
government borrowing on interest rates and thus higher saving rates, the model used a 
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one period lagged values of the deposits. The variable I used was, therefore expressed 
in the form FINTt-1. 
INSQUAL measured the quality of governance institutions in the economy. 
When creditors can use the institutional systems to enforce repayment of loans, they 
would be more willing to extend credit. Accordingly, Djankov et al. (2007) found a 
positive relationship between the quality of the governance institutions and private 
credit. I, therefore, expect a positive relationship between INSQUAL and PSCREDIT. 
I expected TBRATE to have a negative relationship with PSCREDIT. Banks 
have the option of purchasing government debt or extending credit to borrowers. 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) found a negative relationship between 
treasury demand and credit. At lower treasury rates demand falls off, and banks 
channel their funds as loans to borrowers.  
Regression analysis. In testing the hypotheses for my first research question, I 
used the methods I outlined in the preceding sections. Following Fayed (2013), I 
performed the ADF test on my data to establish their unit root properties. My data 
were a mix of I(0) and I(1), and so I adopted the method of Pesaran and Shin (1999) 
and used the ARDL method to analyze my data and make inferences. The dependent 
variable was PSCREDIT. The independent variable was DEBT). The covariates were 
TBRATE, the log of GDP, the FINT, and INSQUAL. I lagged FINT in the regression 
model to account for the delayed effect of government policy on the financial market. 
I used the ADF method to check the unit root properties of my data. I followed 
up with a bounds test to confirm their cointegration status. I then derived and tested 
both the long run and short run cointegration coefficients from the ADRL model. 
Following the ADRL analysis, I performed the Ramsey test to confirm the validity of 
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the analysis and the stability of the long run model. I then drew my conclusions on the 
effect of government borrowing on the quantity of credit available to the private 
sector.  
Data Analysis Plan for Research Question 2 
In Research Question 2, I investigated the correlation between government 
borrowing and the cost of credit to Ghanaian firms by using Equation 22: 
NIMt = α0 + α1DEBTt – 1- α2DEFt + α3EXCHRt + α4INFLt + α5RISKt + 
α6CONCENt + α7EFFt + α8SIZEt + α9HHI + α10RQUALt + εt  (22) 
I derived my model from that of Agca and Celasun (2012) who used a similar 
model for investigating the relation between corporate borrowing costs and public 
debts for 580 loan agreement in 15 countries. Unlike these authors, however, I used 
the NIM to proxy for the cost of credit instead of the loan spread, and I limited myself 
to corporate borrowing in the domestic market instead of in the foreign market.  
Agca and Celasun (2012) used panel data for their analysis. Their use of panel 
data was inevitable given that their research covered individual loan applications in 15 
countries and had to analyze their data by country. My study differs from theirs in that 
I used data from a single country. Secondly, I used national data and not data on 
individual loan agreements. My data was, therefore, time series instead of a panel. I 
used sampled data derived from the number of periods required to assure adequate 
power of the research's findings.  
The change in research focus from external to domestic borrowing 
necessitated changes to the original model. Agca and Celasun (2012) focused on 




Research variables. The key variables were the cost of credit represented by 
NIM, and DEBT. The key regression parameter was the regression coefficient α1. 
Covariates were DEF, EXCHR, RISK, CONCEN, EFF, INF, SIZE, HHI, and 
RQUAL. Crowding out of the corporate sector due to the domestic financing of 
government debt implied that there should be a positive relationship between public 
debt and the cost of credit. I expected a positive coefficient of regression of DEBT. 
Financing the deficit would require the government to borrow from the 
domestic market. I expected a negative coefficient for DEF. However, DEF entered 
the model as a negative variable, and so the sign would remain unchanged.  
EXCHR is a measure of inflation in the economy (Loloh, 2014) and its pass-
through can affect profitability if the speed of adjustment were not the same (Dietrich 
et al., 2015). INF also measures the degree of macroeconomic instability which can 
lead to higher interest spreads and by extension higher NIM. Therefore, I expected a 
positive relationship between NIM and EXCHR and between INF and NIM. 
Dietrich, Wanzenried, and Cole (2015) stated that good governance’s effect on 
the net interest margin could be ambiguous for two reasons. Margins can narrow 
because of enforcement of creditor rights which may lead to the speedier recovery of 
overdue loans. As a consequence, banks will reduce their pricing of risk and thus 
decrease their margins. On the other hand, good governance may attract risky 
borrowers and the increase in default risk may lead to wider margins. By these 
arguments, I could not predict the outcome of the relationship between NIM and 
RQUAL.  
RISK was also expected to have an ambiguous relationship with the NIM 
(Dietrich et al. 2015). While RISK can be low during times of economic booms, 
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higher volumes of lending can lead to banks suffering higher default rates. Similarly, 
RISK may be high during economic downturns but lower demand for credit in such 
periods may lead to lower default rates.  
I expected EFF, a measure of the operational cost of banks to positively 
correlate with NIM. Dietrich et al. (2015) argued that banks need to cover their 
operational costs through their interest margins. Banks pass these costs on to 
borrowers that will lead to a positive correlation between NIM and EFF. 
Bank SIZE shall have a negative correlation with NIM. Larger banks have 
economies of scale which they can pass on to their customers in the form of lower 
interest rates (Dietrich et al., 2015). I expected a negative coefficient of bank SIZE.  
CONCEN and HHI measure the structure of the banking industry. CONCEN 
is a measure of the size of the three largest banks in the industry. According to 
Dietrich et al. (2015) in a highly concentrated banking structure, banks can engage in 
collusive activities which can drive up spreads. Therefore, I expected CONCEN and 
HHI to be positively correlated with NIM. 
Regression analysis. Following Agca and Celasun (2012), I used regression 
analytical methods to document the variation of cost of credit with the government’s 
domestic debt and to make inferences. My data analysis plan, therefore, mirrors the 
method I adopted to answer my first research question.  
Stationarity tests yielded a mix of I(0) and I(1) variables. I, therefore, adopted 
the ARDL method to analyze my data and make inferences. In the model, the 
dependent variable was the NIM. The independent variable was DEBT. Covariates 
were macroeconomic variables including INF, DEF, and EXCHR. Others were SIZE, 
EFF, and RISK; industry variables were CONCENRQUAL). Following Agca and 
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Celasun (2012), I lagged DEBT to account for the delayed effect of government fiscal 
policy on the financial market. 
Threats to Validity 
External Validity 
External validity is the ability to generalize the research’s findings to other 
jurisdictions and times. An inappropriate sampling of persons, time of the study, or 
location of the survey can threaten the external validity of the research (Trochim, 
2006). A random sampling of data, replication of the study in different jurisdictions, 
or selecting different time periods for analysis can eliminate these threats.  
I used time series data in my research. The advantage of using time series data 
is that there was no sampling of the data per se thus effectively eliminating the 
potential for sampling bias. For a defined number of study variables, the number of 
periods of data required determined the sample size. I selected the time span for data 
collection by statistical methods to assure adequate power of the analysis. I eliminated 
sampling bias by this approach.  
I used mathematical models in my study which made the study replicable in 
different jurisdictions and times. My research was an attempt to replicate studies 
undertaken elsewhere. For example, to answer the first research question, I adopted a 
mathematical model from Fayed (2013) applied to a study in Egypt. My research was 
an attempt to generalize the model to Ghana and to present it as appropriate for 
predicting FCO in developing and emerging economies. 
In answering the second research question, I established the causal 
relationships between the cost of credit to the private sector and government 
borrowing from the domestic market. I adapted a mathematical model by Agca and 
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Celasun (2012) to test my hypothesis. The use of this mathematical model ensured 
replicability and generalizability of the findings, thus eliminating any threat of 
external validity of the research’s findings. 
Internal Validity 
Trochim (2006) established the relevance of internal validity in cause and 
effect relations. Internal validity confirms that the effect measured or assessed by the 
research is the result of the causes attributed to it. Internal validity is, therefore, an 
attribute of the data used in the analysis and is not generalizable to other research 
even in the case of quantitative research such as mine. Quality issues such as history, 
maturation, mortality, testing, instrumentation, and regression threats may affect the 
data and create internal validity problems.  
Mortality, testing, instrumentation, and regression threats are the result of 
primary data collection. I eliminated the potential for these threats by employing 
secondary data collected by the World Bank and the BoG. These institutions collect 
data as part of their normal reporting requirements and not for specific research 
purposes. Therefore, I expected that the most likely internal validity issues would be 
history and maturation.  
History results from general changes that occur in the data over time. 
Unexpected changes in the economy can affect trends in the data. These unexpected 
effects or shocks (Sharpe, 2013) to the economy results in variations in the GDP. 
Therefore, to overcome the influence of history on the data, I weighted some of the 
variables by the GDP in the year of reporting.  
Triangulation of data collection (Zohrabi, 2013) is one method of assuring 
data quality. My two sources of data checked each other and assured internal validity. 
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Additionally, I included covariates in the model which served the purpose of 
examining the dependent variable from other perspectives and supported the 
triangulation of data and results. These covariates also captured the effect of history in 
the data.  
The BoG and the World Bank eliminated maturation effects by introducing 
definitions for each variable and ensuring their strict adherence. Reporting banks and 
countries do not have the opportunity to define or report data other than in the 
specified format. 
Construct Validity 
Construct validity, according to Trochim (2006) measures the extent to which 
the inferences made from a study are attributable to the theoretical constructs which 
underpinned the research. In my research, the validity test was to check the functional 
form of my models to ensure that they do not suffer from misspecification errors. I 
used the Ramsey’s (1969) Regression Specification Error Test (RESET) method to 
test the functional form of my model.  
The RESET detects functional form misspecification in a linear regression 
model. Ramsey (1969) postulated that if a linear model of the form in Equation 23: 
yt = β0 + β1xk + … +βkxk + μt      (23) 
is correctly specified, then nonlinear functions of the independent variables 
should not be significant when added to the equation. The RESET test is to add 
polynomial of the OLS fitted values to linear model to detect functional form 
misspecification. The added polynomials are usually the squared and cubed terms 
(Wooldridge, 2009) to create Equation 24: 
yt = β1 + β2x2 + … + βkxk + δ1ŷ
2 + δ2ŷ
3 + ϑt    (24)  
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where 𝜗𝑡 is an error term. 
 I used Equation 24 to test whether Equation 23 missed important nonlinear 
functions of xi. The null hypothesis is that Equation 23 is correctly specified, that is, 
Ho: δ1 = δ2 = 0 in the equation. If the RESET test returns a significant F statistic, it 
suggests that there was a problem with the specification of the regression model and it 
has to be re-specified. The RESET test was available in EViews. The software reports 
both the t and F statistics. 
Ethical Procedures 
Walden University (2015) rules regarding the conduct of research are that 
researchers must be ethical in dealing with human subjects in the collection, storage, 
retrieval, and use of data. I adhered to the rules which required that researchers 
obtained approval from the University’s IRB before proceeding with data collection. 
My approval number was 05-15-17-0406581.  
I did not collect my data from human subjects. However, I requested for some 
data from the Bank of Ghana. The bank does not publish confidential data on its 
website. Specifically, data on individual bank performance were not available. My 
estimation of the HHI, for example, required data on individual bank’s market share. 
The BoG provided anonymized data which made possible the calculation of the index 
without compromising on their confidentiality obligations. 
I obtained some of my data by downloading from the websites of the World 
Bank and the BoG. These websites require no permissions. Researchers may also send 
comments on the data to their owners when they have any to make.  
I treated the data with the utmost care. I made copies of all data I received and 
stored them on a backup disk. I also purchased cloud storage facilities for a 5-year 
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period and uploaded the data for storage. I maintained a working copy on my 
computer. As required by Walden, I will maintain the collected data for 5 years and 
destroy them afterward. 
Summary 
I discussed my research method in this chapter. I began with a restatement of 
the purpose of my research. I followed that with a discussion of my research design 
and the rationale for adopting a quantitative methodology. I identified my research 
population, discussed my sampling, and data collection method, provided operational 
definitions, and my expectation of the independent variable and the covariates’ 
relationship with the dependent. I also detailed my plan for data cleaning, screening, 
and checking the unit root properties of my variables to determine the best estimation 
method. I detailed my method for performing my cointegration regression and for 
checking my models’ residuals. I was guided by the methods Fayed (2013), 
Niyimbanira (2013), Pesaran et al. (2001), Pesaran and Shin (1999), and Ramsey 
(1969). My use of mathematical formulae and secondary data minimized any external 
validity threats. I stated my method for checking the stability of my models and my 
compliance with Walden’s requirement for ethical behavior. 
In next chapter, I report the results of my investigations. I start by re-stating 
my research the purpose, questions, and hypotheses. I follow with a discussion of my 
data collection efforts and conclude by reporting the findings of the statistical analysis 
for each research question.   
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Chapter 4: Results  
The purpose of this quantitative research was to investigate the presence of 
FCO in Ghana. I posed two questions with associated hypotheses to assist with my 
investigations. The first research question was: 
RQ1: What was the relationship between government’s domestic debt and the 
quantity of private sector credit? 
My null hypothesis was that there was no significant relationship between 
government’s domestic debt and the quantity of private sector credit. I tested my 
hypothesis by regressing the quantity of private corporate sector credit with 
government debt and other covariates.  
The second research question was: 
RQ2: What was the relationship between government’s domestic debt and the 
cost of credit to the private sector in Ghana?  
My null hypothesis was that there was no significant relationship between 
government debt and the cost of credit to the Ghanaian private corporate sector. I 
tested the second hypothesis by regressing the cost of credit with government debt 
and other covariates. I operationalized cost of credit as the net interest income earned 
by banks in Ghana.  
In the rest of this chapter, I present the of my data collection and cleaning. I 
follow with a detailed presentation of my data analysis and results. I end the chapter 
with a summary and a transition to the final chapter. 
Data Collection 
My data sources were the BoG and the World Bank Group databases. The 
World Bank data were available on their website. I downloaded data on the 
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governance indicator for Ghana, specifically the regulatory quality index, published 
by the World Bank’s Governance Institute. These data are published annually and 
uploaded to the institute’s website.  
The BoG uploads banking time series data on its website aggregated at the 
industry level. The BoG, however, considers some data confidential, such that the 
BoG does not upload them to its site. I wrote to the BoG to request data from each 
Ghanaian bank and received financial statements on each of the banks in operation in 
Ghana between the years 2006 and 2016. I received anonymized data designed to 
prevent tracing to individual banks, an action that would have breached its 
confidentiality obligations. I extracted data on all my research variables from the data 
supplied by the BoG as shown in Table 4 and Table 5. 
Data for Question 1  
I summarized the variables I used to answer Question 1 in Table 4. These were 
one independent variable—private sector credit as a percentage of total credit; one 
dependent variable—government debt expressed as a percentage of total credit; and 
four covariables—log of GDP, level of financial intermediation, institutional quality, 
and the treasury bill rate. I defined each of these variables in Chapter 3. I presented 
data on each variable in Appendix A. In this section, I will discuss only how I 
obtained each variable from the data that I received. 
102 
 
Table 4  
Source and Measurement of Variables of Research Question 1 
Variable Measurement Source 
PSCREDIT Total loans to the private sector as a 
percentage of total bank credit--all 
loans, treasury bills, and bond 
purchases 
Bank of Ghana 
DEBT Credit to government and its 
agencies--loans, treasury bills, and 
bond purchases as a percentage of 
total bank credit 
Bank of Ghana 
GDP Annual nominal GDP expressed in 
natural logarithm 
Bank of Ghana 
FINT Total deposits as a percentage of 
monetary base (M2) 
Estimated from 
data available at 
the Bank of Ghana 
INSQUAL World Bank measure of the quality 
of governance ranging from -2.5 to 




TBRATE Average monthly 91-day treasury bill 
rate in percentage 
Bank of Ghana 
 
Private credit (PSCREDIT): I obtained the industry level data by summing all 
the individual private corporate credit entries for all banks in each reporting period. I 
divided the credit to the private sector by the total credit extended by the banks to 
obtain the variable. 
Government domestic debt (DEBT): DEBT comprised treasury bill purchases, 
government bonds, loans, and credit advanced by commercial banks to the central 
government, government ministries, departments, agencies, and corporations 
expressed as a percentage of total credit advanced by the banks. The data used in the 
model were the total outstanding amount at the end of each month. I collated and 
summarized the data from the balance sheet of individual banks. 
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Gross domestic product (GDP): The Bank of Ghana supplied annual GDP 
data for the research period. The data were in annual installments only. I used the 
annual data to represent the GDP for each month of the applicable year in the model. 
Level of financial intermediation (FINT): I obtained bank deposits comprising 
savings and time deposits from the balance sheets of individual banks. The BoG 
supplied the M2 data. I divided the total deposits by the M2 for each month to obtain 
the variable. 
Institutional quality (INSQUAL): I downloaded the data from the website of 
the World Governance Institute. The data were in annual installments only. I used the 
annual data to represent the monthly data for each month of the applicable year in the 
model. 
Treasury bill rate (TBRATE): The Bank of Ghana supplied the monthly 
average treasury bill rates as part of the data I requested. 
Data for Question 2 
I summarized the variables I used to answer Question 2 in Table 5. These were 
one independent variable, the net interest margin expressed as a percentage of GDP, 
and one dependent variable, government debt expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
Covariates were macroeconomic variables comprising inflation, exchange rate, and 
budget deficits; banking variables comprising bank size, bank efficiency, bank risks, 
bank concentration, and the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index; and institutional and 
regulatory quality index. I defined each of these variables in Chapter 3. I presented 
data on each variable in Appendix B. In this section, I will discuss only how I 
obtained the variables from the data that I received. 
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Table 5  
Source of Variables of Research Question 2  
Variable Measurement Source 
NIM Net interest income of banks 
as a percentage of nominal 
GDP 
Estimated from data from 
the Bank of Ghana 
INF  Percent change in headline 
inflation measured by the 
consumer price index 
Bank of Ghana 
DEBT Credit to government and its 
agencies--loans, Treasury 
bills, and bond purchases by 
banks as a percentage of 
nominal GDP 
Bank of Ghana 
DEF Difference between 
government revenue and 
expenditure 
Bank of Ghana 
EXCHR Ghana cedis per US dollar Bank of Ghana 
SIZE Total assets of banks Estimated from data from 
the Bank of Ghana 
EFF Non-interest expenses as a 
percentage of total assets 
Estimated from data from 
the Bank of Ghana 
RISK Total loans as a percentage of 
total assets 
Estimated from data from 
the Bank of Ghana 
HHI Sum squared of percentage 
total bank assets 
Estimated from data from 
the Bank of Ghana 
CONCEN Sum of assets of three largest 
banks 
Estimated from data from 
the Bank of Ghana 
RQUAL World Bank measure ranging 
between -2.5 to +2.5 
World Bank database 
 
Net interest margin (NIM): I obtained net interest income data from the 
income statements of the banks. The net interest income (NII) was the interest income 
less the interest expense. I estimated the NIM by dividing the NII by the GDP and 
expressed it as a percentage. I collated the data at industry level on a monthly basis. 
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Inflation (INF): The BoG provided data on annual inflation in the country 
expressed in percentage. I used the annual data to represent inflation for each month 
of the applicable year in the model. 
Government domestic debt (DEBT): DEBT comprised treasury bill purchases, 
government bonds, loans, and credit advanced by commercial banks to the central 
government, government ministries, departments, agencies, and corporations 
expressed as a percentage of total credit advanced by the banks. The data used in the 
model were the total outstanding amount at the end of each month. I collated and 
summarized the data from the balance sheet of individual banks.  
Budget deficit (DEF): The BoG provided annual data on the budget deficit. 
The variable that I used in the model was the annual budget deficit divided by the 
GDP and expressed as a percentage. I used the annual DEF data to represent the data 
for each month in the applicable year. 
Exchange rate (EXCHR): The BoG supplied monthly exchange rate data from 
their database. 
Bank size (SIZE): I collated and summarized the monthly total asset values 
from the balance sheet of individual banks. In the model, I used total bank assets 
expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
Bank efficiency (EFF): I collated the noninterest expense data from the income 
statement of banks, and the total asset data from their balance sheets and aggregated 
at the industry level. I presented the data at monthly intervals. 
Bank risks (RISK): I extracted the total loan outstanding and total asset data 
from the balance sheets of the individual banks and aggregated at the industry level. I 
presented the data at monthly intervals. 
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Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI): I derived the variable by squaring the 
percentage of total industry assets held by each bank and aggregating at the industry 
level. 
Bank concentration (CONCEN): I derived the concentration variable from the 
balance sheet of the banks, by dividing each bank’s total assets by the total industry 
assets expressed as a percentage. I followed that by ranking the obtained values to 
arrive at the three largest which I summed and used in the model. 
Regulatory quality (RQUAL): I obtained the variable by downloading from the 
website of the World Governance Institute. 
Study Results for Research Question 1 
I used my first research question to find out whether there was any statistically 
significant relationship between DEBT and PSCREDIT. On acquiring my data from 
the sources discussed in the preceding section, I subjected it to screening and cleaning 
before I entered them into the regression models for analysis. 
Data Cleaning and Screening 
My first action on acquiring the data was to screen and clean it. I visually 
inspected the data to check for duplicate data, missing data, outliers, and mistakes. 
Screening yielded no duplicate data. There were three missing entries and some 
obvious mistakes. The BoG replaced the wrong data. Data for January 2006, July 
2007, and May 2015 were missing. The missingness was completely random. The 
BoG could not supply the missing data, so I resolved it by omitting the data for 
January 2006 from the database and replacing the others by interpolation between 
adjacent values, assuming linearity of the variable within that space. My dataset, 
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therefore, started from February 2006 for a total of 131 months. I reported the 
descriptive statistics for my first research question in Table 6. 
Descriptive Statistics and Tests 
I conducted descriptive statistics and tests of the data which I reported in 
Table 6. I reported on the range, mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, and 
normality for each variable. Skewness test results yielded non-significant results, (|S| 
< 0.5) for all variables. Kurtosis test also yielded non-significant results, (|K| < 3) for 
all variables.  
Table 6  
Descriptive Statistics of Question 1 Variables 
 PSCREDIT DEBT FINT GDP INSQUAL TBRATE 
 Mean 49.85484 39.94554 1.133739 24.77127 0.029801 18.22409 
 Median 48.81041 40.84071 1.141808 24.81454 -0.007182 20.87348 
 Maximum 59.49003 51.22951 1.322745 25.84315 0.132062 27.80000 
 Minimum 37.90047 30.93421 0.988024 23.65206 -0.071557 9.130000 
 Std. Dev. 5.040178 5.021522 0.064496 0.714354 0.079469 6.421331 
 Skewness -0.017881 0.060913 -0.217788 -0.054931 0.114191 -0.206244 
 Kurtosis 2.097781 2.013978 2.771176 1.653200 1.308571 1.296771 
 Jarque-Bera 4.450063 5.387815 1.321391 9.966589 15.90062 16.76327 
 Probability 0.108064 0.067616 0.516492 0.006851 0.000353 0.000229 
 Sum 6530.984 5232.866 148.5198 3245.037 3.903962 2387.356 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 3302.441 3278.039 0.540768 66.33917 0.820990 5360.353 
 Observations 131 131 131 131 131 131 
 
Check for normality of data. I checked for the normality of my research data using 
the Jarque-Berra (J-B) method. The test rejects a J-B statistic greater than 5.5 for 
normality. The results of the J-B test as presented in Table 6, indicated that 
PSCREDIT and FINT had normal distributions at the 5% level. DEBT was normal at 
the 10% level. GDP, TBRATE, and INSQUAL were not normally distributed, (i.e., 
their J-B values were greater than 5.5).  
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The solution to non-normality is data transformation. However, I adhered to 
Field (2013, p. 184) caution that in large samples, researchers need not worry about 
normality as results are likely to be significant. I chose to ignore the non-normal 
distribution exhibited by the affected variables. 
Check for multicollinearity. I checked for collinearity among the research 
variables. The test is to reject a correlation coefficient of more than 0.9 between any 
pairs of variables that are stationary and normally distributed. However, for non-
stationary data, the theoretical correlation will vary with time making it impossible to 
determine true correlations.  
The results presented in Table 7, indicated that there were no signficant 
correlations between the variables except for DEBT that correlated highly with 
PSCREDIT (r = -.98). I ignored the relationship between DEBT and PSCREDIT in 
my analysis because of the potential for serial correlation within the variables. Thus, I 
adopted and used all the variables in the regression model.  
Table 7  
Pearson Correlation Test Results for Question 1 Variables 
 PSCREDIT DEBT FINT GDP INSQUAL TBRATE 
PSCREDIT 1.00 -0.98 0.60 0.24 -0.21 0.68 
DEBT -0.98 1.00 -0.62 -0.31 0.19 -0.72 
FINT 0.60 -0.62 1.00 0.73 0.25 0.67 
GDP 0.24 -0.31 0.73 1.00 0.15 0.56 
INSQUAL -0.21 0.19 0.25 0.15 1.00 0.04 
TBRATE 0.68 -0.72 0.67 0.56 0.04 1.00 
 
Stationarity check. Based on the results of the descriptive statistics and tests, 
I concluded that the ordinary least square regression would yield biased and 
unacceptable results consistent with the literature that suggests that macroeconomic 
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time series data could be non-stationary (Fayed, 2013). I, therefore, proceeded to 
check the stationarity status of my data.  
I confirmed stationarity by testing for unit roots in my data using the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) method. I used the EViews software to perform the 
analysis. My null hypothesis was that there were no unit roots in any of the variables. 
I tested each variable independently in levels[I(0)] and first differences [I(1)]. The 
results, summarized in Table 8, indicated that the data exhibited a mixture of I(0) and 
I(1). FINT was I(0). All other variables were I(1).  
Table 8  
Test for Unit Roots in Question 1 Variables  



























































Note. Table reports t-statistics and p values in parentheses 
 
Under these conditions of mixed levels of integration, Perasan and Shin (1999) 
proposed the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to finding a 
cointegration relationship between the variables. I first performed the bounds test to 
determine the unit root properties of the variables and whether there was a long-run 
cointegration relationship between the variables.  
110 
 
Bounds test. I performed the bounds test using the EViews software. I 
presented the results of the bounds test in Table 9. The bounds test results returned F 
= 8.515. The F result was greater than the critical value for I(1), (F = 3.79, p = 0.05), 
thus confirming that the model’s variables were integrated of order I(1). The test 
result also rejected the null hypothesis that no long-run relationship existed between 
the variables. The model, therefore, had both short- and long-run properties. I 
presented confirmation of these results in Table 10.  
Table 9  
ARDL Bounds Test Results for Question 1 Variables 
Test Statistic Value k 
F-statistic  8.515 5 
Critical Value Bounds 
Significance I0 Bound I1 Bound 
10% 2.26 3.35 
5% 2.62 3.79 
2.5% 2.96 4.18 
1% 3.41 4.68 
Note. Null Hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist 
 
Specifying the Question 1 Regression Model 
Following the results of the bounds test, I estimated the short and long-run 
models. I performed the ARDL analysis using the EViews software. In the ARDL 
model, I specified an automatic lag selection procedure with the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) to select my model. The software iterated 12500 models and selected a 
model with parameters ARDL (1, 1, 0, 0, 3, 1) that yielded the lowest AIC result. 
Figure 2 presents the graph of the top twenty models showing that the selected model 











































































































































































































































































































































Akaike Information Criteria (top 20 models)
 
Figure 2. Akaike information criterion results for PSCREDIT. 
 
Short-run PSCREDIT model. In Table 10, I reported the results of the 
cointegration test. The cointegration coefficient strongly predicted the long-run 
relationship, β = -.582, ρ < .001. I expected the result given that there was a long run 
relationship. It also indicated that the short run drift of the model returned very 
quickly to the long run model, that is, within two reporting periods.  
DEBT significantly predicted the short-run PSCREDIT, β = -.909, ρ < .001. 
FINTt-1, was a non-significant predictor of the short run PSCREDIT, β = 3.453, ρ 
=.112 and INQUAL was also not a significant predictor of the short-run PSCREDIT, 
β = -1.833, ρ =.665. However, the first lag of the institutional quality, INSQUALt-1, 
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predicted the short-run PSCREDIT, β = -13.499, ρ = .021; the second lag of 
institutional quality, INSQUALt-2 was also a significant predictor of short-run 
PSCREDIT, β = 12.735, ρ =.003.  
Table 10  
Short-Run Cointegration Coefficients for Question 1Model 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(DEBT) -0.909530 0.049252 -18.467006 0.0000 
D(FINT(-1)) 3.453523 2.153556 1.603637 0.1115 
D(GDP) -0.405341 0.160574 -2.524322 0.0129 
D(INSQUAL) -1.833795 4.228972 -0.433627 0.6654 
D(INSQUAL(-1)) -13.499041 5.755393 -2.345459 0.0207 
D(INSQUAL(-2)) 12.734713 4.203694 3.029410 0.0030 
D(TBRATE) -0.156803 0.059190 -2.649160 0.0092 
CointEq(-1) -0.581816 0.079382 -7.329334 0.0000 
Cointegration equation 
Cointeq = PSCREDIT - (-0.9810*DEBT + 5.9358*FINT(-1) - 0.6967*GDP  
-3.1543*INSQUAL -0.0165*TBRATE + 100.0108 ) 
 
INSQUAL data was in annual installments. Thus it is not likely to affect the 
monthly changes in the lending regime in the industry. The growth in GDP predicted 
the short-run change in PSCREDIT, β = -.405, ρ = .013. TBRATE was a negative and 
significant predictor of the short-run PSCREDIT, β = -.157, ρ = .009. 
The short run cointegration equation was given by Equation 25: 
ΔPSCREDITt = -0.909ΔDEBTt + 3.453ΔFINTt – 1 – 1.833ΔINSQUALt – 
13.499ΔINSQUALt – 1 + 12.735ΔINSQUALt – 2 – 0.157ΔTBRATEt – 0.405ΔGDPt – 
0.582ECt – 1          (25) 
where ECt-1 is the lagged residual from the long run relationship between the 
variables. 
Long-run model. Table 11 is a summary of the long-run relationship between 
the variables as determined by the ARDL evaluation. DEBT significantly predicted 
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PSCREDIT, β = -.981, ρ < .001 as was expected. I found that a one-unit increase in 
government debt resulted in a 0.98 decrease in the volume loans extended to the 
private sector. In effect, government credit crowded out the private sector in the loan 
market.  
Table 11  
Long-Run Coefficients for Question 1 Model 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DEBT -0.981039 0.047686 -20.572917 0.0000 
FINT(-1) 5.935762 3.521739 1.685463 0.0946 
GDP -0.696682 0.249454 -2.792825 0.0061 
INSQUAL -3.154305 1.786238 -1.765893 0.0800 
TBRATE -0.016512 0.029306 -0.563435 0.5742 
C 100.010764 5.013059 19.950048 0.0000 
 
The result for DEBT runs contrary to the crowding in found by Fayed (2013) 
in Egypt and the findings of Sharpe (2013) for sovereign countries. Fayed (2013) 
found no significant effect of government debt on private credit in the short run. In the 
long-run Egyptian government debt predicted a crowd-in of private sector credit. 
According to Sharpe (2013), sovereign governments can print money to pay their 
debts and need not crowd out the private sector. 
FINT was a positive and significant predictor of PSCREDIT at the 10% level, 
β = 5.936, ρ < .095. FINT crowded-in private sector credit as expected. FINT is a 
measure of bank liquidity. Thus a positive relationship was expected because higher 
liquidity would enable banks to make more loans after accounting for statutory 
reserves. The descriptive test results of Table 6 indicated a minimum, maximum, and 
mean FINT of 0.988, 1.322, and 1.133, an indication that the currency in circulation is 
nearly the same as the volume of banks deposits. I inferred from my result that 
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government did not resort to printing money as was suggested by Sharpe (2013), 
rather it borrowed from the banks to pay its debt which led to a crowding out of the 
private sector.  
INSQUAL was also a significant predictor of PSCREDIT at the 10% level, β 
= -3.154, ρ = .080. The result was unexpected. INSQUAL is a measure of the quality 
of governance. Good governance generates confidence in the economy which will 
contribute towards increased investments as was reported by Djankov et al. (2007). 
Thus, I expected a positive relationship between INSQUAL and PSCREDIT, but the 
result was otherwise for Ghana. The effect of the quality of governance on the private 
sector credit requires further study to determine the underlying factors. 
GDP growth was a significant but negative predictor of PSCREDIT at the 
10% level, β = -1.191, ρ = .092. The result was consistent with the findings of 
Churchill et al. (2014). Increasing GDP should generate a higher demand for credit as 
businesses took advantage of the improved economic conditions to make investments. 
Dietrich et al. (2015) had found a positive relationship between GDP growth and the 
NIM meaning that credit became more expensive with increasing rate of GDP growth 
which could account for the results. The result indicated that the rate of growth of the 
GDP in Ghana induces a higher cost of credit probably because of increased demand 
that ultimately leads to lower demand as the cost becomes unaffordable for the private 
sector. Another reason for the negative significance could be as explained by 
Churchill et al. (2014) that GDP does not influence the pricing of loans in Ghana. 
TBRATE was not a significant predictor of PSCREDIT, β = -.017, ρ = .574. 
TBRATE was expected to be negatively related to PSCREDIT. TBRATE contain 
information about the general level of prices in the economy and therefore should 
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have a negative relation with the demand for credit consistent with the findings of 
Fayed (2013) and Shetta and Kamaly (2014). Banks would prefer to invest in low-risk 
government debt than advance loans to perceived risky private sector borrowers. The 
negative coefficient is thus consistent with the literature, but the insignificant results 
could mean that the pricing of treasury bills was not a major influence on the lending 
capacity of banks. 
The long-run relationship between PSCREDIT and the variables was: 
PSCREDITt = 100.010 – 0.981DEBTt + 5.935FINTt – 1 – 3.154INSQUALt – 
0.017TBRATEt – 0.697GDPt + εt        (26) 
Test of Residuals 
Following from the ADRL test I performed tests on the residuals. These tests 
were to satisfy the requirement that results were best linear unbiased estimates 
(BLUE) and can explain the relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables in the model. I checked for outliers, serial correlation, and heteroscedasticity 
of the residuals. 
The overall ARDL model which I reported in Appendix C, returned 
F=561.809, p < .001, an adjusted R2 of 0.98, and a Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic of 
1.929. These results indicated that overall the model was robust in explaining the 
relationship between the variables. The DW results indicated that serial correlation 
was not an issue in the residuals. Figure 3 is a representation of the graphical plot of 
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Figure 3. Private sector credit model diagnostics. 
Serial correlation of residuals. I checked the residuals of the model for 
possible serial correlation by the Breusch-Godfrey LM test. The null hypothesis is the 
presence of serial correlation in the residuals. The results, Table 12, returned F(2,114) 
= 0.081, ρ = 0.922 rejecting the null hypothesis of serial correlation between the 
residuals. 
Table 12  
Residual Diagnostics Results for Question 1 Variables 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic 0.081247 Prob. F(2,114) 0.9220 
Obs*R-squared 0.182189 Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.9129 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
F-statistic 0.729408 Prob. F(11,116) 0.7084 
Obs*R-squared 8.280747 Prob. Chi-Square(11) 0.6880 




Heteroscedasticity test. I tested for heteroscedasticity among the residuals by 
the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey method. The null hypothesis is the presence of 
heteroscedasticity in the residuals. The result, presented in Table 12, returned F(11, 
116) = 0.729, ρ = 0.708, a non-significant output. Thus, I rejected the null hypothesis 
and accepted the alternative of no heteroscedasticity in the residuals.  
Threats to Validity 
Adequacy of the model. I checked the construct validity of my research 
model by confirming its adequacy using the Ramsey RESET test. I presented the 
results in Table 13. The test result, F(1, 115) = 0.150, ρ = 0.698, is not significant. 
Therefore, I rejected the null hypothesis of a non-adequately specified model. 
Table 13  
Ramsey RESET Test Result for Question 1 Variables 
 Value df Probability 
t-statistic  0.387926  115  0.6988 
F-statistic  0.150486 (1, 115)  0.6988 
F-test summary: 
 Sum of Sq. df Mean Squares 
Test SSR  0.071153  1  0.071153 
Restricted SSR  54.44553  116  0.469358 
Unrestricted SSR  54.37438  115  0.472821 
 
Study Results for Research Question 2 
In my second research question, I sought to find out whether there was any 
statistically significant relationship between DEBT and the NIM. I subjected the data 
to screening and cleaning as I described under Research Question 1 and conducted 
other tests described hereunder. 
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Descriptive Statistics and Tests 
I conducted descriptive statistics and tests of the data which I reported in 
Table 14. I reported on the range, mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, and 
normality for each variable. Skewness test results yielded significant results, (|S| < 0. 
5) for NIM, DEBT, DEF, EFF, and SIZE. EXCHR (|S| = .881) and HHI (|S| = .714) 
exhibited slightly positive skews. The kurtosis results indicated that NIM and DEBT 
were significant (|K| > 3). The other variables returned non-significant results.  
Check for normality of data. I checked for the normality of my data using 
the Jarque-Berra (J-B) method. The results, presented in Table 14, indicated that 
DEBT, RISK, and SIZE had normal distributions. All the other variables did not. 
Similar to Question 1, I adhered to Field (2013, p. 184) caution and ignored the non-
normal distribution exhibited by the other variables.  
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Table 14  
Descriptive Statistics of Research Question 2 Variables 
 
NIM DEBT DEF EXCHR INF CONCEN EFF HHI RISK SIZE RQUAL 
 Mean 0.253 9.613 -7.284 1.970 13.434 33.026 3.865 673.875 48.880 31.842 0.030 
 Median 0.249 9.618 -6.813 1.517 12.810 31.465 3.875 626.038 48.532 31.804 -0.007 
 Maximum 0.529 13.432 -4.005 4.187 20.740 43.925 7.818 982.347 58.797 42.278 0.132 
 Minimum -0.055 6.653 -11.483 0.909 8.390 23.808 0.537 497.213 38.000 19.335 -0.072 
 Std. Dev. 0.080 1.420 2.294 1.036 3.837 5.680 2.090 124.522 4.180 5.339 0.079 
 Skewness -0.017 0.325 -0.407 0.881 0.276 0.304 0.037 0.714 0.223 -0.351 0.114 
 Kurtosis 4.473 3.055 2.065 2.351 1.625 1.948 1.829 2.436 3.369 2.457 1.309 
 Jarque-Bera 11.846 2.320 8.394 19.237 11.993 8.057 7.519 12.873 1.829 4.299 15.901 
 Probability 0.003 0.314 0.015 0.0001 0.002 0.018 0.023 0.002 0.401 0.117 0.0004 
 Sum 33.189 1259.325 -954.142 258.094 1759.832 4326.350 506.349 88277.670 6403.219 4171.334 3.904 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.826 262.256 684.390 139.474 1913.573 4194.083 567.763 2015747.000 2271.113 3705.616 0.821 




Table 15  
Pearson Correlation Test Results for Question 2 Variables 
 
NIM DEBT DEF EXCHR INF CONCEN EFF HHI RISK SIZE RQUAL 
NIM 1.00 0.57 -0.36 0.73 0.42 -0.69 0.29 -0.67 -0.02 0.77 0.02 
DEBT 0.57 1.00 -0.33 0.42 -0.08 -0.64 0.32 -0.64 -0.48 0.60 0.42 
DEF -0.36 -0.33 1.00 -0.40 -0.10 0.44 0.08 0.47 -0.03 -0.37 -0.27 
EXCHR 0.73 0.42 -0.40 1.00 0.47 -0.87 0.001 -0.80 -0.18 0.75 -0.16 
INF 0.42 -0.08 -0.10 0.47 1.00 -0.21 0.005 -0.19 0.65 0.57 -0.33 
CONCEN -0.69 -0.64 0.44 -0.87 -0.21 1.00 -0.001 0.99 0.44 -0.81 -0.29 
EFF 0.29 0.32 0.08 0.001 0.005 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.06 0.21 -0.05 
HHI -0.67 -0.64 0.47 -0.80 -0.19 0.99 -0.0002 1.00 0.41 -0.81 -0.39 
RISK -0.02 -0.48 -0.03 -0.18 0.65 0.44 0.06 0.41 1.00 0.02 -0.32 
SIZE 0.77 0.60 -0.37 0.75 0.57 -0.81 0.21 -0.81 0.02 1.00 0.24 




Check for multicollinearity. I checked for collinearity among the research 
variables. The results presented in Table 15, indicated that CONCEN and HHI were 
highly correlated. Both variables were measures of the level of competition in the 
banking industry, therefore, and following Dietrich et al. (2015), I retained CONCEN 
and omitted HHI from the regression analysis. No other pairs of variables exhibited 
any significant level of correlation to be of concern. 
Stationarity check. Based on the results of the descriptive statistics and tests, 
I concluded that the ordinary least square regression would yield biased and 
unacceptable results consistent with the literature which suggest that macroeconomic 
time series data could be non-stationary (Fayed, 2013). I, therefore, proceeded to 
check the stationarity status of my data. I tested for unit roots in my data using the 
ADF method. My null hypothesis was that there were no unit roots in any of the 
variables. I tested each variable independently in levels and first differences. The 
summarized results in Table 16 indicated that the data exhibited a mixture of I(0) and 
I(1). NIM and DEBT were I(0) whereas the rest of the variables were I(1).  
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Table 16  
Test for Unit Roots in the Question 2 Variables 








































































































Note. Table reports t-statistics; p values in parentheses 
 
Under these conditions of mixed levels of integration, I adopted the ARDL 
approach to finding a cointegration relationship between the variables. I first 
performed the bounds test to determine the unit root properties of the variables and 
whether there was a long-run cointegration relationship between the variables.  
Bounds test. Following from the ARDL analysis, I performed the bounds test 
to determine the stationarity of the variables. I presented the results of the bounds test 
in Table 17. The bounds test results returned F = 11.1586. The result is greater than 
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the critical value for I(1) (F = 3.30, ρ = 0.05). Thus, the model’s variables are all I(1). 
By the test results, I also rejected the null hypothesis that no long-run relationship 
existed between the variables. The model, therefore, had both short- and long-run 
properties. I confirmed these by the results presented in Table 18.  
Table 17  
Bounds Test Results for Question 2 Model 
Test Statistic Value k 
F-statistic 22.84775 9 
Critical Value Bounds 
Significance I0 Bound I1 Bound 
10% 1.88 2.99 
5% 2.14 3.30 
2.50% 2.37 3.60 
1% 2.65 3.97 
Note. Null Hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist 
 
Specifying the Question 2 Regression Model 
Following the results of the bounds test, I used the ARDL method to estimate 
the short- and long-run models. In the ARDL estimation, I specified an automatic lag 
selection procedure with the AIC as my model selection criteria. The software iterated 
7812500 models and selected a model with the parameters ARDL (1, 3, 0, 0, 0, 4, 3, 
0, 4, 0). I presented the results of the ARDL results in Appendix 4. In Figure 4 I 
presented the graph of the top twenty models showing that the selected model had 
lowest AIC value.  
In the ARDL results, the first lag of NIM, NIMt-1 was significant (β = -.337, ρ 
< .001). The other variables returned varying levels of significance in their different 
lags. Overall, the model returned an F = 18.250, ρ < .001, a DW statistic of 2.064, and 
an adjusted R2 = 0.811. These results confirmed the presence of unit roots in the NIM 
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data, a necessary condition for the application of the ARDL methodology. The results 
also confirmed the model as adequate for explaining the relationship between NIM, 




















































































































































































































































































































Akaike Information Criteria (top 20 models)
 
Figure 4. Akaike information criterion results for NIM. 
Short-run NIM model. In Table 18, I reported the results of the cointegration 
test. The error correction coefficient was -1.337 and strongly significant (ρ < .001). 
The result was much lower than expected. However, Narayan and Smyth (2006) 
intimated that a coefficient between -1.0 and -2.0 is acceptable because it indicates a 
diminishing and fluctuating form of convergence of the short-run drift of the model to 
the long-run equilibrium.  
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Table 18  
Short-run Coefficients for Question 2 Model 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
D(DEBT(-1)) 0.014292 0.008265 1.729239 0.0868 
D(DEBT(-2)) -0.003498 0.009739 -0.359224 0.7202 
D(DEBT(-3)) 0.016166 0.007326 2.206669 0.0296 
D(DEF) 0.000726 0.002144 0.338674 0.7356 
D(EXCHR) 0.089497 0.01961 4.563841 0.0000 
D(INF) -0.004903 0.002589 -1.894182 0.061 
D(CONCEN) -0.016704 0.005306 -3.148249 0.0022 
D(CONCEN(-1)) -0.007213 0.00643 -1.121779 0.2646 
D(CONCEN(-2)) 0.000807 0.006067 0.13295 0.8945 
D(CONCEN(-3)) -0.01034 0.005351 -1.932344 0.0561 
D(EFF) 0.004991 0.002515 1.984751 0.0499 
D(EFF(-1)) 0.004221 0.003379 1.248978 0.2145 
D(EFF(-2)) 0.003881 0.00272 1.426595 0.1568 
D(RISK) 0.005074 0.002384 2.127853 0.0358 
D(SIZE) 0.008604 0.002379 3.616583 0.0005 
D(SIZE(-1)) 0.006751 0.003082 2.19031 0.0308 
D(SIZE(-2)) 0.003446 0.003025 1.139269 0.2573 
D(SIZE(-3)) -0.008673 0.002438 -3.557524 0.0006 
D(RQUAL) 0.090602 0.124142 0.729832 0.4672 
CointEq(-1) -1.336792 0.087791 -15.226907 0.00000 
Cointeq = NIM - (0.0184*DEBT(-1) + 0.0005*DEF + 0.0669*EXCHR -
0.0037*INF + 0.0065*CONCEN + 0.0023*EFF + 0.0038*RISK + 
0.0047*SIZE + 0.0678*RQUAL -0.5665 ) 
 
All the model’s variables were also significant predictors of the change in the 
dependent variable as shown in Table 18. The short-run model’s equation is therefore 
given by Equation 27: 
ΔNIMt = 0.014ΔDEBTt–1 – 0.003ΔDEBTt–2 + 0.016ΔDEBTt–3 + 0.001ΔDEFt + 
0.089ΔEXCHRt – 0.005ΔINFt + 0.005ΔRISKt + 0.007ΔSIZEt + 0.003ΔSIZEt–1 – 
0.009ΔSIZEt–3 – 0.017ΔCONCENt – 0.007ΔCONCENt – 1 + 0.001ΔCONCENt–2 – 
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0.010ΔCONCENt-3 + 0.005ΔEFFt + 0.004ΔEFFt – 1 + 0.004ΔEFFt–2 + 0.091ΔRQUALt 
– 1.34ECt-1         (27) 
where ECt-1 is the lagged residual from the long run relationship between the 
variables. 
Long-run NIM model. In Table 19 I presented a summary of the long-run 
relationship between the variables as determined from the ARDL evaluation. DEBT 
had a positive and significant relationship with NIM, β = .0184, ρ <.001. The result 
was as expected. Significantly, the coefficient of DEBT implied that government debt 
in the preceding period accounted for nearly 2% increase in NIM in the current 
period.  
Table 19  
Long-run Model Coefficients for Question 2  
Variable Coefficient Std. 
Error 
t-Statistic Prob.  
DEBT(-1) 0.018447 0.003796 4.858948 0.0000 
DEF 0.000543 0.001604 0.338644 0.7356 
EXCHR 0.066949 0.014355 4.663698 0.00000 
INF -0.003668 0.001933 -1.8973 0.0606 
CONCEN 0.006489 0.003032 2.1399 0.0347 
EFF 0.002338 0.002395 0.976001 0.3314 
RISK 0.003795 0.001783 2.128581 0.0357 
SIZE 0.004666 0.002238 2.084892 0.0396 
RQUAL 0.067776 0.093089 0.728077 0.4682 
C -0.566548 0.128224 -4.418431 0.00000 
 
Similarly, EXCHR, INF, and RISK were all significant predictors of the NIM, 
thus confirming the findings of Churchill et al. (2014), Dietrich et al. (2015), and 
Mensah and Abor (2014). EXCHR and INF are macroeconomic variables with major 
influence on the economy. 
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DEF did not exhibit a significant relationship with NIM, β = -.007, ρ = .749. 
The findings could be because of the partial reliance on foreign sources of funds to 
finance the budget deficits consistent with the findings of Hubbard (2012) that foreign 
savings could reduce the effect of the deficit on interest rates. Data from the Ministry 
of Finance (2015) of Ghana indicated that foreign source financing of the deficit had 
been up to 50% of the total for the period 2008 and 2014. The second reason that I 
can assign to the non-significant results is the fact that the domestic debt accounts for 
part of the deficit, thus rendering the variable was redundant in the model. Therefore, 
the non-significant result of the DEF was not unexpected. 
EXCHR significantly predicted NIM, β = .067, ρ < .001. Significantly 
EXCHR explained nearly 7% of the variation in the NIM of banks. The positive 
impact on NIM and, by extension, the cost of capital, was expected because increases 
in the rate signaled depreciation of the Ghanaian currency, and banks were expected 
to adjust their lending rates to maintain their level of profitability. The significant 
coefficient indicated a strong pass-through effect of exchange rate shocks on interest 
rates contrary to Loloh (2014) who reported an incomplete effect.  
INF significantly predicted NIM at the 10% level, β = -0.004, ρ = 0.061. I 
expected INF to correlate positively with NIM. Mensah and Abor (2014) had reported 
a positive relationship between inflation and interest rates because banks were 
supposed to account for inflation in pricing the loans. My result contradicted their 
findings. Loloh (2014) reported that Ghanaian producers endure a reduction in their 
profit margins because of an inability to pass-through exchange rate shocks to their 
consumers. My result seems to show that a similar situation exists in the case of 
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inflation and NIM—Ghanaian banks endure a reduction in their margins due to 
inflation.  
RISK significantly predicted NIM, β = .004, ρ = .036. The role of RISK in 
NIM is ambiguous (Dietrich et al., 2015). I measured RISK as the ratio of total loans 
to bank assets. I expected therefore that the greater the volume of loans granted, the 
higher the interest margins to be earned but also the higher the risk of default. Thus, 
the positive relationship was appropriate. The positive and significant relations 
between RISK and NIM were as expected and confirm Were and Wambua (2014) 
who found a positive correlation between bank-specific factors and interest rate 
spreads. 
CONCEN was a significant predictor of NIM β = .006, ρ = .035. The results 
confirm my expectations and the findings of Dietrich et al. (2015) for developing 
countries. My results also confirm the findings of Mensah and Abor (2014) that 
concentration in the banking industry in Ghana leads to higher interest margins. The 
basic assumptions of the findings of these authors were that in highly concentrated 
markets, banks have enough market power to pass their costs to customers. It appears 
that competition among Ghana’s banks is not strong enough to affect their earnings.  
EFF did not significantly predict NIM, β = .002, ρ = .331. The finding run 
counter to my expectations. Bank interest rates contain information about their 
overhead expenses as well as the cost of the risk of the loans they advance to 
customers. I expected that increases in the variable would be passed on to customers 
in the form of higher borrowing and lower saving rates (Dietrich et al., 2015). The 
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non-significant nature of the results indicated that Ghanaian banks do not 
accommodate all their costs in their interest rates. 
SIZE significantly predicted NIM, β = .005, ρ = .0396. Obviously, the growth 
of bank assets, my measure of SIZE, had a bearing on NIM thus confirming Mensah 
and Abor (2014). It is an indication that Ghanaian banks took advantage of the growth 
in their asset base in the market.  
Overall, the relations between bank-specific factors and NIM confirm some of 
Were and Wambua (2014). The authors found that bank size, credit risk, return on 
average assets, and operating costs had a positive effect on interest rate spreads 
whereas higher bank liquidity ratio has a negative effect. My findings are that bank 
size is significant but not operating costs probably because Ghanaian banks do not 
accommodate all their costs in their interest rates.  
RQUAL did not significantly predict NIM, β = .068, ρ = .468. The result run 
counter to expectations. The quality of regulations, especially, regulations that protect 
lenders should to boost confidence in the sector and lead to a high lending regime that 
will contribute to higher interest margins. Obviously, the situation in Ghana is 
different. 
The long-run relationship between NIM and the variables was, Equation 28: 
NIMt = -0.567 + 0.0184DEBTt – 1- 0.0005DEFt + 0.0669EXCHRt – 
0.0037INFLt + 0.0038RISKt – 0.0065CONCENt + 0.0023EFFt – 0.047SIZEt + 
0.0678RQUALt + εt        (28) 
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Test of Residuals 
Following from the ADRL test I performed tests on the residuals. These tests 
were to satisfy the requirement that results were BLUE and can explain the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables in the model. I checked 
for outliers, serial correlation, and heteroscedasticity of the residuals. 
The overall ARDL analysis, presented in Appendix D, returned an F(18.250, ρ 
< 0.001) and a DW statistic of 2.065. These results indicated that overall, the model 
was robust in explaining the relationship between the variables. The DW results 
indicated that serial correlation was not an issue in the residuals. Figure 5 is a 
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Serial Correlation of Residuals. I checked the residuals of the model for 
possible serial correlation by the Breuch-Godfrey LM test. The results, Table 20, 
returned F(2, 100) = 0.529, ρ = 0.591 rejecting the null hypothesis of serial correlation 
between the residuals. 
Table 20  
Residual Diagnostics Results for Question 2 Variables 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
F-statistic 0.528756 Prob. F(2,100) 0.591 
Obs*R-squared 1.328985 Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.5145 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey  
F-statistic 1.240585 Prob. F(24,102) 0.2267 
Obs*R-squared 28.69536 Prob. Chi-Square(24) 0.2318 
Scaled explained SS 36.50878 Prob. Chi-Square(24) 0.049 
 
Heteroscedasticity test. I tested for heteroscedasticity among the residuals by 
the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey method. The null hypothesis is the presence of 
heteroscedasticity in the residuals. The results F(24, 102) = 41.241, ρ = 0.227, is not 
significant. Thus, I rejected the null hypothesis and accepted the alternative of no 
heteroscedasticity in the residuals.  
Threats to Validity 
Adequacy of the model. I checked the construct validity of my model by 
confirming its adequacy using the Ramsey RESET test. I presented the results in 
Table 21. The test result was not significant F(1, 101) = 0.117, ρ = 0.733. Therefore, I 
rejected the null hypothesis of a non-adequately specified model. 
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Table 21  
Ramsey RESET Test Result for Research Question 2 Residuals 
 Value df Probability 
t-statistic 0.342207 101 0.7329 
F-statistic 0.117106 (1, 101) 0.7329 
F-test summary: 
   
 
Sum of Sq. df Mean Squares 
Test SSR 0.000155 1 0.000155 
Restricted SSR 0.133779 102 0.001312 
Unrestricted SSR 0.133624 101 0.001323 
 
Summary 
In this chapter, I presented the results of my data analysis. In my research, I 
investigated the incidence of FCO in Ghana along the quantity and cost channels. I 
obtained data from the BoG and the World Bank for the period February 2006 to 
December 2016, a total of 131 data entries. I subjected my data to initial checks for 
multicollinearity, normality, and unit root properties. The variables were a mix of I(0) 
and I(1), and some violated the normality assumptions. I, therefore, used the ARDL 
method to analyze the data.  
The results for PSCREDIT indicated that there was both a short-run and long-
run cointegration relationship between the variables. I also found a negative and 
significant relationship between my dependent and independent variables an 
indication of the presence of FCO in Ghana along the quantity channel. The results 
for NIM exhibited similar long- and short-term cointegration relationships between 
the dependent, independent, and covariables. The results indicated a significant and 
positive relationship between the dependent and independent variable, thus showing 
the presence of FCO along the cost channel.  
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The next chapter is my final for the dissertation. In that chapter, I discussed 
my findings, drew conclusions, made recommendations for further research, and 




Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The purpose of this quantitative research was to investigate the presence of 
FCO in Ghana. I did this by examining the relationship between the government’s 
domestic debt and the credit advanced to the private corporate sector by Ghanaian 
banks. My objective was to use the results to determine whether the government 
crowded out the private sector regarding the quantity of credit and the cost of credit to 
show that FCO exists in the Ghanaian economy.  
FCO is one of the several theories that explain the lack of access to finance for 
the private sector. FCO theory is, however, still evolving (Aisen & Hauner, 2013) 
with diverging opinions. In Ghana, Sheriff and Amoako (2014) found evidence of a 
short-term relationship between macroeconomic variables and the IRS, pointing to a 
potential presence of FCO. My research extended their work by incorporating bank-
specific variables and investigating FCO along both the quantity and cost channels 
following the steps of Fayed (2013) and Sharpe (2013). 
My results indicated that there is a long-term negative relationship between 
PSCREDIT and DEBT, and a long-term positive relationship between NIM and 
DEBT. These results provide evidence that government borrowing affects the supply 
of credit to the private corporate sector. In effect, based on the data available at this 
time, the GoG’s policy of borrowing from the domestic market to offset some of the 
budget deficit crowded out the private sector from the loan market. 
Interpretation of Findings 
Several factors determine how firms gain access to credit for their operations 
in a country. Researchers including Dietrich et al. (2015), Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot, 
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(2012), Joeveer (2013), and Love and Peria (2015) identified these factors and noted 
that they operated at the levels of the economy, firm, household, and lending 
institutions or banks. Using the method of Deltuvaite and Sineviciene (2014), I 
concluded that Ghana’s credit market is bank driven. At this level of operations, 
neoclassical theory indicates that there will be competition for funds, that can drive up 
the cost of credit. In this research, I hypothesized that government’s domestic 
borrowing accounted for the high cost and low quantities of credit available to the 
private sector in Ghana under the phenomenon described as FCO. I posed two 
questions along the quantity and cost channels to investigate whether there was FCO 
in Ghana; that is, whether the government’s domestic debt competed with credit to the 
private corporate sector.  
Research Questions 
My first question asked about the relationship between the government’s 
domestic debt and the quantity of private sector credit. I tested the null hypothesis that 
there was no significant relationship between the government’s domestic debt and the 
volume of private sector credit. My second research question asked about the 
relationship between government’s domestic borrowing and the cost of credit to the 
private sector. I tested the null hypothesis that there was no significant relationship 
between the cost of credit, which I operationalized as the NIM and government debt.  
Findings of the Research 
I used a regression model of the form Yt = β0 + β1X + εt, where Yt is the 
dependent variable, β0 and β1 are regression constants, Xt is the independent variable, 
and εt is the error term. My key independent variable was the government’s domestic 
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debt represented by Xt in the model. In the presence of crowding out, the constant β1 < 
0, and if the error term, εt, is random, the constant β1 will be an unbiased, consistent, 
and efficient estimator of FCO in both the short and long term. Where the dependent 
variable correlated with both the current and lagged values of Xt, it creates a 
distributed-lag model, and the relationship between the dependent variable and the 
independent will be of the form: Yt = β0 + β1Xt +β2Xt-1 + β2Xt-2 + …+βnXt-n + εt. Under 
these circumstances, there is both a short-run and long-run relationship between the 
variables. The short-run relation shall be β1 whereas the long-term relationship will be 
of the form Σnt=1βt = β1 + β2 + β3 + …+ βn. The two estimators were the key results 
that I relied on to answer the research questions to determine whether credit to the 
Ghanaian private sector was the product of the government’s domestic debt. 
Findings of Research Question 1. The findings of the investigation of FCO 
along the quantity channel yielded a β1 and βt of -0.909 and -0.981, respectively. 
These results indicated that by the available data, the government’s borrowing 
activities crowded out the private sector in both the long and short runs. In the long 
term, a one-unit increase in DEBT reduced PSCREDIT by 0.98 units.  
Findings of Research Question 2. The findings of the investigation of FCO 
along the quantity channel yielded a β1 and a βt of 0.0143 and 0.0184, respectively. 
The findings indicated by available data, DEBT was responsible for the net income 
margins earned by the banking industry. A one-unit increase in DEBT resulted in a 
0.0184-unit increase in the NIM in the long term. 
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Importance of the Findings 
My study contributed to the rhetoric on FCO by establishing that there was 
FCO in the Ghanaian economy. Aisen and Hauner (2013) reported the inconclusive 
nature of research findings on FCOs. My results, based on the available data, make a 
categorical statement on the phenomenon in the Ghanaian economy. My results 
contradict Fayed (2013), who did not find any long- or short-term FCO in Egypt, but 
rather a crowding in of credit. My results also contradict Sharpe (2013), who argued 
that sovereign states need not suffer FCO because the government can resort to the 
printing of money to settle its debts.  
The results provide a window into the effect of macroeconomic policies as 
well as banking operations in the country. The government, acting through its 
ministry of finance, is responsible for the macroeconomic policies and management of 
the country. These policymakers can use my results to quantify the extent and effect 
of government fiscal policies on the private corporate sector and to support policy 
revision.  
Ghana is a lower-middle-income country and had benefited from substantial 
International Development Association (IDA) and IMF loans, and bilateral assistance 
from several countries. In addition to the external loans, the GoG borrows extensively 
from the domestic market to supplement its revenue shortfalls. In 2011, the 
government adopted a public-private partnership (PPP) policy (Ministry of Finance, 
2011) for infrastructure development in the country. The objective was for the private 
corporate sector to partner government to deliver needed key public infrastructure and 
services to the people of Ghana. PPPs are project financed and, therefore, highly 
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levered with debt-to-total capital levels in the range of 74% to 75% (Esty, Chavich, & 
Sesia, 2014). Competing with the private sector for bank credit can be detrimental to 
the implementation of the PPP policy. 
Limitations of the Study 
In this research, I sought to correlate the quantity and the cost of credit to the 
private corporate sector with government debt. The sector comprises industries of 
various types and sizes, and with different credit ratings. I did not attempt to 
differentiate between the institutions. It was possible that some sectors received better 
services than others. However, I overcame this limitation by aggregation (i.e., the 
estimates were at country and not at the level of the firm). The implication was that 
the results I obtained addressed the issues of cost and quantity of private sector credit 
at the aggregate level without distinguishing between sectors of the economy. 
I used data from the BoG and World Bank. The reliability and accuracy of the 
data were beyond my control as a researcher. However, these are credible institutions 
with several years’ experience in data collection, cleaning, analysis, and 
dissemination. The reliability of the data from these sources was a reasonable 
expectation. 
The frequency of my data was a mixture of annual and monthly intervals. The 
BoG reported macroeconomic variables in annual intervals whereas banking data was 
monthly. To assure adequate power for the research’s findings, I adopted the monthly 
intervals as my period that resulted in 131 data points. To overcome the lack of 
monthly macroeconomic data I adopted the annual data for each month for the 
reporting year. The resulting dataset violated the normality assumptions. It is possible 
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that the distribution led a less than robust statistical estimates. However, these 
macroeconomic variables were covariables only, so I expected their effect on the 
models to be minimal. 
Recommendations 
My research has brought to the fore the fact that government debt crowded out 
the private sector. If the private sector is to be the engine of growth, then every effort 
must be made to support their operations. Government has to review its fiscal 
policies. The policy on deficit financing requires revision and reassessment because 
the net effect on the economy could be negative.  
NIM, the dependent variable for the second research question, had information 
on interest rates. Ghanaian businesses report high interest rates. I will recommend 
studies that will review interest rate cost build up with the aim of determining the 
contribution of government debt to the overall interest charged borrowers. I will 
encourage further research to determine other factors that may be driving up interest 
rates and by extension the NIM, which does not include increases in the demand for 
loans. 
Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) stated that open market operations by a central 
bank affect nominal interest rates, the so-called liquidity effect. A central bank can, 
therefore, stabilize interest rates as well as the quantities of funds available to the 
banking system by engaging in open market operations. I would recommend that the 
BoG use their open market operations as a strategy to stabilize both liquidity and 
interest rates to reduce the incidence of crowding out of Ghanaian businesses. 
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The research period was from 2006 to 2016. The period included the credit 
crunch period when the world’s economy suffered a major setback. I did not account 
for this period in my analysis. I recommend further research to study the effect of the 
credit crunch on the quantity and cost of credit in Ghana during the period. 
Implications  
I investigated FCO as a possible problem confronting the Ghanaian corporate 
sector’s quest for credit. The underlying principle of the research was that access to 
credit is essential for businesses to survive and thrive in an economy. FCO, according 
to Gaye (2013), results in a slowdown or stagnation in economic activities, growth, 
and welfare. Broner et al. (2014) stated that it could induce financial crisis, whereas 
Asogwa and Okeke (2013) listed low industrial growth and job losses among its many 
effects. Another effect would be a lower investment in research and development in 
the economy (Cecchetti & Kharroubi, 2015). These identified negative effects of a 
credit squeeze would be minimized or avoided in the presence of adequate and 
affordable credit. Therefore, the positive social change implications of the study are 
obvious: the revision of fiscal policies which can contribute to a better quality of life 
for all Ghanaians when the private sector can invest and grow the economy. 
Conclusions 
The purpose of my study was to investigate the presence of FCO in Ghana. I 
did this by correlating government debt with the quantity of credit to the private 
sector, and government debt with the NIM of Ghanaian banks. I used data from the 
BoG and the World Bank databases for my research. My data spanned the years 2006 
to 2016. The findings of the research, based on the available data and my research 
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models, indicated the presence of FCO in Ghana along both the quantity and cost 
channels. The result contributes to the rhetoric on FCO, which remains inconclusive 
among researchers. My results contradict the findings of Fayed (2013), who found 
long-term crowding in in Egypt, and Sharpe (2013), who argued that based on the 
modern money theory, FCO cannot occur in sovereign states like Ghana. I hope that 
policymakers in Ghana will take notice of my findings and revise their fiscal policies. 
At the current level of economic development with high interest rates compared with 
those in similar countries, unbridled borrowing by the government from the domestic 
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Appendix A: Dataset for PSCREDIT Analysis  
MONTH PSCREDIT DEBT FINT GDP INSQUAL TBRATE 
2006M02 37.900 51.230 1.011 23.652 -0.072 10.290 
2006M03 39.729 50.669 1.018 23.652 -0.072 9.800 
2006M04 40.155 50.215 1.029 23.652 -0.072 9.630 
2006M05 40.005 48.436 1.010 23.652 -0.072 9.680 
2006M06 43.628 46.732 1.015 23.652 -0.072 10.200 
2006M07 44.087 47.049 0.993 23.652 -0.072 9.680 
2006M08 42.935 47.861 1.015 23.652 -0.072 10.280 
2006M09 43.786 46.972 1.033 23.652 -0.072 10.350 
2006M10 44.585 45.713 1.040 23.652 -0.072 10.500 
2006M11 45.354 44.501 1.025 23.652 -0.072 10.400 
2006M12 46.822 43.454 0.988 23.652 -0.072 9.600 
2007M01 43.799 46.443 1.015 23.865 -0.072 9.900 
2007M02 45.388 44.730 1.029 23.865 -0.072 9.700 
2007M03 45.988 44.698 1.035 23.865 -0.072 9.600 
2007M04 46.431 43.897 1.055 23.865 -0.072 9.600 
2007M05 47.414 42.949 1.033 23.865 -0.072 9.600 
2007M06 48.248 42.396 1.040 23.865 -0.072 9.600 
2007M07 47.060 42.459 1.053 23.865 -0.072 9.700 
2007M08 45.708 45.298 1.082 23.865 -0.072 9.800 
2007M09 51.388 38.926 1.115 23.865 -0.072 9.800 
2007M10 51.398 38.350 1.054 23.865 -0.072 10.250 
2007M11 53.221 37.511 1.058 23.865 -0.072 10.600 
2007M12 52.813 38.472 1.012 23.865 -0.072 10.600 
2008M01 51.966 36.851 1.058 24.130 -0.031 10.800 
2008M02 52.185 37.586 1.082 24.130 -0.031 10.800 
2008M03 51.485 38.779 1.086 24.130 -0.031 11.100 
2008M04 53.088 36.653 1.107 24.130 -0.031 11.800 
2008M05 53.754 35.679 1.075 24.130 -0.031 14.000 
2008M06 53.957 34.955 1.108 24.130 -0.031 16.300 
2008M07 56.397 34.184 1.117 24.130 -0.031 19.800 
2008M08 56.785 32.673 1.152 24.130 -0.031 24.600 
2008M09 58.304 31.729 1.146 24.130 -0.031 24.600 
2008M10 57.757 32.150 1.132 24.130 -0.031 24.700 
2008M11 57.138 32.812 1.099 24.130 -0.031 24.700 
2008M12 55.109 34.922 1.071 24.130 -0.031 24.700 
2009M01 55.070 35.197 1.099 24.130 0.091 24.700 
2009M02 54.556 35.425 1.140 24.130 0.091 24.700 
2009M03 57.034 33.864 1.171 24.130 0.091 27.800 
2009M04 57.970 32.573 1.169 24.130 0.091 25.700 
Table continues  
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MONTH PSCREDIT DEBT FINT GDP INSQUAL TBRATE 
2009M05 57.807 32.877 1.179 24.130 0.091 25.700 
2009M06 58.311 32.337 1.196 24.130 0.091 25.800 
2009M07 59.490 31.599 1.217 24.130 0.091 25.900 
2009M08 57.195 33.559 1.216 24.130 0.091 25.900 
2009M09 56.097 34.126 1.184 24.130 0.091 25.900 
2009M10 55.139 34.622 1.143 24.130 0.091 25.800 
2009M11 53.144 37.406 1.111 24.130 0.091 24.900 
2009M12 49.633 41.358 1.157 24.130 0.091 22.500 
2010M01 48.809 42.831 1.141 24.553 0.126 18.900 
2010M02 47.930 43.750 1.163 24.553 0.126 17.200 
2010M03 48.810 42.898 1.142 24.553 0.126 14.600 
2010M04 47.624 43.811 1.157 24.553 0.126 13.400 
2010M05 48.375 43.392 1.146 24.553 0.126 12.900 
2010M06 47.816 42.388 1.172 24.553 0.126 13.300 
2010M07 47.392 42.696 1.170 24.553 0.126 12.700 
2010M08 47.291 43.391 1.168 24.553 0.126 12.700 
2010M09 46.893 43.502 1.149 24.553 0.126 12.500 
2010M10 44.874 44.433 1.181 24.553 0.126 12.400 
2010M11 45.783 44.428 1.069 24.553 0.126 12.330 
2010M12 45.737 44.342 1.053 24.553 0.126 12.250 
2011M01 44.518 46.472 1.096 24.815 0.132 12.150 
2011M02 41.790 48.442 1.121 24.815 0.132 12.120 
2011M03 40.962 48.615 1.103 24.815 0.132 12.110 
2011M04 41.061 48.605 1.119 24.815 0.132 12.050 
2011M05 41.737 48.153 1.133 24.815 0.132 10.490 
2011M06 43.935 45.804 1.147 24.815 0.132 10.570 
2011M07 45.363 44.433 1.160 24.815 0.132 10.200 
2011M08 45.033 44.220 1.155 24.815 0.132 9.370 
2011M09 45.465 42.821 1.150 24.815 0.132 9.410 
2011M10 47.325 41.294 1.108 24.815 0.132 9.130 
2011M11 46.714 41.368 1.133 24.815 0.132 9.630 
2011M12 47.522 42.231 1.093 24.815 0.132 10.670 
2012M01 47.759 42.513 1.119 25.045 0.130 10.850 
2012M02 48.092 41.639 1.131 25.045 0.130 11.340 
2012M03 47.372 42.384 1.188 25.045 0.130 12.300 
2012M04 47.238 42.132 1.172 25.045 0.130 13.970 
2012M05 47.895 41.365 1.183 25.045 0.130 16.920 
2012M06 48.437 40.054 1.186 25.045 0.130 22.443 
2012M07 50.683 37.967 1.168 25.045 0.130 22.850 
2012M08 50.474 38.095 1.169 25.045 0.130 22.850 




MONTH PSCREDIT DEBT FINT GDP INSQUAL TBRATE 
2012M10 49.790 38.436 1.160 25.045 0.130 23.090 
2012M11 47.401 40.841 1.115 25.045 0.130 22.340 
2012M12 46.373 43.014 1.101 25.045 0.130 22.900 
2013M01 43.295 45.576 1.105 25.260 0.084 22.897 
2013M02 45.673 43.154 1.105 25.260 0.084 22.998 
2013M03 45.532 43.028 1.137 25.260 0.084 22.861 
2013M04 45.175 43.471 1.126 25.260 0.084 22.968 
2013M05 46.119 42.624 1.118 25.260 0.084 23.027 
2013M06 48.121 41.888 1.132 25.260 0.084 23.060 
2013M07 46.274 43.766 1.120 25.260 0.084 23.068 
2013M08 43.333 43.716 1.128 25.260 0.084 22.858 
2013M09 45.818 43.141 1.128 25.260 0.084 21.587 
2013M10 44.799 43.638 1.106 25.260 0.084 20.290 
2013M11 43.233 44.602 1.089 25.260 0.084 19.230 
2013M12 46.808 43.241 1.117 25.260 0.084 18.800 
2014M01 47.264 43.080 1.129 25.454 -0.007 19.463 
2014M02 47.900 42.447 1.154 25.454 -0.007 20.378 
2014M03 47.168 40.869 1.166 25.454 -0.007 22.893 
2014M04 52.404 37.139 1.143 25.454 -0.007 24.043 
2014M05 51.759 38.007 1.159 25.454 -0.007 24.066 
2014M06 54.880 35.029 1.194 25.454 -0.007 24.071 
2014M07 54.712 34.457 1.174 25.454 -0.007 24.646 
2014M08 53.991 35.383 1.196 25.454 -0.007 25.009 
2014M09 53.793 35.829 1.209 25.454 -0.007 25.337 
2014M10 53.220 36.299 1.206 25.454 -0.007 25.681 
2014M11 52.691 36.992 1.149 25.454 -0.007 25.727 
2014M12 51.018 37.892 1.170 25.454 -0.007 25.791 
2015M01 51.148 37.535 1.118 25.643 -0.031 25.832 
2015M02 52.092 36.531 1.200 25.643 -0.031 25.622 
2015M03 54.143 34.796 1.226 25.643 -0.031 25.552 
2015M04 56.262 33.178 1.241 25.643 -0.031 25.179 
2015M05 57.790 32.166 1.258 25.643 -0.031 25.050 
2015M06 59.012 30.934 1.323 25.643 -0.031 25.170 
2015M07 57.370 32.175 1.248 25.643 -0.031 25.202 
2015M08 58.403 31.379 1.251 25.643 -0.031 25.218 
2015M09 57.039 31.694 1.227 25.643 -0.031 25.285 
2015M10 56.367 33.056 1.187 25.643 -0.031 25.328 
2015M11 54.458 34.798 1.174 25.643 -0.031 24.498 
2015M12 55.020 35.501 1.176 25.643 -0.031 23.120 
2016M01 52.568 35.837 1.151 25.843 -0.031 22.729 
2016M02 52.787 34.841 1.196 25.843 -0.031 22.668 




MONTH PSCREDIT DEBT FINT GDP INSQUAL TBRATE 
2016M04 54.147 35.854 1.195 25.843 -0.031 22.765 
2016M05 54.505 35.496 1.200 25.843 -0.031 22.788 
2016M06 54.471 35.651 1.199 25.843 -0.031 22.802 
2016M07 55.366 34.892 1.208 25.843 -0.031 22.771 
2016M08 54.170 36.140 1.227 25.843 -0.031 22.771 
2016M09 53.448 37.159 1.215 25.843 -0.031 22.867 
2016M10 51.651 38.985 1.199 25.843 -0.031 22.761 
2016M11 50.000 40.664 1.181 25.843 -0.031 20.873 




Appendix B: Dataset for NIM Analysis  
MONTH NIM DEBT DEF EXCHR INF CONCEN EFF HHI RISK SIZE RQUAL 
2006M02 -0.055 7.980 -4.796 0.909 12.10 43.925 1.295 982.347 48.652 20.211 -0.072 
2006M03 0.175 8.017 -4.796 0.910 9.90 43.259 1.948 956.756 47.230 20.555 -0.072 
2006M04 0.164 8.263 -4.796 0.911 9.50 42.646 2.658 940.213 47.103 20.746 -0.072 
2006M05 0.178 8.173 -4.796 0.912 10.20 42.864 3.257 944.537 48.673 21.420 -0.072 
2006M06 0.167 7.873 -4.796 0.915 10.50 42.615 3.875 933.093 46.823 21.681 -0.072 
2006M07 0.185 8.082 -4.796 0.916 11.40 42.589 4.523 929.077 48.232 21.965 -0.072 
2006M08 0.185 8.435 -4.796 0.918 11.20 42.985 5.155 933.927 48.704 22.249 -0.072 
2006M09 0.186 8.697 -4.796 0.920 10.80 42.641 5.746 916.037 49.248 22.716 -0.072 
2006M10 0.191 8.631 -4.796 0.921 10.50 42.678 6.407 910.758 49.886 23.187 -0.072 
2006M11 0.255 8.565 -4.796 0.921 10.30 42.713 7.346 906.446 50.485 23.364 -0.072 
2006M12 0.185 8.580 -4.796 0.921 10.50 41.291 7.818 870.696 48.609 23.926 -0.072 
2007M01 0.163 7.925 -4.890 0.921 10.89 41.353 0.704 862.511 48.994 19.335 -0.072 
2007M02 0.140 7.718 -4.890 0.922 10.42 40.294 1.186 848.394 49.344 22.806 -0.072 
2007M03 0.205 8.091 -4.890 0.925 10.19 40.235 1.842 831.778 50.179 23.733 -0.072 
2007M04 0.101 8.060 -4.890 0.926 10.50 41.151 2.632 844.445 48.941 23.617 -0.072 
2007M05 0.239 7.999 -4.890 0.925 11.02 39.497 3.071 809.396 47.585 24.194 -0.072 
2007M06 0.141 8.065 -4.890 0.926 10.69 39.387 3.801 816.343 48.649 23.892 -0.072 
2007M07 0.216 8.859 -4.890 0.927 10.14 39.854 3.782 823.480 49.939 29.099 -0.072 
2007M08 0.175 9.618 -4.890 0.930 10.41 40.239 4.543 834.294 49.017 25.764 -0.072 
2007M09 0.213 8.451 -4.890 0.935 10.19 40.329 5.577 831.390 50.610 26.090 -0.072 
2007M10 0.197 8.607 -4.890 0.942 10.14 41.244 5.807 854.575 51.918 27.016 -0.072 
Table continues  
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MONTH NIM DEBT DEF EXCHR INF CONCEN EFF HHI RISK SIZE RQUAL 
2007M11 0.331 8.490 -4.890 0.952 11.40 40.989 6.557 840.506 51.815 28.195 -0.072 
2007M12 0.050 9.123 -4.890 0.959 12.75 41.288 6.907 837.957 53.190 28.882 -0.072 
2008M01 0.162 6.653 -6.549 0.969 12.81 41.243 0.658 834.587 52.637 22.160 -0.031 
2008M02 0.165 6.969 -6.549 0.972 13.21 41.048 0.994 827.406 52.855 26.359 -0.031 
2008M03 0.171 7.460 -6.549 0.977 13.79 40.406 1.676 820.828 54.790 27.266 -0.031 
2008M04 0.159 7.049 -6.549 0.981 15.29 40.266 2.245 808.946 53.558 28.117 -0.031 
2008M05 0.174 7.099 -6.549 0.993 16.88 40.516 3.084 817.461 54.739 27.096 -0.031 
2008M06 0.195 7.046 -6.549 1.011 18.41 39.099 4.034 784.874 55.633 27.387 -0.031 
2008M07 0.198 7.154 -6.549 1.040 18.31 40.612 4.669 811.800 56.318 27.657 -0.031 
2008M08 0.198 6.883 -6.549 1.080 18.10 39.737 5.293 795.751 55.901 27.927 -0.031 
2008M09 0.209 6.961 -6.549 1.109 17.89 39.301 5.843 789.068 55.328 28.685 -0.031 
2008M10 0.167 7.437 -6.549 1.138 17.30 38.862 6.278 786.881 57.447 29.337 -0.031 
2008M11 0.269 7.701 -6.549 1.165 17.44 37.728 7.107 752.949 58.072 29.455 -0.031 
2008M12 0.219 8.596 -6.549 1.194 18.13 37.545 7.715 744.339 55.805 30.965 -0.031 
2009M01 0.249 8.900 -6.813 1.240 19.86 37.292 0.663 752.990 55.067 33.725 0.091 
2009M02 0.182 9.182 -6.813 1.307 20.34 36.894 1.284 746.619 56.524 34.165 0.091 
2009M03 0.261 9.157 -6.813 1.352 20.53 36.984 1.811 749.474 58.452 36.534 0.091 
2009M04 0.277 8.786 -6.813 1.384 20.56 37.872 0.905 764.271 58.797 36.826 0.091 
2009M05 0.282 8.905 -6.813 1.410 20.06 36.709 3.224 746.432 57.975 36.600 0.091 
2009M06 0.289 8.951 -6.813 1.442 20.74 35.937 3.969 732.053 58.048 36.987 0.091 
2009M07 0.222 8.645 -6.813 1.461 20.50 34.894 4.223 704.819 56.668 40.194 0.091 
2009M08 0.300 9.394 -6.813 1.471 19.65 34.183 5.221 695.426 56.644 37.283 0.091 
2009M09 0.181 9.781 -6.813 1.460 18.37 35.225 5.923 710.175 55.423 37.561 0.091 
Table continues  
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MONTH NIM DEBT DEF EXCHR INF CONCEN EFF HHI RISK SIZE RQUAL 
2009M10 0.269 10.210 -6.813 1.454 18.04 34.395 6.513 693.982 53.350 38.166 0.091 
2009M11 0.427 11.549 -6.813 1.443 16.92 34.835 6.962 693.351 53.140 40.183 0.091 
2009M12 0.287 13.429 -6.813 1.435 15.97 34.849 7.789 692.593 49.282 39.968 0.091 
2010M01 0.190 9.505 -6.515 1.429 14.78 34.071 0.668 685.817 49.554 26.386 0.126 
2010M02 0.213 9.946 -6.515 1.430 14.23 34.026 1.129 675.513 49.383 31.021 0.126 
2010M03 0.246 9.658 -6.515 1.427 13.32 33.959 1.831 670.343 46.991 30.731 0.126 
2010M04 0.312 10.052 -6.515 1.422 11.66 33.484 2.444 667.202 47.344 31.099 0.126 
2010M05 0.239 9.952 -6.515 1.421 10.68 33.453 2.990 663.147 47.090 31.141 0.126 
2010M06 0.358 9.951 -6.515 1.423 9.52 32.185 3.716 630.994 47.749 30.979 0.126 
2010M07 0.226 9.911 -6.515 1.432 9.46 31.465 4.238 626.420 46.791 31.728 0.126 
2010M08 0.326 10.303 -6.515 1.434 9.44 31.443 5.082 623.613 47.504 31.167 0.126 
2010M09 0.259 10.543 -6.515 1.433 9.38 31.384 5.780 624.707 47.365 31.331 0.126 
2010M10 0.289 12.140 -6.515 1.431 9.38 29.026 5.442 592.515 45.642 37.244 0.126 
2010M11 0.224 11.544 -6.515 1.434 9.08 31.047 6.904 613.072 45.999 32.285 0.126 
2010M12 0.284 11.968 -6.515 1.445 8.58 30.379 7.349 599.958 45.953 33.756 0.126 
2011M01 0.195 9.802 -4.005 1.465 9.08 31.541 0.546 626.119 44.771 29.650 0.132 
2011M02 0.176 9.844 -4.005 1.509 9.16 31.088 1.128 622.095 41.569 29.700 0.132 
2011M03 0.196 10.275 -4.005 1.517 9.13 30.007 1.694 605.193 41.151 30.275 0.132 
2011M04 0.194 10.754 -4.005 1.518 9.02 31.543 2.162 622.599 38.000 31.804 0.132 
2011M05 0.213 10.757 -4.005 1.507 8.90 30.139 2.795 602.142 39.158 31.066 0.132 
2011M06 0.198 10.456 -4.005 1.506 8.59 30.331 3.427 603.215 39.776 31.327 0.132 
2011M07 0.203 10.162 -4.005 1.508 8.39 30.677 4.166 606.852 40.785 30.545 0.132 
2011M08 0.188 10.176 -4.005 1.511 8.41 29.618 4.661 596.729 41.442 30.641 0.132 
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2011M09 0.232 10.009 -4.005 1.524 8.40 30.590 5.210 605.999 41.351 31.915 0.132 
2011M10 0.246 9.535 -4.005 1.547 8.56 30.541 5.808 605.662 41.626 32.202 0.132 
2011M11 0.185 10.037 -4.005 1.561 8.55 30.570 6.260 604.363 42.391 32.862 0.132 
2011M12 0.210 10.754 -4.005 1.574 8.58 30.069 6.827 590.079 42.397 32.789 0.132 
2012M01 0.207 8.935 -11.483 1.615 8.73 29.507 0.605 583.806 43.293 29.575 0.130 
2012M02 0.147 8.768 -11.483 1.671 8.64 30.398 1.070 592.926 43.921 30.028 0.130 
2012M03 0.201 9.409 -11.483 1.700 8.78 29.897 1.647 597.486 45.874 29.900 0.130 
2012M04 0.193 9.213 -11.483 1.762 9.11 30.318 2.189 605.284 44.495 30.440 0.130 
2012M05 0.208 9.390 -11.483 1.841 9.34 30.733 2.770 605.063 45.268 30.763 0.130 
2012M06 0.179 9.189 -11.483 1.884 9.44 32.672 3.309 646.856 45.409 30.706 0.130 
2012M07 0.215 8.894 -11.483 1.915 9.54 32.793 3.911 646.018 47.916 30.490 0.130 
2012M08 0.230 9.220 -11.483 1.926 9.46 33.165 4.470 652.137 49.269 30.834 0.130 
2012M09 0.241 8.812 -11.483 1.908 9.43 32.937 4.964 650.918 50.407 31.498 0.130 
2012M10 0.281 9.700 -11.483 1.893 9.24 32.620 5.530 641.537 49.547 31.940 0.130 
2012M11 0.280 10.669 -11.483 1.903 9.31 31.664 6.137 624.433 48.188 32.151 0.130 
2012M12 0.328 11.550 -11.483 1.884 8.84 31.955 6.586 623.099 47.809 33.154 0.130 
2013M01 0.236 10.143 -9.921 1.896 10.09 31.877 0.558 629.462 48.461 28.961 0.084 
2013M02 0.221 9.710 -9.921 1.905 10.40 32.307 1.089 638.631 48.325 29.541 0.084 
2013M03 0.256 9.875 -9.921 1.924 10.78 31.330 1.583 627.084 47.736 32.084 0.084 
2013M04 0.248 10.151 -9.921 1.946 10.87 32.169 2.253 637.965 47.049 30.374 0.084 
2013M05 0.255 10.341 -9.921 1.962 11.02 30.914 2.797 620.338 49.076 30.853 0.084 
2013M06 0.274 10.544 -9.921 1.986 11.63 30.536 3.379 615.744 49.926 31.036 0.084 
2013M07 0.256 11.497 -9.921 1.991 11.79 30.780 3.771 626.038 48.532 32.379 0.084 
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2013M08 0.325 11.663 -9.921 1.994 11.45 30.265 4.381 614.978 47.696 32.667 0.084 
2013M09 0.289 11.724 -9.921 1.998 11.95 31.194 4.963 636.406 46.607 32.837 0.084 
2013M10 0.297 12.131 -9.921 2.007 13.09 30.104 5.517 613.239 46.722 33.198 0.084 
2013M11 0.297 12.795 -9.921 2.060 13.22 30.426 6.077 618.049 46.503 33.430 0.084 
2013M12 0.323 12.783 -9.921 2.111 13.50 30.395 6.565 617.285 47.076 34.093 0.084 
2014M01 0.270 10.873 -10.191 2.291 13.80 30.838 0.537 625.895 47.738 32.058 -0.007 
2014M02 0.259 11.040 -10.191 2.438 14.00 30.623 1.083 613.904 47.089 33.263 -0.007 
2014M03 0.306 10.847 -10.191 2.583 14.50 30.286 1.646 606.354 48.554 33.900 -0.007 
2014M04 0.285 9.686 -10.191 2.740 14.70 30.142 2.163 615.388 49.005 34.632 -0.007 
2014M05 0.298 10.262 -10.191 2.863 14.80 30.166 2.679 614.777 49.731 35.300 -0.007 
2014M06 0.309 9.595 -10.191 2.982 15.00 29.230 3.220 595.119 50.272 35.861 -0.007 
2014M07 0.321 9.474 -10.191 3.019 15.30 28.702 3.796 585.459 50.170 36.081 -0.007 
2014M08 0.345 10.254 -10.191 3.065 15.90 28.472 4.474 587.721 49.492 36.091 -0.007 
2014M09 0.368 10.710 -10.191 3.182 16.50 28.001 5.099 575.703 49.779 36.353 -0.007 
2014M10 0.370 11.067 -10.191 3.196 16.90 28.508 5.654 583.722 48.449 37.107 -0.007 
2014M11 0.364 11.559 -10.191 3.197 17.00 27.393 6.072 571.110 48.500 38.638 -0.007 
2014M12 0.384 11.789 -10.191 3.197 17.00 26.498 7.035 551.899 46.857 38.201 -0.007 
2015M01 0.341 9.649 -6.891 3.218 16.40 26.800 0.553 559.094 47.390 34.773 -0.031 
2015M02 0.274 9.651 -6.891 3.361 16.50 26.548 1.156 548.338 47.202 35.466 -0.031 
2015M03 0.275 9.576 -6.891 3.591 16.60 26.698 1.784 553.484 48.806 35.313 -0.031 
2015M04 0.374 9.153 -6.891 3.812 16.80 26.609 2.337 555.279 49.901 36.748 -0.031 
2015M05 0.333 8.984 -6.891 3.893 16.90 26.580 2.953 550.692 50.191 36.536 -0.031 
2015M06 0.363 9.063 -6.891 4.186 17.10 26.429 3.436 546.004 50.867 38.543 -0.031 
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2015M07 0.319 8.789 -6.891 3.532 17.90 26.692 3.969 551.859 50.925 39.490 -0.031 
2015M08 0.346 9.000 -6.891 3.859 17.30 26.627 4.644 546.528 50.042 38.972 -0.031 
2015M09 0.350 8.996 -6.891 3.782 17.40 26.269 5.188 536.599 50.199 39.459 -0.031 
2015M10 0.355 9.777 -6.891 3.764 17.40 25.888 5.724 535.511 49.017 40.036 -0.031 
2015M11 0.318 10.596 -6.891 3.790 17.60 25.490 6.234 529.945 48.199 40.476 -0.031 
2015M12 0.529 11.179 -6.891 3.795 17.70 24.545 7.081 512.448 47.494 40.710 -0.031 
2016M01 0.290 9.413 -7.856 3.806 18.99 24.736 0.549 514.803 47.938 35.913 -0.031 
2016M02 0.287 9.007 -7.856 3.871 18.47 24.896 1.127 519.856 48.072 36.734 -0.031 
2016M03 0.314 9.331 -7.856 3.851 19.22 25.217 1.696 520.860 46.760 36.921 -0.031 
2016M04 0.316 9.652 -7.856 3.820 18.71 25.572 2.271 524.400 47.841 37.043 -0.031 
2016M05 0.330 9.748 -7.856 3.811 18.89 25.096 2.857 521.768 47.458 37.252 -0.031 
2016M06 0.384 10.050 -7.856 3.882 18.40 24.405 3.421 503.202 48.819 37.779 -0.031 
2016M07 0.307 9.703 -7.856 3.939 16.70 23.808 4.057 501.667 47.863 37.338 -0.031 
2016M08 0.315 10.339 -7.856 3.945 16.90 24.433 4.623 519.338 48.315 37.679 -0.031 
2016M09 0.329 10.877 -7.856 3.956 17.20 25.143 5.227 523.498 47.640 38.137 -0.031 
2016M10 0.353 11.914 -7.856 3.967 15.80 24.493 5.825 517.887 45.966 38.835 -0.031 
2016M11 0.407 12.950 -7.856 3.972 15.50 24.432 6.417 515.192 44.441 39.595 -0.031 





Appendix C: Results of ARDL Analysis for PSCREDIT  
Dependent Variable: PSCREDIT 
Method: ARDL   
Date: 10/25/17 Time: 18:43 
Sample (adjusted): 2006M05 2016M12 
Included observations: 128 after adjustments 
Maximum dependent lags: 4 (Automatic selection) 
Model selection method: Akaike info criterion (AIC) 
Dynamic regressors (4 lags, automatic): DEBT FINT(-1) GDP INSQUAL 
TBRATE 
Fixed regressors: C 
Number of models evaluated: 12500 
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 1, 0, 0, 3, 1) 
Note: final equation sample is larger than selection sample 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.*  
PSCREDIT(-1) 0.418184 0.079382 5.268001 0.0000 
DEBT -0.90953 0.049252 -18.46701 0.0000 
DEBT(-1) 0.338745 0.094218 3.595336 0.0005 
FINT(-1) 3.453523 2.153556 1.603637 0.1115 
GDP -0.405341 0.160574 -2.524322 0.0129 
INSQUAL -1.833795 4.228972 -0.433627 0.6654 
INSQUAL(-1) -0.765759 5.781284 -0.132455 0.8949 
INSQUAL(-2) 13.49904 5.755393 2.345459 0.0207 
INSQUAL(-3) -12.73471 4.203694 -3.02941 0.003 
TBRATE -0.156803 0.05919 -2.64916 0.0092 
TBRATE(-1) 0.147196 0.056539 2.603462 0.0104 
C 58.18789 8.474535 6.866204 0.0000 
R-squared 0.981575 Mean dependent var 50.10312 
Adjusted R-squared 0.979828 S.D. dependent var 4.823689 
S.E. of regression 0.685097 Akaike info criterion 2.170548 
Sum squared resid 54.44553 Schwarz criterion 2.437925 
Log-likelihood -126.915 Hannan-Quinn criteria. 2.279185 
F-statistic 561.8093 Durbin-Watson stat 1.928993 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000000    




Appendix D: Results of ARDL Analysis for NIM  
Dependent Variable: NIM 
Method: ARDL 
Date: 01/21/18 Time: 21:22 
Sample (adjusted): 2006M06 2016M12 
Included observations: 127 after adjustments 
Maximum dependent lags: 4 (Automatic selection) 
Model selection method: Akaike info criterion (AIC) 
Dynamic regressors (4 lags, automatic): DEBT(-1) DEF EXCHR INF 
CONCEN EFF RISK SIZE RQUAL  
Fixed regressors: C 
Number of models evaluated: 7812500 
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 3, 0, 0, 0, 4, 3, 0, 4, 0) 
Note: final equation sample is larger than selection sample 
Variable Coefficient 
Std. 
Error t-Statistic Prob.* 
NIM(-1) -0.336792 0.087791 -3.83627 0.0002 
DEBT(-1) 0.014292 0.008265 1.729239 0.0868 
DEBT(-2) 0.023035 0.010381 2.219037 0.0287 
DEBT(-3) 0.003498 0.009739 0.359224 0.7202 
DEBT(-4) -0.016166 0.007326 -2.20667 0.0296 
DEF 0.000726 0.002144 0.338674 0.7356 
EXCHR 0.089497 0.01961 4.563841 0.0000 
INF -0.004903 0.002589 -1.89418 0.0610 
CONCEN -0.016704 0.005306 -3.14825 0.0022 
CONCEN(-1) 0.008632 0.0062 1.392136 0.1669 
CONCEN(-2) 0.007213 0.00643 1.121779 0.2646 
CONCEN(-3) -0.000807 0.006067 -0.13295 0.8945 
CONCEN(-4) 0.01034 0.005351 1.932344 0.0561 
EFF 0.004991 0.002515 1.984751 0.0499 
EFF(-1) 0.006235 0.003282 1.89985 0.0603 
EFF(-2) -0.004221 0.003379 -1.24898 0.2145 
EFF(-3) -0.003881 0.00272 -1.4266 0.1568 
RISK 0.005074 0.002384 2.127853 0.0358 
SIZE 0.008604 0.002379 3.616583 0.0005 
SIZE(-1) -0.000843 0.003031 -0.27798 0.7816 
SIZE(-2) -0.006751 0.003082 -2.19031 0.0308 
SIZE(-3) -0.003446 0.003025 -1.13927 0.2573 
SIZE(-4) 8.67E-03 0.002438 3.557524 0.0006 
RQUAL 0.090602 0.124142 0.729832 0.4672 
C -0.757357 0.175976 -4.30374 0.00000 
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R-squared 0.811112 Mean dependent var 0.2577 
Adjusted R-squared 0.766667 S.D. dependent var 0.074973 
S.E. of regression 0.036215 Akaike info criterion -3.62418 
Sum squared resid 0.133779 Schwarz criterion -3.0643 
Log likelihood 255.1352 Hannan-Quinn criteria -3.3967 
F-statistic 18.250050 Durbin-Watson stat 2.064951 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00000     
*Note: p-values and any subsequent tests do not account for model selection. 
 
